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I. INTRODUCTION
The alarming rate of overweight and obesity in U.S. children,
adolescents, and adults has focused attention on the marketing of unhealthy
149
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foods and beverages.' Adolescents are heavily targeted in marketing for
beverages, including sugary drinks like soda.2 They have higher rates of
overweight and obesity than children less than five years of age, and are on
a path to have a shorter life expectancy than their parents. This article
analyzes soda marketing through the lens of teen biological and
psychological development, marketing tactics commonly used with teen
audiences, and consumer protection law principles.
II. TEENS AND THE OBESITY CRISIS
The prevalence of obesity among U.S. adolescents from twelve to
nineteen years of age has increased steadily from 5% in 1980 to 18% in
2008.4 Researchers have identified sugary drink consumption as a
particularly important driver of the epidemic. 5 Obese adolescents are more
likely to have high cholesterol or high blood pressure, putting them at
greater risk for cardiovascular disease. 6 Obesity also puts adolescents at'
greater risk for diabetes,' and the percentage of teenagers testing positive
for diabetes or pre-diabetes more than doubled from 9% in 1999-2000 to
* Richard A. Daynard, Ph.D., J.D., is a University Distinguished Professor at
Northeastern University School of Law.
** Brendan Burke received his J.D. from Northeastern University School of Law in
May 2013
*** Cara L. Wilking, J.D., is Senior Staff Attorney at the Public Health Advocacy
Institute. The authors would like to thank Rachel Rodgers and Andrew Cheyne for their
helpful comments on portions of this article and Dale Willett for research assistance.
1. Cornelia Pechmann et al., Impulsive and Self-Conscious: Adolescents'
Vulnerability to Advertising and Promotion, 24 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 202, 202
(2005).
2. Id.
3. Amir Tirosh et al., Adolescent BMI Trajectory and Risk ofDiabetes Versus
Coronary Disease, 364 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1315, 1316 (2011); Cynthia Ogden &
Margaret Carroll, Prevalence of Obesity Among Children and Adolescents: United
States, Trends 1963-1965 Through 2007-2008, NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS
1,1(2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity child_ 07_08
/obesity _child 07_08.pdf.
4. Ogden & Carroll, supra note 3, at 1.
5. David S. Ludwig et al., Relation Between Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened
Drinks and Childhood Obesity: A Prospective, Observational Analysis, 357 THE
LANCET 505, 507 (2001), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/lancet.pdf.
6. David S. Freedman et al., Cardiovascular Risk Factors and Excess Adiposity
Among Overweight Children and Adolescents: The Bogalusa Heart Study, 150 J.
PEDIATRICS 12, 13-15 (2007).
7. Tirosh et al., supra note 3, at 1319-20.
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23% in 2007-2008.8 Over their life spans, children and adolescents who
are obese are likely to be obese as adults.9 This means these adolescents
are more at risk for health problems such as heart disease, type 2 diabetes,
stroke, certain cancers, osteoarthritis,10 and end-stage renal disease."
III. THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Compared to adults, adolescents' judgment and decision-making
abilities are characterized by developmentally-specific attributes including
neurological, psychosocial, and cognitive, which render them vulnerable to
risky-decision making.' 2 Developmental differences make it more difficult
for adolescents to make decisions in their best long-term interests, thereby
making them more vulnerable targets for marketers.13 Research shows that
adolescents may be particularly drawn to products that provide "immediate
gratification, thrills, and/or social status."' 4 Marketers craft advertising
campaigns to capitalize on adolescent characteristics such as their
susceptibility to peer influence, impulsive behavior, and their focus on the
short-term." The marketing of addictive products and substances like
alcohol and cigarettes, and foods and beverages high in sugar, fat, salt, and
caffeine to adolescents raises special public health concerns because of the
potential for adverse long-term health effects.16
8. Roni C. Rabin, Diabetes on the Rise Among Teenagers, N.Y.TIMES (May 21,
2012), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/diabetes-on-the-rise-among-
teenagers/.
9. Shumei S. Guo & William C. Chumlea, Tracking of Body Mass Index in
Children in Relation to Overweight in Adulthood, 70 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 145S,
146S (1999).
10. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, THE
SURGEON GENERAL'S VISION FOR A HEALTHY AND FIT NATION: 2010 2-4 (2010),
available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/initiatives/healthy-fit-nation/obesity
vision2010.pdf.
11. Asaf Vivante et al., Body Mass Index in 1.2 Million Adolescents and Risk for
End-Stage Renal Disease, 172 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1644, 1647 (2012).
12. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason ofAdolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty,
58 AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1012-13 (2003), available at http://humanservices.vermont.
gov/boards-committees/cfcpp/publications/publications-2007/macarthur/publications
/Less _Guilty byReason_of Adolescence.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Pechmann et al., supra note 1, at 202.
15. See DAVID A. KESSLER, THE END OF OVEREATING: TAKING CONTROL OF THE
INSATIABLE AMERICAN APPETITE 240 (2009). See generally FOOD AND ADDICTION: A
COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK (Kelly D. Brownell & Mark S. Gold eds., 2012).
16. Id.
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A. Brain Development
Brain development and hormonal changes have a profound effect on
adolescent behavioral patterns and decision-making.17  Changes to the
adolescent brain occur due to age and experience, and are independent of
puberty.' 8 The prefrontal cortex acts in a decision-making capacity using
prior experience to guide behaviors;' 9 specifically, it plays an important
role in inhibiting responses to stimuli so as to promote planned behavior.2 0
Importantly, the prefrontal cortex does not fully develop until late
adolescence or early adulthood.2' When fully developed, the inhibitory
effect of the prefrontal cortex helps control emotional responses to external
stimuli, and thus regulates impulsive behavior.22
Adolescents also experience an increased level of circulating
hormones.23 These hormones act on the amygdala, the part of the brain
responsible for transforming experience into emotion.24 Elevated levels of
hormones in the body have a number of excitatory effects on adolescents,
including hypersensitivity to stressors and strong emotional responses to
their environments.25 The combination of elevated hormone levels and an
underdeveloped prefrontal cortex make it harder for adolescents to override
the excitatory emotional responses of the amygdala, resulting in poor
impulse control. 26 "The mismatch in excitatory drive and inhibitory control
during early adolescence has been likened to 'starting the engine with an
unskilled driver."' 27 An inability to exercise inhibitory control of their
emotions leads adolescents to exhibit reckless and risky behavior more
frequently than either adults or children.2 8 This means that adolescents are
much less likely than adults to engage in responsible decision-making. 29 At




21. Id. at 206.
22. Id. at 203.
23. Id. at 205.
24. Id. at 203.
25. Id at 205.
26. Id
27. Id (quoting Ronald E. Dahl, Adolescent Brain Development: A Period of
Vulnerabilities and Opportunities - Keynote Address, 1021 ANNALs N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1,
17 (2004)).




the same time they are more likely to experience greater emotional
volatility, further disrupting their ability to control their impulses.30
B. Psychosocial Development
Adolescents also face psychosocial challenges, because psychosocial
maturity continues to develop into adulthood.3 1  Social immaturity most
often leads to feelings of self-consciousness and embarrassment.3 2 These
feelings occur at the same time that adolescents face the challenges of
forming a personal identity and fitting in socially with their peers. Thus,
adolescents are very susceptible to peer influences. 3 4 Two of the primary
processes implicated in peer influence are social comparison and social
conformity.35 Social comparison is the process through which adolescents
use the behavior of others to measure their own behavior.3 6 Upward social
comparisons, that is, comparisons with targets who are perceived to be
superior role models (for example, more popular adolescents), can be
thought of as a means of finding ways for self-improvement. 37  Social
conformity is a group process through which adolescents tend to adapt their
behavior and attitudes to that of their peers so as to earn acceptance.38
Direct peer influence and the desire for peer approval may lead adolescents
to rely on the consumption of particular brands to project a positive image
39to their peers.
C. Characteristic Teen Decision-Making
The notion of a "rational teenager" may seem laughable to many.
Teen decision-making behavior, however, makes perfect, rational sense
when viewed from the perspective of a teen. Adolescents do perform risk
to reward calculations when they make decisions; it's just that due to their
30. Id. at 207-08.
31. LAURENCE STEINBERG, JUVENILES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: NEW EVIDENCE FROM
RESEARCH ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT, 4 (2007), available at http://www.family
impactseminars.org/s wifis25c0l.pdf.
32. Pechmann et al., supra note 1, at 209.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 230 (1995).
3 6. Id.
37. Jerry Suls et al., Social Comparison: Why, With Whom, and With What Effect,
11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 159, 161 (2002).
38. Scott et al., supra note 35, at 230.
39. Pechmann et al., supra note 1, at 210.
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psychological and psychosocial immaturity, their ideas of risks and rewards
may sharply differ from those of adults. 40 For example, adolescents focus
less on protection against losses than on opportunities for gains, meaning
they are driven by rewards and not by risks.41 In addition, adolescents'
temporal perspective 4 2 tends to put more weight on short-term
consequences than on future outcomeS43 leading to impulsive and risky
behavior." Heightened susceptibility to peer influence, the need for social
acceptance, and the focus on short-term rewards makes it more difficult for
an adolescent to make responsible choices. This is especially true when the
full negative consequences of their choices may not manifest themselves
until later in life.45 As a result, youth engage in more frequent risky
behavior such as unprotected sex, drunk driving, and criminal conduct.46
IV. TEEN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO MARKETING
Adolescents are vulnerable targets for marketers. Protecting youth
from marketing of harmful products is a public health strategy because
"adolescents may be especially tempted to use heavily advertised, popular
brands of alcohol and cigarettes because these brands may fulfill their
needs for immediate gratification and thrill seeking and their need for high-
status consumption symbols.""7  Adolescence also is an important age
because teens have a higher likelihood of developing an addiction than
adults.48 Unhealthy foods, similar to alcohol and cigarettes, put teens at
great risk for chronic disease later in life.49 By the time adolescents reach
an age of mature decision-making, they may have formed unhealthy food
preferences and eating habits that will be extremely difficult to change.
A popular text about marketing to youth notes that "[e]motions are
driving tweens - and so are brands."5 o Marketers craft advertising
40. Scott et al., supra note 35, at 233.
41. Id.at231.
42. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 12, at 1012.
43. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Development Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
137, 164 (1997).
44. Id. at 164-65.
45. Id. at 164.
46. Id. at 162-63.
47. Pechmann et al., supra note 1, at 212.
48. Id. at 202.
49. Freedman et al., supra note 6, at 13-15.
50. MARTIN LINDSTROM & PATRICIA B. SEYBOLD, BRANDCHILD: REMARKABLE




campaigns to capitalize on emotional desires for "immediate gratification,
thrills, and/or social status." Food and beverage marketers tailor their
campaigns to maximize adolescent consumption of unhealthy foods and
beverages.
A. Soda Marketing to Teens
Beverage companies put their money where their mouths are when it
comes to marketing to teens. Companies invest heavily in developing
specialized campaigns to capture the teen market and talk openly about
their teen focus. As Sarah Robb O'Hagan, Chief Marketing Officer for
PepsiCo's Gatorade products stated during an interview, "[w]hen you're in
your teen years is when you develop your sort of deep emotional
connection with things . . . So it's such an important time for us [PepsiCo]
to begin the brand relationship with the consumer. We've always seen
[teens] as our focus." 52
Soda industry self-regulation does not cover marketing to teens. The
American Beverage Association, the trade association for the non-alcoholic
beverage industry, has pledged to abide by a Global Policy on Marketing to
Children, but it only applies to children twelve and under. This remains
the case despite skyrocketing rates of adolescent overweight and obesity
and scientific literature demonstrating that adolescents' judgment and
decision-making abilities are underdeveloped compared to adults.54
In 2006, the food and beverage industry reported $1.08 billion spent
marketing to adolescents. 5 That figure decreased slightly to $1.01 billion
in 2009." In 2006, carbonated beverage companies spent a total of $508
million promoting their products to adolescents, making them the most
51. Pechmann et al., supra note 1, at 202.
52. Jennifer Zegler, Primed for Performance: Gatorade Refocuses on Sports
Performance Innovation, BEVERAGE INDUSTRY, June 11, 2010, http://www.
bevindustry.com/articles/cover-story-gatorade-refocuses-on-sports-performance-
innovation?v-preview.
53. INT'L COUNCIL OF BEVERAGES Ass'Ns, GUIDELINES ON MARKETING TO
CHILDREN (2008), available at http://www.icba-net.org/files/resources/icba-marketing-
to-children-guidelines.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013); Press Release, Am. Beverage
Ass'n, ABA Reaffirms Commitment to Reduce Marketing to Children (July 29, 2008),
http://www.ameribev.org/news-media/news-releases-statements/more/106/.
54. See Pechmann et al., supra note 1, at 202; INT'L COUNCIL OF BEVERAGES
Ass'NS, supra note 53.
55. FED. TRADE COMM'N, A REVIEW OF FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND




JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
aggressive food or beverage marketers to teens.Y Fast-food restaurants
came in second, spending approximately $140 million on advertising to
teens.58 In 2009, carbonated beverage companies were still the most
aggressive marketers to adolescents, despite a decrease in spending to $382
million in advertising to that group. 59 Fast-food restaurants increased their
advertising targeting teens in 2009, spending $185 million.60 To put this
into perspective, less than 1% of expenditures on advertising all food and
beverage to children and teens during the same period were for fruits and
vegetables.6 1
Part of the reason for the decline in food and beverage advertising
expenditures is that companies rely more heavily on less expensive, new
62media channels, such as the Internet. For example, in 2006, new media
accounted for only 4% of youth-directed marketing by food companies. 63
In 2009, that number increased to 7%.4 Carbonated beverage companies
spent the most of any food category on new media targeted at teens,
spending $22.6 million in 2009, a 3.4% increase from 2006.65
Multi-layered digital campaigns combining social networks, mobile
services, and online videos 66 allow food companies to seamlessly weave
advertisements in with content "in an interactive digital environment that
pervades [teens'] personal and social lives."6 Food and beverage
marketers use stealth or viral marketing techniques to mask the commercial
origin of marketing messages created by companies. And more and
more, marketers rely upon user-generated content whereby teen consumers
are encouraged to create videos, "like" a product on Facebook, or create
content on other social media platforms that integrates food and beverage
brands and can be circulated to their peers. 6 9





62. Id. at 10
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 16.
66. Kathryn C. Montgomery & Jeff Chester, Interactive Food and Beverage
Marketing: Targeting Adolescents in the Digital Age, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S 18,
S19 (2009).
67. Id. at S23.
68. Id. at S22.
69. Id. at S21.
156 [VOL. 9
LIVE FOR NOW
In 2006, Internet food and beverage advertisements produced 9 billion
impressions on teen-oriented websites. 0 Further, "two-thirds of carbonated
beverage ad impressions and one-third of [fast-food restaurant] ad
impressions appeared to have been teen-directed." 7 1 In 2009, teen-oriented
websites generated more than 2.3 billion display ad impressions for food
products.72 The reason for the decrease appears to be the categorization of
MySpace, which ceased qualifying as a teen-oriented website in 2007.73
Regardless, some food companies view general-audience websites such as
Facebook and MySpace as an important medium to target teens.74
Food retailers that sell candy, beverages, snacks, and ready-to-eat
foods, such as convenience stores, also are keen to capture the teen market.
A 2005 report by Coca-Cola called "Convenience Teens" encouraged
convenience store owners to cultivate teen customers. 7 5 The report found
that while teens differ from older shoppers by spending less per visit, they
tend to make more frequent convenience store visits thereby making up for
the lower amount spent per visit.76 The report noted that by encouraging
teenagers to shop at convenience stores now, those stores (and by extension
brands like Coca-Cola) will gain the teens' loyalty for future years.77 Soon
those teenagers will be in their twenties, and they will have more
disposable income and will continue to be valuable convenience store
customers.78
B. PepsiCo Tells Teens to "Live for Now"
While examples of food and beverage campaigns targeting
adolescents abound,79 PepsiCo's 2012 global marketing campaign "Live
70. FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A





72. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 71, at D-8.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. CLICKIN RESEARCH, CONVENIENCE TEENS: BUILDING LOYALTY WITH THE NEXT
GENERATION 1-2 (2005), available at https://www.ccrrc.org/wp-content/uploads
/2012/09/Convenience TeensStudy 2005.pdf.
76. Id at 4-5.
77. Id. at 38.
78. Id at 5.
79. See, e.g. DEWMOCRACY, http://digitalads.org/how-youre-targeted/case-
studies/dewmocracy/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013); DORITOs 626, http:// digitalads.org
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for Now" is emblematic. Faced with declining sales of its traditional cola
drink in the U.S., the campaign seeks to make PepsiCo's full sugar cola
beverages more relevant by tying them to music and entertainment trends.so
When asked about the Live for Now campaign, Brad Jakeman, President of
Global Enjoyment and Chief Creative Officer for PepsiCo stated that "[t]he
category [carbonated soft drinks] is in decline in this country ... It lost the
cool quotient. If there's any brand that can inspire the category again, it's
Pepsi."8'
Al Carey, CEO of PepsiCo Americas Beverages, made the adolescent
focus of the Live for Now campaign clear to investors when he stated that
"it's about sports and music, excitement and youth, and I think it is the
right kind of feel for this Pepsi business."82 The campaign emphasizes pop
culture and entertainment by partnering with celebrities from sports and
music, including pop singer Beyonce, and sponsoring major events like the
National Football League's Super Bowl halftime show. The campaign also
uses "Pepsi Pulse," a dedicated webpage that serves as the social media
nexus for the campaign.8 3 The Live for Now campaign is so teen-focused
that it has had to be decoded for older investors.84 At one symposium, after
investors were shown a Live for Now commercial the moderator told the
audience, "for those of you who are not in tune with popular culture, that
was [pop singer] Nicki Minaj."8 PepsiCo's CFO then shared that he too
had to be told who Nicki Minaj was because he doesn't "have teenage
girls."86
/how-youre-targeted/case-studies/doritos-626 (last visited Oct. 5, 2013); McDONALD'S
AVATAR, http://digitalads.org/how-youre-targeted/case-studies /mcdonalds-avatar/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2013); MYCOKE, http://digitalads.org/how-youre-targeted/case-studies
/mycoke (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
80. Natalie Zmuda, Pepsi Tackles Identity Crisis; After Fielding Biggest Consumer-
Research Push in Decades, Brand Settles on 'Now' Global Positioning, ADVERTISING
AGE, May 7, 2012, http://adage.com/article/news/pepsi-tackles-identity-crisis/234586/.
8 1. Id.
82. Edited Transcript of PEP-Deutsche Bank Global Consumer Conference (June 20,
2012) 4, available at http://www.pepsico.com/Download/PEP-Transcript-2012-06-
20.pdf [hereinafter Al Carey Transcript].
83. PEPSI PULSE, http://www.pepsi.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
84. Edited Transcript of PEP - PepsiCo at Goldman Sachs Consumer Products






V. CONSUMER PROTECTION CASES INVOLVING TEENS AND
BRANDING
State and federal consumer protection laws outlaw deceptive and
unfair marketing. Marketing campaigns can focus on the qualities,
characteristics, or benefits of a product or seek to create associations
between a product and a consumer's desire to be happy, wealthy, healthy,
popular, etc.87 These two approaches to advertising were described at the
turn of the twentieth century as "reason-why advertising" and "atmosphere
advertising," respectively.88  Atmosphere advertising is now commonly
referred to simply as "branding," and is grounded in the basic principle that
consumers generally define themselves by their possessions.89
Consumer protection law actions may be necessary to denormalize
and discontinue soda marketing to minors. The current consumer
protection legal framework is somewhat ill-suited to protect vulnerable
consumers from branding with a focus on building positive associations
and developing attachment with a brand as opposed to marketing that
focuses on factual characteristics like taste, quality of ingredients, price, or
volume. In the 2000's, alcohol marketing with appeal to minors was
unsuccessfully challenged as a deceptive trade practice in a number of
states.90 In the 1990's, R.J. Reynolds' Joe Camel campaign for tobacco
was challenged as an unfair trade practice under state and federal consumer
protection law and subsequently outlawed by the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA). 91 In this section we summarize existing consumer
protection case law concerning brand-awareness style marketing campaigns
for harmful products targeting minors.
87. MICHAEL BLANDING, THE COKE MACHINE: THE DIRTY TRUTH BEHIND THE
WORLD'S FAVORITE SoFT DRINK 41 (2010).
88. Id.
89. BRAND IMAGE, http://www.asiamarketresearch.com/glossary/brand-image.htm
(last visited Oct. 5,2013).
90. See generally Alston v. Advanced Brands & Importing Co., 494 F.3d 562 (6th
Cir. 2007).
91. MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 14 (1998), available at http://www.naag.org
/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msapdf/MSA%20with%2OSig%20Pages%20and%2OEx
hibits.pdf/file view (follow "Click here to get the file" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 23,
2013).
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A. Branding with Appeal to Minors as a Deceptive Trade Practice
In general, a deceptive trade practice is a practice that is likely to
mislead a reasonable consumer in a way that is material to a transaction. 9 2
Deception can involve an affirmative misrepresentation or a material
omission of facts.93 When analyzing a potentially deceptive trade practice,
courts typically view the allegedly illegal conduct from the perspective of a
reasonable member of the target audience.94 A wide range of alcohol
industry players, including the Beer Institute and major brewers and
distillers like Coors and Bacardi, were the subject of a series of private
lawsuits by parents alleging that the industry had unlawfully marketed its
products to appeal to their minor children. 95  As the result of this
marketing, youths allegedly spent family funds to purchase alcoholic
beverages.96 In short, plaintiffs argued that the alcohol industry's
"advertising [wa]s responsible for the illegal (underage) purchase of
alcoholic beverages by minor children."9 7 The suits sought restitution for
family funds spent by underage youth to purchase alcohol and injunctive
relief barring the industry from using marketing tactics with appeal to
98minors.
Plaintiffs alleged that the alcohol industry engaged in a marketing
scheme designed to increase underage drinking including: a) developing
and promoting beverages specifically designed to appeal to new and
underage drinkers, often called "alcopops"; b) advertising in media that
minors read, see, or use in disproportionate numbers; c) developing
promotional themes specifically tailored to appeal to minors, including the
portrayal of children flouting authority, and alcohol-enhanced sexual
prowess; d) market research to target promotional and advertising efforts at
children; e) internet marketing designed to attract and target children,
including maintaining web sites that offer games, contests, and other
content designed to appeal to children; f) using cartoons, logos, and
promotional items such as apparel and toys, and using actors, models, and




95. See generally Alston, 494 F.3d at 562; Goodwin v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc.,
No. BC310105, 2005 WL 280330 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005); Hakki v. Zirna Co.,
No. 03-9183, 2006 WL 852126 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2006); Tomberlin v. Adolph
Coors Co., 742 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2007).
96. See generally Tomberlin, 742 N.W.2d at 74.
97. Alston, 494 F.3d at 564.




spokespersons who appear younger than the legal drinking age so that the
promotions appeal to minors; and g) sponsoring promotional events
designed to appeal to minors, including beach and spring break "parties." 99
These complaints were all ultimately dismissed either for lack of
standing or for failure to state a claim.'00
While standing varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, at its most
basic standing requires that a plaintiff suffered an injury to a legally
protected interest.' 0' The primary injury alleged by parent plaintiffs was
the loss of family funds incurred when their children made illegal
purchases of alcohol.10 2 Courts rejected the theory that a loss of family
funds could provide a form of economic injury which would give the
parents standing to sue.103 As one judge noted, "the Court is not aware of
any legal doctrine that would recognize a parent's legal possessory interest
in the monies given to and spent by their children. Once the Plaintiffs gave
money to their children, that money is viewed as a gift and thereby a
possession of the children." 04 Therefore, only the children themselves
could have had standing-not their parents. The Sixth Circuit took its
standing analysis even further, opining that in order for the parents to have
standing they would have to seek to recover "from their children the money
those children converted from . . . [them] in order to violate the law
prohibiting underage purchase of alcohol." 05  In other words, under the
theory presented in the complaints, possible defendants included the
underage children who illegally purchased alcohol, but not the alcohol
industry.
All of the cases were dismissed without leave to amend.' 06 Plaintiffs
were not granted leave to amend any of the complaints because courts
99. Alston v. Advanced Brands & Importing Co., No. Civ. 05-72629, 2006 WL
1374514 at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2006), vacated and remanded, 494 F.3d 562 (6th
Cir. 2007).
100. See, e.g., Alston, 494 F.3d at 562 (denying standing for lack of causation or
redressability); Goodwin, 2005 WL 280330 (denying standing for lack of injury and
failing to allege a violation of the California consumer protection law); Hakki, 2006
WL 852126 (denying standing for lack of injury); Tomberlin v. Adolph Coors Co., No.
05-CV-545, 2006 WL 4808298 (Wis. Cir. Feb. 16, 2006) (trial order) (denying
standing for lack of injury or causation).
101. Tomberlin, 2006 WL 4808298.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Eisenberg v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2006 WL 290308 at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 2,
2006), vacated and remanded sub nom. Alston, 494 F.3d at 562.
105. Alston, 494 F.3d at 565.
106. Alston, 494 F.3d 562, 566; Goodwin v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., No.
BC310105, 2005 WL 280330 at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005); Hakki v. Zima Co.,
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found that even if teens were named as plaintiffs, they could not maintain
claims for violations of state consumer protection laws.' 07  Plaintiffs
alleged that alcohol marketing with appeal to minors was unfair and
deceptive and that it violated certain enumerated deceptive trade
practices. 0 8 The two enumerated practices plaintiffs alleged in the various
cases were "representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or qualities that they do not
have" and that the marketing contained omissions of material facts that
tended to mislead or deceive teen consumers.' 0 9
With respect to representing that certain alcohol marketing tactics
conveyed benefits that alcohol does not have, one judge reasoned that there
exists "no duty . . . to disclose . . . either [the] inherent dangers of
consuming alcoholic beverages, or that alcohol would not make fantasies
come to life.""i0 Courts found that "qualities that are not affirmations of
fact such as the fun, sexiness, popularity, social acceptance, athleticism,
etc. that drinking alcohol can bring" amounted to mere puffery and
therefore were not actionable as deceptive trade practices."' The fact that
it is illegal to sell alcohol to minors also entered into the analysis." 2 The
court reasoned that the illegality of underage drinking makes it common
knowledge that alcohol is a dangerous product."13
The crux of plaintiffs material omission claim was that "because of
their age, minors are unable to appreciate or understand the deleterious
effects of alcohol, or that Defendant's ads that show 'unrestricted
merriment' after consuming alcohol are not true.""14 This argument also
was rejected. One judge reasoned that:
[t]o assert that minors, because of their age, cannot
understand that alcohol does not, in fact, make everyone
No. 03-9183, 2006 WL 852126 at *5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2006); Tomberlin, 2006
WL 4808298 at *5.
107. Goodwin, 2005 WL 280330 at *4; Hakki, 2006 WL 852126 at *3; Tomberlin,
2006 WL 4808298 at *5.
108. Alston, 2006 WL 1374514 at *5.
109. Id.
110. Id.at*6.
111. Id. (citing Overton v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 517 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994)); see also Goodwin, 2005 WL 280330 at *5.
112. Alston, 2006 WL 1374514 at *6; Goodwin, 2005 WL 280330 at *4.
113. Alston, 494 F.3d. at 565; Goodwin, 2005 WL 280330 at *5; Hakki v. Zima Co.,
No. 03-9183, 2006 WL 852126 at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2006); Tomberlin v.
Adolph Coors Co., No. 05-CV-545, 2006 WL 4808298 (Wis. Cir. Feb. 16, 2006) (trial
order) .
114. Alston, 2006 WL 1374514 at *6.
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more attractive, transport them to a tropical paradise, or
other similar scenarios that are common themes in alcohol
ads is ridiculous at best. Moreover, while minors may be
considered incompetent to handle the effects of the
intoxication, there is no presumption that minors are
incompetent to watch advertising, handle the messages
included therein, or that they are incompetent to
understand that underage drinking is illegal."'
Minors, in this case, were thus deemed competent to handle alcohol
marketing with appeal to their demographic." 6
The Sixth Circuit also expressed a deep skepticism about the impact
of the alcohol marketing at issue on actual consumer behavior.l 17 When
denying plaintiffs standing, the court discussed the lack of a viable remedy
for plaintiff parents in light of the fact that it is already illegal to sell
alcohol to minors when it stated that "if outlawing the actual sale and
purchase [of alcoholic beverages to minors] is insufficient to remedy the
alleged injuries . . . , then outlawing mere advertising must be insufficient
as well."" 8  This reasoning denies the practical reality of underage
drinking. Despite its illegality, underage alcohol consumption is an
important segment of the market for alcoholic beverages.1 9 Underage
alcohol consumption is estimated to account for between 11% and 20% of
all U.S. alcohol sales.12 0 Researchers who study alcohol marketing to
youth have found that "[b]randing plays an essential role in alcohol
marketing and the relationship of youth to individual alcohol products.
Developing brand capital-that is, the meaning and emotion associated
with a brand-is perhaps the most important function of alcohol
advertising."' 2 ' An evolving body of research about actual underage
alcohol consumption patterns has found that exposure to alcohol marketing
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Alston, 494 F.3d at 564-65.
118. Id. at 565-66.
119. See generally PAC. INST. FOR RESEARCH & EVALUATION, DRINKING IN AMERICA:
MYTHS, REALITIES, & PREVENTION POLICY (2005), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov
/Ihc/drug/DrinkinginAmericaMosherSep26.pdf.
120. Id.; Susan E. Foster et al., Alcohol Consumption and Expenditures for Underage
Drinking and Adult Excessive Drinking, 289:8 JAMA 989, 994 (2003).
121. Michael Siegel et al., Brand-Specific Consumption ofAlcohol Among Underage
Youth in the United States, ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL& EXPERIMENTAL RES. 1, 1 (2013).
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increases teen alcohol consumptionl2, and that the top twenty-five alcohol
brands in the U.S. account for about one-half of all underage alcohol
consumption by volume.12 3 This research demonstrates the effectiveness of
atmosphere advertising or branding of alcohol to minors in terms of its
impact on actual underage drinking patterns.
Current standards for deceptive practices are designed to address
misleading "reason-why" advertising and are ill-equipped to protect
vulnerable populations from branding that seeks to build positive
associations with harmful products. The various courts' discussions of
teenagers' abilities to process marketing messages and act in their own best
interest is in sharp contrast with what is known about teen decision-making
abilities. Moreover, courts' conceptions of teen "reasonableness" seems to
be rooted in societal expectations for teen behavior as opposed to how
teens actually make decisions, given their brain and psychosocial
development. In order to truly analyze potentially deceptive marketing
from the perspective of a target audience of teens, additional insight into
teen decision-making capabilities and how marketers intentionally exploit
their emotionality and desires is needed.
B. Branding with Appeal to Minors as an Unfair Trade Practice
Unfairness focuses on preventing substantial injury to consumers that
is not otherwise avoidable or beneficial to competition, or on preventing
marketing that offends established public policy. Actions challenging
branding campaigns with appeal to minors for cigarettes have fared better
in the courts than the subsequent alcohol litigation. In the late 1990's,
litigation was embraced as an affirmative public health strategy to combat
smoking-related disease. Tobacco litigation continues today on behalf of
injured smokers, but state-led litigation efforts culminated with the MSA
negotiated between forty-six states and four of the largest tobacco
companies in 1998.124 Prior to the MSA, state Attorneys General (AGs)
122. Auden C. McClure et al., Alcohol Marketing Receptivity, Marketing-Specific
Cognitions, and Underage Binge Drinking, 37:S1 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL RES. E404, E404 (2013).
123. Siegel et al., supra note 121, at 6.
124. Kathleen Michon, Tobacco Litigation: History & Recent Developments, NOLO,
available at http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/tobacco-litigation-history-and-
development-32202.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2013).
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filed suit against tobacco companies alleging, inter alia, violations of state
125consumer protection statutes.
For example, the State of Iowa filed suit against R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company, alleging that the company committed violations of the
Iowa Consumer Fraud Act.12 6 Alleged violations included: a) misleading
the public regarding the addictive nature of cigarettes; b) misleading the
public regarding whether cigarettes caused life-threatening illnesses; c)
falsely claiming the company had performed an independent study to
determine the health effects of smoking; d) failing to disclose added
ingredients in cigarettes; e) and engaging in marketing practices oriented
towards minors. 127 The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied a
motion to dismiss the complaint that included "claims relate[d] to false and
misleading public statements and unfair trade practices such as ...
marketing harmful tobacco products to minors."l 2 8 Before such actions
were rendered moot in states that signed onto the MSA, other lower courts
declined to dismiss consumer protection claims brought by AGs on behalf
of the citizens of their states, alleging, in pertinent part, unfair and
deceptive marketing of tobacco products to minors.' 2 9
R.J. Reynolds' use of Joe Camel, a cartoon character depicted in print
ads, on billboards, point-of-sale signage, and promotional items, like t-
shirts and beach towels, to market its Camel brand cigarettes galvanized
opposition to tobacco marketing to minors. Similar to the marketing
strategies at the heart of the alcohol cases, R.J. Reynolds appealed to
minors through depictions of Joe Camel, a likeable cartoon character often
shown in sexual (surrounded by women in bikinis) or cool (riding a
motorcycle) situations while smoking Camel cigarettes. Marketing
campaigns built around spokes-characters are intended to build brand
awareness. A 1991 study found that by the time children reached the age
125. UNIV. CAL. SAN FRANCIsCO LIBRARY & CTR. FOR KNOWLEDGE MGMT.,
TOBACCO LITIGATION DOCUMENTS, http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation
/states (last visited Dec. 22, 2013).
126. Complaint, Iowa v. Phillip Morris Inc., No. CL71048 1, 41-44 (Iowa Dist. Ct.,
Nov. 27, 1996), available at http://www.1ibrary.ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ ucsf assets/ia
complaint.pdf.
127. Id
128. Ruling on Certain Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, No.
CL71048 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 1997), available at http://www.library.ucsf edu
/sites/all/files/ucsf assets/dec8-26.pdf.
129. See generally, e.g., State of Colo. ex. rel. Norton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
No. 97CV3432 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 20, 1998), available at http://www.library.ucsf
.edu/sites/all/files/ucsf assets/cocomplaint.pdf; Maryland v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No.
96122017/CL211487 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 21, 1997), available at http://www.library.
ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ ucsf assets/3mdcomplaint.pdf.
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of six, Joe Camel and Mickey Mouse "were nearly equally well recognized
and correctly matched by almost all children."'
1 3 0
The Joe Camel campaign was challenged under California consumer
protection law in the case of Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. The
plaintiff alleged that the use of Joe Camel to market cigarettes constituted
an unfair trade practice13 ' because it encouraged minors to illegally
purchase cigarettes. 13 2 Mangini was subsequently dismissed on preemption
grounds,13 3 but an intermediate court opinion in the case is one of the few
written opinions applying the elements of unfairness to the target marketing
of minors. In the opinion, the California appellate court applied the
following test for unfairness: "(1) whether [the alleged conduct] . . . offends
public policy as established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise; 2)
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; and 3)
whether it causes substantial injury to consumers."' 3 4
The court found the use of Joe Camel offended California's "statutory
policy of keeping children from starting on the road to tobacco
addiction."' 35 The court cited a number of state statutes intended to prevent
tobacco use, including bans on tobacco sales to minors and free tobacco
sampling. 136 While the court found the question of ethics and morals too
subjective, it did find the targeting of minors by tobacco companies to be
oppressive and unscrupulous in that "it exploits minors by luring them into
an unhealthy and potentially life-threatening addiction before they have
achieved the maturity necessary to make an informed decision whether to
take up smoking despite its health risks." 37 The court also recognized
findings by the California State Legislature that tobacco advertising was an
important contributor to smoking by children.' 38 The court concluded that
"[a] persuasive argument can be made that the targeting of minors causes
substantial physical injury to them." 39
In a footnote, the court went on to say that the question of "unfair"
marketing is one of degree.14 0 The question is whether the defendants had
130. Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years,
266:22 JAMA 3145, 3147 (1991).
131. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 75 (Cal. 1993).
132. Id.
133. In re Tobacco Cases II, 41 Cal. 4th 1257, 1276 (Cal. 2007).







140. Id. at 242 n. 2.
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crossed a boundary in their efforts to market their cigarettes. 14 1 "If R.J.
Reynolds had, for example, presented Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles on
children's lunch boxes to promote cigarette smoking, we have little doubt
there would be a statutory cause of action for unfair advertising." 4 2 The
court relied on how blatantly the defendant marketed its products to minors
to determine if its efforts were unfair.143 It held that the Joe Camel
advertisements could be found to be unfair under the California consumer
protection law if the factual record showed they violated "public policy by
luring minors into unlawfully purchasing and consuming cigarettes." 44
The Joe Camel campaign also was the subject of an enforcement
action by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as an unfair trade practice
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 14 5 In its complaint, the FTC
alleged that the campaign made smoking attractive to children and
adolescents under the age of eighteen, inducing them to smoke, or at least
increasing the risk that they would smoke.14 6 The complaint alleged that
the Joe Camel campaign accomplished its goal of getting teens to smoke
because "after the initiation of the Joe Camel campaign, the percentage of
smokers under the age of 18 who smoked Camel cigarettes became larger
than the percentage of all adult smokers aged 18 and older who smoked
Camel cigarettes." 4 7  It is of note that two dissenting Commissioners
specifically noted that they did not find sufficient evidence to support a
causal connection between the Joe Camel campaign and underage
smoking. 148
The complaint also alleged that R.J. Reynolds knew or should have




144. Id at 242.
145. Complaint, In the Matter of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., F.T.C. No. 9285 1, 2-3
(May 28, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
1997/05/d9285cmp.pdf [hereinafter Complaint, R.J Reynolds]. Two Commissioners
dissented from the decision to issue the complaint, relying heavily on the fact that the
Commission declined to file the same claim against R.J. Reynolds three years earlier.
In the Matter of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., F.T.C. No. 9285 (May 28, 1997) (Starek,
J., dissenting), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases
/1997/05/jcrbs3.htm [hereinafter Starek dissent]; In the Matter of R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., F.T.C. No. 9285 (May 28, 1997) (Azcuenaga, J., dissenting), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1997/05/rjrmla.htm [hereinafter
Azcuenaga dissent].
146. Complaint, R.J Reynolds, supra note 145, at 2.
147. Id.
148. Azcuenaga dissent, supra note 146; Starek dissent, supra note 146.
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age of eighteen, and the campaign therefore would cause teens under
eighteen to smoke.14 9 Moreover, by 1984 the defendant allegedly had
identified the need to attract younger, "first usual brand" smokers. 5 0 The
FTC asserted that "children and adolescents do not adequately comprehend
the nature of the risk or the seriousness of nicotine addiction, or the other
dangerous health effects of smoking cigarettes."' 5 1 Therefore, due to the
harmful nature of cigarettes and nicotine addiction, the Joe Camel
campaign was likely to cause substantial injury to children under the age of
eighteen.' 5 2
In its proposed order, the FTC ordered the defendant to "cease and
desist from advertising to children its Camel brand cigarettes through the
use of the images or themes relating or referring to . . . the Joe Camel
figure."' 3 The proposed order also required R.J. Reynolds to supply data
concerning each of its cigarette brands' share of smokers under the age of
eighteen, and to issue public education messages discouraging people
under eighteen from smoking.15 4
Ultimately, the use of cartoon characters, like Joe Camel, to promote
tobacco products was prohibited by the MSA. 5 5
VI. Is "LIVE FOR Now" THE JOE CAMEL OF SODA MARKETING?
In this section we examine the Live for Now campaign as a
potentially unfair trade practice. The legal actions taken to address the Joe
Camel campaign were a key element in an overall tobacco control strategy.
There are a wide range of factors contributing to the obesity crisis, and as
discussed above, research has shown that sugary drinks are a driver of the
epidemic. In this section we explore whether, much like the Joe Camel
campaign, Live for Now is susceptible to a challenge as an unfair trade
practice.
Interpretations of unfair marketing vary from state to state.15 6 Federal
consumer protection law currently defines an unfair act as a trade practice
that "is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
149. Complaint, R.1 Reynolds, supra note 145, at 2.
150. Id. at 1.
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id.
155. MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 91, at 14.




countervailing benefits to consumers or competition." 57 When determining
if an act constitutes an unfair trade practice, "the Commission may consider
established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other
evidence."' 58 However, "public policy considerations may not serve as a
primary basis" for determining whether a trade practice is unfair.15 9
As an initial matter, it is important to distinguish soda marketing to
teens from alcohol and tobacco marketing to teens. The private alcohol
cases alleging deceptive marketing discussed above failed to establish
standing primarily because the cases were filed by parents to recover so-
called "family assets." Soda, unlike alcohol and cigarettes, is a legal
product that teens buy with their own spending money. A State Attorney
General could certainly investigate and issue a complaint on behalf of the
adolescents in her particular state. Any private cases filed alleging unfair
target marketing of soda to teens should be filed on behalf of a class of
teens who purchased soda products for themselves with their own spending
money. Moreover, since soda is a legal product, there would be no issue of
intervening criminal activity in the course of the sale to insulate beverage
companies that engage in marketing to teens from liability.
With respect to substantial injury to consumers, full-sugar carbonated
soft drinks like Pepsi Cola are one of the most obesogenic categories of
beverages. One twenty ounce bottle of full sugar Pepsi Cola contains 250
calories and sixty-nine grams of sugar, which equates to approximately
eighteen teaspoons of sugar.160 While evidence of sugar addiction is
preliminary and controversial, Pepsi Cola also contains caffeine, which is a
mildly addictive substance that can drive consumption.161 There is
evidence that food and beverage marketing is a significant contributor to
obesity.16 2 The purpose of branding campaigns like Live for Now is to
secure lifelong brand loyalty and a lifetime of consumption. The stated
purpose of the teen-focused campaign, as expressed by PepsiCo executives,
is to make full sugar soda "cool" and to prop-up a slumping category of
157. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2013).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. PEPSICO, THE FACTS ABOUT YOUR FAVORITE BEVERAGES, http://www.pepsico
beveragefacts.com/infobyproduct.php?prod type=1 026&prod_size=20&brandfam id
=1051&brand id=1000&product=Pepsi (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
161. Jennifer L. Temple, Caffeine Use in Children: What We Know, What We Have
Left to Learn, and Why We Should Worry, 33 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REv. 793, 799
(2009).
162. Mary Story & Simone French, Food Advertising and Marketing Directed at
Children and Adolescents in the U.S., 1 INT'L J. BEHAV. NUTR. & PHYS. ACTivITY 3, 13
(2004).
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beverages.1 6 3 Similar to the Joe Camel campaign, which reversed a decline
in teenage smoking, the Live for Now campaign threatens to do the same
for teenage soda consumption. Like tobacco, the health harms of soda
accrue as one continues to consume the product. Obesity, especially higher
levels of obesity, is associated with increased mortality compared with
people of normal weight.16 For example, one study found that.obesity was
associated with a substantial number of excess deaths, the majority of
which occurred in individuals less than seventy years old. 165  Obesity-
related conditions include heart disease, stroke, type-2 diabetes, and certain
types of cancer.' 6 6 These conditions are some of the leading causes of
preventable death in the U.S. 167
Whether or not harms caused by a trade practice are easily avoidable
by a consumer depends, among other factors, upon the target audience and
the tactics used. The Live for Now campaign itself is not easily avoided by
adolescents because it is designed to pervade virtually every aspect of their
lives via television, internet, mobile marketing, and social media. With
respect to the content of the campaign, Live for Now is a clear directive to
teens that they should ignore the health risks of full sugar soda like Pepsi
Cola. Marketers understand that "reasonable" adolescents have a hard time
grasping the idea of long-term consequences, and instead focus on the
short-term when making purchase decisions for products like soda. 16 8 Live
for Now is designed to capitalize on this cognitive vulnerability through
depictions of healthy and happy young people and the use of popular and
successful musicians, athletes, and celebrities as spokespeople for the
brand. The target audience of adolescents and the tactics used create a
trade practice that leads to future health harms that are not reasonably
avoided by adolescents when viewed from their perspective as a target
audience of consumers.
No countervailing benefits to consumers or competition of a
campaign like Live for Now are readily apparent. The campaign is
designed to build brand awareness and brand loyalty as opposed to
conveying factual information about the product to consumers or its
benefits relative to other similar products in the marketplace. Nothing in
163. Al Carey Transcript, supra note 82, at 4.
164. Katherine M. Flegal et al., Excess Deaths Associated with Underweight,
Overweight, and Obesity, 293:15 JAMA 1861, 1863-64 (2005).
165. Id. at 1864.
166. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADULT OBESITY FACTS,
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
167. Id.
168. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 231 (1995).
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the campaign appears to be designed to spur a competitor to improve its
offerings in terms of nutritional profile, price, or quality of ingredients.
Similar to the public health policies to curb youth smoking discussed
in the Mangini case, public health nutrition policy continues to expand to
reduce adolescent consumption of sugary drinks. For example, California
state law currently prohibits the sale of full-sugar soft drinks like Pepsi
Cola in schools.' 6 9 Pepsi Cola is not an allowable beverage under the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's proposed nutrition standards for competitive
beverages sold in schools that, when finalized, will apply to all schools
participating in the National School Lunch Program.170 Pepsi Cola is not
currently allowed to be sold in middle or high schools under the American
Beverage Association's voluntary School Beverage Guidelines established
in partnership with the Alliance for a Healthier Generation. 171 In addition,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture recommends limiting consumption of
empty calories from added sugars and solid fats and includes soda in its list
of foods that contribute the most empty calories to the U.S. diet.172 One
twenty ounce bottle of full sugar Pepsi Cola contains 250 calories and
approximately eighteen teaspoons of sugar.'17  This amount exceeds the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's current total daily empty calorie
recommendation for sedentary girls between the ages of fourteen and
eighteen of 160 calories per day and is almost equal to the total 265 calorie
limit recommended for sedentary boys between the ages of fourteen and
eighteen.174  The target marketing of full sugar soda to teens through
campaigns like Live for Now is at odds with these policies.
169. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 15576 (2013); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49430 (2013); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 49431.5 (2013).
170. National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program: Nutrition
Standards for All Foods Sold in School as Required by the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids
Act of 2010, 78 Fed. Reg. 27: 9530 (proposed Feb. 8, 2013) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pts.
210, 220).
171. AM. BEVERAGE Ass'N, SCHOOL BEVERAGE GUIDELINES, http://www.ameribev
.org/nutrition-science/school-beverage-guidelines/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2014).
172. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., WHAT ARE EMPTY CALORIES?, http://www.choosemy
plate.gov/weight-management-calories/calories/empty-calories.html (last visited Jan.
27, 2014).
173. PEPSI, http://www.pepsicobeveragefacts.com/infobyproduct.php?prod_type= 10
26&prod size=20&brandfamid=1051&brand id=1000&product=Pepsi (last visited
Jan. 27, 2014).
174. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., How MANY CAN I HAVE?, http://www.choosemyplate.
gov/weight-management-calories/calories/empty-calories-amount.html (last visited Jan.
27, 2014).
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VII. CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen when or whether State AGs or the private bar
will take up cases to protect adolescents from aggressive marketing of
unhealthy food and beverage products like the Live for Now campaign.
The very fact that such actions will involve adolescent consumers makes
already complicated legal issues that much more complex. What little case
law exists with respect to adolescents and branding is inconsistent at best.
Both cigarettes and alcohol are illegal to sell to minors and are addictive
products. Pepsi Cola contains high levels of sugar and is caffeinated. The
marketing strategies challenged in the alcohol cases had the same goal as
the Joe Camel campaign-to persuade adolescents to use an unhealthy
product that adults were abandoning in droves. The legal standards for
deception and unfairness are quite different. This does not fully explain
why the Mangini court and the FTC's unfairness analysis acknowledged
the diminished capacity of adolescents to make decisions in their long-term
interest with respect to tobacco, yet the deception analysis in the alcohol
cases was primarily dismissive of teens' diminished ability to process
alcohol marketing messages. Actions to address food and beverage
marketing to adolescents must take great care to include evidence-based
arguments about teen decision-making and how their development impacts
their behavior as consumers. Exposing the deliberate exploitation of teen
biological and psychological development by marketers to increase their
consumption of unhealthy products will be equally important. The fact that
PepsiCo openly touts to its shareholders and the press that Live for Now is
specifically designed to increase teen consumption of one of its most
unhealthy beverages also demonstrates that much more work is needed at
the broader societal level to denormalize sugary drinks.
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"[P]laintiffs do not have a fundamental right to obtain any food they
wish."'
"When did we lose our right to buy whatever food we want directly
from farmers and assorted food producers, outside of the regulatory system
of permits and inspections?"2
1. Br. in Supp. of United States' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 26, Farm-
To-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-04018-MWB (N.D. Iowa, filed
Apr. 26, 2010).
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I. THE FOOD MOVEMENT RISES
For millennia, humans either caught or raised their own food or pur-
chased it from local farmers or shopkeepers; however they obtained their
food, they knew where it came from. In fact, obtaining one's food directly
from the farmer who grew it is one of the most traditional economic prac-
tices that there can be. But with the industrial age came industrial food,
which has broken the local food connection between producer and consum-
er.4 For example, two companies now grow 85% of all of the carrots eaten
in the U.S.5 The four largest beef slaughterers have sold between 65% and
70% of all beef consumed nationally since 2000.6 But local food is making
a comeback; locavores look for locally grown or raised food, and other epi-
curean consumers seek organic and naturally produced food.7 These alter-
native food movements are a "challenge to and a denouncement of the cur-
rent industrial food system," which writer Michael Pollan, champion of the
food movement, calls "Big Food."
Pollan explains that the alternative food movement is about many
things, including consumer health, food safety regulation, farmland preser-
vation, and efforts to promote urban agriculture, as well as "community,
identity, pleasure, and, most notably, about carving out a new social and
economic space removed from the influence of big corporations on the one
side and government on the other."9 For Pollan, eating is a political acto
2. DAVID E. GUMPERT, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF FOOD RIGHTS: THE
ESCALATING BATTLE OVER WHO DECIDES WHAT WE EAT 5 (2013).
3. Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barri-
ers Facing Producers of "Local Foods," 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 49, 55
(2012).
4. Id at 50.
5. Mark Bittman, Everyone Eats There, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/magazine /californias-central-valley-land-of-a-
billion-vegetables.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PACKERS & STOCKYARDS PROGRAM, 2011 P&SP
ANNUAL REPORT: GRAIN INSPECTION, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ADMINISTRATION 30
(2012), available at http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/Publications/psp/ar/2011 _psp_ annu-
al report.pdf.
7. Jaime Bouvier, The Symbolic Garden: An Intersection of the Food Movement
and the First Amendment, 65 ME. L. REv. 426, 430 (2013).
8. Id.
9. Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, June 10,
2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/food-movement-rising
/?pagination=false.
10. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE'S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR
MEALS 11 (2006).
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and the food movement is a way "to foster new forms of civil society.""
Activists, journalists, and researchers take Pollan's theories even fur-
ther; for them, food choice expresses one's self-identity,12 and the food
movement is a political, communicative, and self-expressive act that is
based in substantial part on consumers' desire to reconnect with food pro-
duction and regain trust in the producers of their food.13
Food movement participants want to demonstrate their support for
local farmers, communicate their positions, pro and con, on food-related
laws and regulations, associate with like-minded people, and advocate
locavorism.14 Their advocacy for small food and against intrusive govern-
mental regulations necessarily questions Big Food, seeks liberty, and cre-
ates social change.'5  But it is not just locavores who have historically
prized small, local farmers. Over a century ago, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court recognized the value of small farmers in a vendor's licensing
appeal. In North Carolina, the court held that public policy favored the
farmer exception because it encouraged "the general raising of live stock
by the small farmer, which will not only be profitable to the individual, but
adds[s] to the aggregate wealth of the community."' 6 This is not just old
law and an old way of thinking; still on the books today are a number of
state and federal statutes that explicitly value the small farmer and the
family farm.' 7
11. POLLAN, supra note 10.
12. Carole A. Bisogni et al., Who We Are and How We Eat: A Qualitative Study of
Identities in Food Choice, 34 J. NUTR. EDUC. & BEHAV., 128, 129 (2002).
13. See generally, e.g., Bouvier, supra note 7, at 430; Marne Coit, Jumping on the
Next Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal Aspects of the Local Food
Movement, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 45, 46-50 (2008); Jeffrey R. Follett, Choosing a Food
Future: Diferentiating Among Alternative Food Options, 22 J. AGRIC. & ENvTL.
ETHIcs 31, 33 (2009); Johnson & Endres, supra note 3, at 56-57; Molly Kate Bean,
Consumer Support for Local and Organic Foods in Ohio (2008) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, The Ohio State University) (on file with The Ohio State University).
14. Bouvier, supra note 7, at 431; Follett, supra note 13, at 33; Johnson & Endres,
supra note 3, at 57-58.
15. Follett, supra note 13, at 37, 42.
16. State v. Spaugh, 129 N.C. 564, 567, 40 S.E. 60, 61 (1901).
17. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2266 (2012) ("Congress reaffirms the historical policy of
the United States to foster and encourage the family farm system of agriculture in this
country. Congress believes that the maintenance of the family farm system of agricul-
ture is essential to the social well-being of the Nation"); ALA. CODE § 2-6B-1 (1975);
IOWA CODE § 175.4(10) (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1-A (2002 & Supp.
2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-9A-1 (2012)
("[t]he Legislature of the State of South Dakota recognizes the importance of the fami-
ly farm to the economic and moral stability of the state").
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Locavores and other food movement participants do not want food
from far away agribusinesses; they seek to buy their food locally and con-
nect with the farmers who produced the food.18 Buying locally allows
them to meet and speak with those who grew their vegetables and raised
their beef; one can hardly shake hands with someone at Kellogg's cereals
or ask Mr. Dole about how he grew his pineapples.1 9 In contrast, anyone at
a farmers' market can walk up to the farmer and ask, before buying any
food, how he grew his lettuce or how she raised her pigs. Learning about
where their food came from empowers consumers to develop or regain
their connection with their community and with their food, and helps them
recover or even discover a sense of place. 20 Finally, it helps consumers
gain or regain trust in their food's safety and quality. Traditionally, "per-
ceptions of food quality were often the result of personal observation and
social networks in the local community." 2 1 Industrial food made this im-
possible. But when a buyer can see the seller and ask her about her prod-
ucts, the buyer regains trust in his food.22
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR FOOD RIGHTS
This article will explore consumers' rights to purchase meat and
poultry directly from the food's producer without mandatory governmental
inspection. It expands former University of Nevada law student Kammi L.
Rencher's recent proposition that food choice may deserve at least some
23
degree of heightened constitutional protection. Rencher suggested that
health, religious expression, cultural expression, self-expression, and
speech can explain a person's food choice, but did "not attempt to establish
that food choice is a fundamental right." 2 4 I take the next step and demon-
strate that: a) the consumer's desire to purchase and consume meat and
poultry from the farmer who raised the animals, without governmental in-
terference, are indeed statements of self-identity and self-expression and
forms of political speech and political action that are aspects of our consti-
tutionally protected liberty interests; and b) our national customs and prac-
tices of purchasing meat and poultry directly from the farmer who pro-
duced that food, without mandatory governmental inspection, is so deeply
18. Coit, supra note 13, at 48-50.
19. Johnson & Endres, supra note 3, at 92.
20. Id. at 50.
21. Bean, supra note 13, at 62.
22. Johnson & Endres, supra note 3, at 93.
23. Kammi L. Rencher, Note, Food Choice and Fundamental Rights: A Piece of
Cake or Pie in the Sky?, 12 NEV. L.J. 418, 420 (2012).
24. Id.
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rooted in our nation's history and tradition that it should constitute a fun-
damental liberty right guaranteed under the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.2 5
Although health, religious, and cultural expression may indeed be
fundamental rights in the context of food choice, I do not make those ar-
guments here. 26 The Supreme Court accepts as fundamental the rights to
make decisions as to one's health care and the right of bodily integrity, but
has not extended those rights beyond actual illnesses, diseases, or protect-
ing against governmental desires to invade one's bodily integrity.2 7 Ac-
cordingly, analysis of those rights, as well as the rights of religious and cul-
tural expression, which involve a whole new ball of wax, are best explored
in a separate article.
While American food regulation laws date back to the founding of
the colonies and were surprisingly detailed in certain areas, a detailed re-
view of these laws reveals that they were narrow in scope.28 Until the
twentieth century, colonial and state statutes focused on food packing and
exporting, food adulteration, vendor licensing, and weights, measures, and
assizes; food inspection was a secondary aim.2 9 The comprehensive food
safety laws as we know them today are a modern invention. 30 Thus, while
state statutes regulated numerous aspects of the food sale transaction, they
rarely affected consumers' rights to purchase food directly from the farmer,
especially when the transaction occurred on the farm.3 1 Most early state
food inspection statutes applied only to food sold at municipal markets,
food sold in barrels, or food sold to middlemen for resale elsewhere, either
for export or at markets.32 Until well into the twentieth century, farmers
and food producers in most states remained free to sell the products of their
farms directly to consumers without any government regulation. 33
25. It should be noted that Florida State University College of Law Professor Samu-
el R. Wiseman recently argued that food choice is not a fundamental right. While I re-
spectfully disagree with Professor Wiseman, this article is not intended to be a rebuttal
of Professor Wiseman's article. Instead, I will let my analysis of the legal issues speak
for itself. Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty ofPalate, 65 ME. L. REV. 738 (2013).
26. Rencher, supra note 23, at 425-26, 431-37.
27. Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 SMU. L. REV. 1557, 1580-82
(2008).
28. Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation
ofAdulteration and Misbranding ofFood, 39 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 2, 35-44 (1984).
29. Id. at 39, 40.
30. Id. at 41.
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Meat inspection statutes were no different. Before the twentieth
century, almost all state meat inspection statutes applied only to cured meat
packaged in barrels for export. 34 Some statutes required inspection of all
meats packaged in barrels, whether for export or not.3 5 Others set up vol-
untary inspection procedures on the theory that inspected and certified food
would be more valuable in the marketplace than uninspected food. 36 Still
other states required farmers to keep the hide of cattle that they slaughtered
for market, but only a few states required mandatory inspections prior to
the sale of food products such as beef and pork.3 7 Even in the modem meat
inspection era in the twentieth century, eighteen states had at one time or
another explicitly excluded from otherwise all-encompassing inspection
statutes meat slaughtered by the farmers who raised the animals or meat
slaughtered in rural districts, where an inspector could not conveniently ac-
cess the meat. The significance of this number is illustrated by the fact that
only twenty-eight states even required inspection of all meat sold intrastate
as late as 1967.38 In fact, farm slaughtered exemption statutes were on the
books of twelve states until the federal Wholesome Meat Act of 1967 man-
dated federal or state inspection of all meat slaughtered for sale for the first
time. Poultry was even less regulated. 3 9 No state required inspection of
poultry products prior to sale until well into the twentieth century. 40 The
federal government required no poultry inspection until 1957.41
This article lays out my argument step by step. Section III will re-
view the law of substantive due process, with emphasis on defining a fun-
damental right and attempting to make a claim for a new, as yet undeclared,
fundamental right. Section IV defines my proposed right in a way that
should meet the Supreme Court's restrictive specifications. Section V
shows that the right to purchase meat and poultry from the farmer who
raised the animals is deeply rooted in our national tradition. Section VI ex-
plains our constitutionally protected liberty rights and demonstrates that
courts should consider food choice to be an aspect of liberty. Finally, Sec-
tion VII provides a brief conclusion.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 90-653, at 4 (1967).
37. See infra Section V.B.
38. Id.
39. See infra Section V.E.
40. GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 98 (1963).
41. WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-1333, at 4 (1968).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: How TO DEFINE A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT
Substantive due process claims arise under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.42 The Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause applies to the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause applies to state and local governments.43 Substantive
due process claims address whether the government's claimed deprivation
of a person's life, liberty (including the right to privacy)," or property is
justified by a sufficient purpose. 45 In order to determine whether the gov-
ernment's deprivation of one's life, liberty, or property is justified by a suf-
ficient purpose, "one must first determine what kind of means-end scrutiny
applies and, second, whether the deprivation is justified under that test.'A6
If the deprivation infringes a fundamental right, the strict scrutiny test ap-
plies. If the deprivation infringes a non-fundamental right, the rational re-
view test applies. 47  Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must
prove that the infringement is necessary to further a compelling govern-
mental interest. Under the rational review test, the citizen "normally has
the burden of proving that the deprivation is not a rational means for fur-
thering any valid government interest."
Because the strict scrutiny test is far more favorable to the litigant
objecting to governmental action (it has been described as "fatal" to the
government's case),49 plaintiffs in constitutional rights litigation naturally
seek to show that the right at issue is a fundamental right, which would re-
42. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause states that "[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.
V. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause states that "[n]o state shall ... de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
43. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L.
REV. 625, 625 n. 1 (1992).
44. Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 1977);
Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F.Supp. 788, 799 n. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (citing Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Providence Journal Co. v. Fed. Bureau of Investiga-
tion, 460 F.Supp. 762, 771 n. 27 (D.R.I. 1978); United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d
293, 304-305, n. 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003).
45. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURo L. REv. 1501, 1501
(1999).
46. Galloway, supra note 43, at 627.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 627-28.
49. Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1057 (1990).
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quire application of the strict scrutiny test. The critical issue in substantive
due process claims is thus how to define a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court has employed two approaches for addressing
fundamental rights claims.o The first approach evaluates the claimed right
on the basis of "personal dignity and autonomy," 5 which is also called the
theory of "reasoned judgment." 52 Under this approach, "the Court itself
evaluates the liberty interest of the individual and weighs it against compet-
ing governmental concerns, determining on this basis whether the liberty
interest deserves protection as a constitutional right."53 The Court used this
approach most notably in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey, an abortion case, in which it proclaimed, "[n]either the Bill of
Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." 5 4 Casey held that "ad-
judication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in in-
terpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition
courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment."5 5 The Court has most
recently approved of Casey in the 2003 gay rights case of Lawrence v. Tex-
as.56
The second, more restrictive, approach looks to the "[n]ation's his-
tory and legal tradition."5  The Court notably employed this approach in
the 1934 case of Snyder v. Massachusetts, which held that "[t]he Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure of its courts
in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless, in so
doing, it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
50. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 445 F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
51. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 445 F.3d at 476
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
52. Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63, 66-67 (2006).
53. Id.
54. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
55. Id. at 849.
56. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Conkle, supra note 52, at 67.
57. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 445 F.3d 470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)), rev'den banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). It should also be
noted that the reasoned judgment approach also considers history and tradition. The
Court in Roe v. Wade used this approach, and "spent a substantial portion of its opinion
exploring tradition." Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's Attempt to
Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853,
862 n. 56 (1991).
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conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."ss The Court best
explained the history and tradition approach in the 1997 right to die case,
Washington v. Glucksberg, which intoned, "[w]e begin, as we do in all due
process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and prac-
tices" in order to determine whether the "asserted right has any place in our
Nation's traditions."59 In order to prove that a supposed right has a place in
American history and traditions, a plaintiff must: a) provide "a careful de-
scription of the asserted fundamental liberty interest;" and b) show that the
alleged fundamental right is "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 6 0
While the Court has been traditionally "reluctant to expand the con-
cept of substantive due process,"6' Glucksberg did leave the door open for
new fundamental rights claims by acknowledging that the "outlines" of the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have never been "fully
clarified" and that they may never be "capable of being fully clarified." 62
The Court has therefore left constitutional rights advocates with the
problem of two independent, incompatible approaches to substantive due
process claims. However, because Lawrence interpreted Casey as applying
strictly to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education," the cautious food
rights advocate may not want to advocate the Casey approach for rights
other than those specifically identified in Casey.6 3  Consequently, the
soundest, most practical solution is to employ the test that allows for the
broadest definition of a fundamental right, but also defines the right in the
way that has the lowest chance of being overruled at the appellate level.
Practically, this means following Glucksberg; for the past decade and a
half, the lower courts have been "overwhelmingly relying on Glucksberg
and ignoring Lawrence."64 While the Casey "reasoned judgment" approach
58. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
59. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 720-21 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
61. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
62. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
63. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003) (citing Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also URI Student Senate v. Town Of
Narragansett, 707 F.Supp.2d 282, 291 (D.R.I. 2010), aff'd, 631 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011)
(stating that the types of choices that are "central to [Casey's] personal dignity and au-
tonomy" are "personal decisions" that relate to "marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education") (citation omitted).
64. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 445 F.3d 470, 476 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that other circuits have ei-
ther treated the Glucksberg analysis as controlling after Lawrence or viewed Lawrence
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is certainly more open to new fundamental rights claims than Glucksberg,
it is a red herring. As will be shown in Section V, infra, the consumer's
right to purchase meat and poultry directly from the farmer who raised the
animals is indeed deeply rooted in American history and tradition and so
fits quite easily into the Glucksberg pigeonhole.
A. Creating a Careful Description
The food rights advocate's first problem under Glucksberg is to
provide a "careful description" of the alleged fundamental right. But what
is a "careful description?" Unfortunately, the Court "has not settled on
how precisely formulated the right must be."65 Glucksberg did not define
"careful description," instructing only that the proposed right be "carefully
refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be
deeply rooted in our legal tradition." 6 6 Nor has the Court offered much ad-
ditional guidance. At the most restrictive end of the continuum, Justice
Scalia argued in a footnote to his plurality opinion in an earlier case, Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., that the claimed right should be defined at "the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified."6 7 However, this footnote, which
was joined by only one other Justice, Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of
Glucksberg, was immediately controversial. Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy, who later authored Casey's plurality opinion, concurred in the opin-
ion, but rejected the footnote, contending that:
[t]his footnote sketches a mode of historical analysis to be
used when identifying liberty interests protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that
may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in
this area . . . On occasion, the Court has characterized rele-
vant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of gener-
ality that might not be "the most specific level" available.68
as not, properly speaking, a substantive due process decision) (citations and punctua-
tion omitted); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1527 (2008) (citing Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg
Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV.
409,411 (2006)).
65. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 445 F.3d at 477.
66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
67. Michael H v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989).
68. Id. at 132.
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Three years later, they reiterated their disapproval in Casey.69 More recent-
ly, a 2003 case reaffirmed only that "vague generalities, such as 'the right
not to be talked to [in a Fifth Amendment case],' will not suffice."70 This
dispute is not just an ivory tower argument; it has practical implications for
the food rights advocate. As Tribe and Dorf succinctly stated, "[t]he more
abstractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes
that the claimed right will fall within its protection."7 1
The lower courts have been slightly more instructive. The Seventh
Circuit termed a "careful description" as "one that is specific and concrete,
one that avoids sweeping abstractions and generalities." 72 The court's duty
is to "carefully define the contested right, employing sufficient specificity
to ground the right in a concrete application and sufficient generality to
connect the right to its animating principles." 7 3 The Eleventh Circuit ad-
vised that grounding the right in a concrete application means that the
claimed right "be dictated 'by the precise facts' of the immediate case."74
The District of Columbia Circuit views the careful description requirement
''as a means of constraining the inadvertent creation of rights that could fall
within the scope of loosely worded descriptions and thus threaten the sepa-
ration of powers."75
While definitions are helpful, examples are even better. In a school
immunization case, the court noted that "whether a parent has a fundamen-
tal right to decide whether her child should undergo a medical procedure
76
such as immunization," was a right too broadly claimed. The court
reformatted the "careful description" by stating that, "the question present-
ed by the facts of this case is whether the special protection of the Due Pro-
cess Clause includes a parent's right to refuse to have her child immunized
before attending public or private school where immunization is a precon-
dition to attending school."7 7 Another example comes from a convicted sex
69. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
70. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (2003).
71. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990).
72. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2004).
73. Id. (quoting Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (Rogers, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11 th Cir. 2004).
75. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 445 F.3d 470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Williams, 378 F.3d at 1240
(noting that "the requirement of a 'careful description' is designed to prevent the re-
viewing court from venturing into vaster constitutional vistas than are called for by the
facts of the case at hand").
76. Boone v. Boozman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938, 956 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
77. Id.
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offender's appeal of his banishment from public parks in his city. A "gen-
eralized right to movement" was too broad; more careful was "a right to en-
ter the parks to loiter or for other innocent purposes." 7 8 A more restrictive
example comes from a municipal employment rights case stemming out of
a policewoman's affair with another police officer, where the Tenth Circuit
rejected "a right to private sexual activity" in favor of the right to engage in
"off-duty [sexual] conduct with a fellow officer at a training conference
paid for in part and supported by the department." 79 Finally, Glucksberg
itself provided an excellent example. The Supreme Court rejected the
Court of Appeals' "liberty interest in determining the time and manner of
one's death" in favor of a more specific "right to commit suicide which it-
self includes a right to assistance in doing so."80
Boone, Doe, and Glucksberg all illustrate how a reasonably narrow
- but not too narrow - right can be constructed out of the facts of the case.
In contrast, Seegmiller dictates the opposite conclusion. Such a constricted
"right" is impossible to defend or substantiate, and in fact the Tenth Circuit
quickly found that the petitioner failed to show that this "right" is deeply
rooted in American history and tradition.81
B. Proving a Deeply Rooted Tradition
The second Glucksberg factor requires proof that the right in ques-
tion is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." 82 The nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices include not just American legal traditions, but also the American
philosophical and cultural heritages. 8 3 Courts have, on occasion, reviewed
our nation's history, traditions, and practices extensively. For example,
Glucksberg analyzed seven hundred years of Anglo-American history on
suicide and assisting suicide going back to the thirteenth century.84 Just a
few years ago, in the Second Amendment case of McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago, the Supreme Court examined the Anglo-American historical and le-
gal traditions of gun rights and usage dating back to the seventeenth centu-
ry. In Abigail Alliance II, a drug regulation case, the District of Columbia
78. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2004).
79. Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 770 (10th Cir. 2008).
80. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997).
81. Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 770.
82. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
83. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
84. Id. at 711-719.
85. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3036-42 (2010).
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Circuit explored the Anglo-American tradition of drug regulation going
back to the fifteenth century.8 6
However, too much historical evidence or unrelated historical evi-
dence is as bad as not enough historical evidence. For example, in Wil-
liams, a case involving the right to sell sexual devices, the Eleventh Circuit
criticized the district judge for too much historical analysis as a result of
defining the right too broadly. The district judge's first problem was defin-
ing the question too broadly, as a "fundamental right to sexual privacy,"87
which the Court of Appeals rejected, instead defining the right as a right to
use sexual devices.88 This overbroad description led directly into the dis-
trict judge's second problem, too much history. The district judge provided
a sixteen page study of American sexual practices and laws from colonial
times to the present day,89 which the Court of Appeals dismissed as an "ir-
relevant exploration of the history of sex in America."90 The Court of Ap-
peals held that the "inquiry should have been focused not broadly on the
vast topic of sex in American cultural and legal history, but narrowly and
more precisely on the treatment of sexual devices within that history and
tradition."91 Williams' message is that the historical analysis in a funda-
mental rights question should match up perfectly with the definition of the
right. The parties and the court should only analyze the American history
and traditions that directly support the carefully described right in question.
C. The Problem of Traditionally Unregulated Rights
A challenge in discerning our national history and traditions in-
volves the distinction, if any, between a right that has been traditionally
protected and one that has been merely "traditionally unregulated."92 Tra
ditionally protecting a right means that the government has affirmatively
acted to protect the right. A traditionally unregulated action is the opposite;
the government has neither protected, nor prohibited, the action. Thus,
showing "a lack of government interference throughout history" with citi-
86. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 495 F.3d 695, 703-05 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Nordyke v. King, 563
F.3d 439, 451 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that "[w]e must trace this right, as thus described,
through our history from the Founding until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment").
87. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev'd sub nom.
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
88. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1242.
89. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1277-1294 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
90. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2004).
91. 1d. at 1243.
92. Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1489 (2008).
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zens' assertion of a right is "some evidence" that the right is "deeply root-
ed," but, for two Courts of Appeals, was not itself enough proof.9 3 In Abi-
gail Alliance II, the District of Columbia Circuit recently pointed out that:
[a] prior lack of regulation suggests that we must exercise
care in evaluating the untested assertion of a constitutional
right to be free from new regulation. But the lack of prior
governmental regulation of an activity tells us little about
whether the activity merits constitutional protection: "The
fact that powers long have been unexercised well may call
for close scrutiny as to whether they exist; but if granted,
they are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant, any more
than nonexistent powers can be prescripted by an unchal-
lenged exercise."94
Indeed, creating constitutional rights to be free from regulation based solely
upon a prior lack of regulation would undermine much of the modem ad-
ministrative state, which, like drug regulation, has increased in scope as
changing conditions have warranted.
In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the district court for ac-
cepting as a deeply rooted tradition what the Eleventh Circuit considered to
be traditionally unregulated actions. "[R]ather than look for a history and
tradition of protection of the asserted right, the district court [wrongly]
asked whether there was a history and tradition of state non-interference
with the right." 95 For the Court of Appeals, the district court's key find-
ings, "the relative scarcity of statutes explicitly banning sexual devices and
the rarity of reported cases of sexual-devices prosecutions . . . essentially
inverted Glucksberg's history and tradition inquiry." 96 Instead of showing
"that the right to use sexual devices is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's histo-
ry and tradition,' [the district court] looked for a showing that proscriptions
against sexual devices are deeply rooted in history and tradition."9 7 How-
ever, one Eleventh Circuit judge has powerfully argued, albeit in dissent,
that the argument that "the panel misreads Glucksburg to say the only rele-
vant historical inquiry is whether there has been a tradition of laws affirma-
93. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 495 F.3d 695, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
94. Id. at 707 (quoting U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 (1950)).
95. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in
original).
96. Id. at 1244.
97. Id.
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tively protecting the conduct at issue."98 That judge, Judge Rosemary Bar-
kett, argued that the Eleventh Circuit panel "made up" that requirement,
which was "entirely unsupported by any Supreme Court case," and that, if
"the Supreme Court required affirmative governmental protection of an as-
serted liberty interest, all of the Court's privacy cases would have been de-
cided differently."99
An analogous way to view this issue is through federal preemption
law. In Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,'00 a personal injury case involving
faulty truck brakes, the Supreme Court held that federal highway safety
laws did not preempt state trucking regulations and thus permitted the
plaintiffs' suit to proceed.10' A federal law, the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, expressly preempted state law whenever a Federal mo-
tor vehicle safety standard was in effect.10 2 The predecessor to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had issued regulations
concerning truck brakes, known as Standard 121, but a Court of Appeals
suspended the standard because it "was neither reasonable nor practica-
ble."o 3 The NHTSA amended Standard 121, but never took final action to
reinstate the standard, and thus it remained suspended.1 0 4 Despite the fact
that Standard 121 was suspended, Freightliner argued that "the absence of
regulation itself constitutes regulation." 0 5 The Court rejected that conten-
tion, holding that "the lack of federal regulation did not result from an af-
firmative decision of agency officials to refrain from regulating air
brakes." 06 The Court justified its conclusion by noting that the NHTSA
did not affirmatively decide anything. "Rather, the lack of a federal stand-
ard stemmed from the decision of a federal court that the agency had not
compiled sufficient evidence to justify its regulations."' 07
The logic of Abigail Alliance, Williams, and Freightliner places no
roadblocks in the food advocate's way. If legislative "affirmative action"
is the difference between a traditionally protected and a traditionally un-
98. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1308
(1 Ith Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane).
99. Id. at 1309; see also id. at 1309 n.49 (noting that "there was no lengthy tradition
of protecting abortion and the use of contraceptives, yet both were found to be protect-
ed by a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause").
100. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 284 (1995).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 284.
103. Id. at 285 (quoting Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978)).
104. Id. at 286.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 286.
107. Id. at 286-287.
188 [VOL. 9
FOOD CHOICE IS A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY RIGHT
regulated right, review of state and federal legislative action with respect to
farm slaughtered meat and poultry shows that state legislatures and Con-
gress have acted affirmatively for hundreds of years to protect farm to con-
sumer transactions. os As will be shown in Section V, infra, the American
colonies and states had a long tradition of regulating food safety dating
back to 1641.109 For centuries, states regulated many different aspects of
food sales, but always carefully left farm to consumer transactions alone." 0
Such carefully considered inaction was clearly an affirmative decision to
not regulate farm to consumer transactions. Even when states began re-
quiring meat inspection at the turn of the twentieth century, they often left
farm to consumer transactions unregulated.'" And, when Congress began
regulating food safety in the late nineteenth century, it followed suit and
also left farm to consumer transactions unregulated until as late as 1967,
only forty-seven years ago. 12 Thus, for the vast majority of our nation's
history, our government has studiously avoided regulating farm to consum-
er meat and poultry sales even though it regulated many other aspects of
food safety."3
IV. DEFINING THE PROPOSED RIGHT CAREFULLY
Defined broadly, we are talking about the individual's right to pur-
chase and consume food of her choice. While that argument may work in
philosophy, it is too broad for constitutional law, and especially for consti-
tutional law as marked by Glucksberg. Because the right to food choice
must be defined very narrowly in order to satisfy Glucksberg, a right to
purchase and consume food of one's choice is far too sweeping and gen-
eral.11 4 More to the point is an individual's right to purchase food of her
choice directly from the producer or grower of that food. But even that is
too broad for Glucksberg; the category of "food" includes many different
types of food, all of which are grown or produced in different ways and so
108. See infra Sections V.C & V.E.
109. Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 35.
110. Gary D. Libecap, The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat In-
spection and Antitrust, 30 EcoN. INQUIRY 242, 252 (1992).
111. See infra Section V.B.
112. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
113. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (stating that "[i]f a thing
has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case
for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it") (quoting Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260
U.S. 22, 31 (1922)); see also id.; Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664,
678 (1970) (an "unbroken practice ... openly and by affirmative state action, not cov-
ertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside").
114. See generally, e.g., Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2004).
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have different means of preparation for sale and different safety concerns.
In order to keep the right as narrow as possible, the right to purchase food
should be limited to food that is grown or produced similarly. Meat and
poultry are more similar than vegetables. Meat and poultry are live animals
that must be raised, slaughtered, and then kept cold so that they do not
spoil. Vegetables certainly have safety issues, but at the very least, they do
not need to be slaughtered, and some vegetables do not need to be kept cold
to avoid spoilage. For this reason, the consumer's right to purchase vege-
tables of her choice directly from the farmer should be treated separately.
A second issue is that, because we are concerned with purchasing
food free from governmental interference, the proposed right must include
that limitation. Finally, because we are also talking about farm slaughtered
meat and poultry, that qualification must also be included in the proposed
right.
Thus, the narrowest and most reasonable definition of our proposed
right that is based on the Nation's historical traditions is an individual's
right to purchase meat and poultry directly from the person who raised and
participated in the slaughtering of that meat or poultry without mandatory
governmental inspection. Such a restricted, focused definition satisfies
Glucksberg's requirement that one must "exercise the utmost care whenev-
er [breaking] new ground" in substantive due process litigation,' 15 as well
as the requirement that the careful description be dictated by the precise
facts of the case.'16
V. THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE MEAT AND POULTRY DIRECTLY FROM
THE FARMERS WHO RAISED THE ANIMALS, WITHOUT GOVERNMENTAL
INSPECTION, IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND TRADITION
The federal government and a majority of the states have traditional-
ly preserved the consumer's right to purchase meat and poultry from the
farmer without government inspection throughout the vast majority of
American history." 7 From the Pilgrims' landing at Plymouth Rock in 1620
until 1897, almost three centuries later, no American colony or state had
ever legally required mandatory inspection of meat or poultry sold by a
farmer on the farm directly to the consumer." 8 By 1907, only four states
had such requirements for meat."l9 As late as 1967, only twenty-eight
115. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
116. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004).
117. See infra Sections V.B & V.C.
118. See infra Section V.B.
119. 1905 Ariz. Sess. Laws 65, 89 (codified as REV. CODE ARIZ. § 3739 (1913));
REV. LAWS MASS. ch. 75, § 105 (1901)); 1897 Okla. Sess. Laws 237, 246 (codified as
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states had passed laws requiring such inspections, and eleven of those
states specifically exempted farm slaughtered meat from mandatory inspec-
tion.12 0 Thus, only forty-five years ago, a majority of states still had no
laws requiring inspection of farm slaughtered meat. Nor did the federal
government enact any such requirements until Congress passed the Whole-
some Meat Act in 1967, 191 years after the Revolution.121
Laws requiring inspection of poultry were even fewer and further
between. Congress passed no national poultry inspection law until 1957.122
By 1968, when Congress passed the more comprehensive Wholesome
Poultry Products Act,123 only twelve states had mandatory poultry inspec-
tion laws, and only four of those had active inspection programs.124
Analysis of state meat inspection laws shows that there can be no
question that the right to purchase meat and poultry directly from the
farmer is deeply rooted in American history and tradition. American histo-
ry includes centuries of direct farm to consumer purchases of meat and
poultry without governmental inspection. American legal traditions in-
clude acknowledging the value of the local farm and ensuring the continua-
tion of farm to consumer purchases of meat and poultry without govern-
mental inspection. 125
A. A BriefHistory of the Meat Trade: From the Local Farmer to the
National Meatpacking Industry
1. The Beginnings
From the earliest days of the American colonies until after the Civil
War, consumers slaughtered their own meat or purchased it locally, either
directly from the farmer or from a local butcher.12 6 The slaughtered meat
REV. STAT. OKLA. ch. 3, (37) §19 (1903)); 1907 Utah Laws 223 (codified as COMP.
LAWS UTAH §1990 (1917)).
120. FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-653, at 4 (1967).
121. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
122. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codi-
fied as 21 U.S.C. § 451 (1958)).
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-1333, at 4
(1968).
125. See generally State v. Spaugh, 129 N.C. 564, 567, 40 S.E. 60, 61 (1901); Follett,
supra note 13 at 37, 42.
126. See generally, e.g., RUDOLF A. CLEMEN, THE AMERICAN LIVESTOCK AND MEAT
INDUSTRY 3 (1966); GARY FIELDS, TERRITORIES OF PROFIT: COMMUNICATIONS,
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, AND THE INNOVATIVE ENTERPRISES OF G.F. SWIFT AND
DELL COMPUTER 92 (2004); George K. Holmes, The First American Farmers, in THE
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trade in those days was so rudimentary as to not even be considered a for-
mal industry. 12 7 As historian Charles W. McCurdy wrote, "[w]hen fresh
meat was available, consumers knew it had been slaughtered nearby." 2 8
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, slaughtered beef remained a
local product, regardless of how it was slaughtered; it rarely traveled more
than fifteen miles to its ultimate destination.129
Cattle and hogs grazed all spring and summer, and were slaughtered
in the fall.130 Livestock could only be slaughtered in the fall because the
flesh was not suitable for butchering in the spring, and, in the summer,
warm temperatures created a high risk of the meat spoiling before it was
cured.' 3' Because fresh meat did not last long, farmers would it eat it
quickly, share it with their neighbors, sell it locally for immediate con-
sumption, or cure and pack it for storage and sale.13 2 Once the slaughtering
season ended, there would be no more fresh meat until the next fall, and
families ate cured, packed meat or no meat at all. Prior the development of
refrigeration in the early 1870's, the only way to store beef was to cure it
and pack it in barrels.133 The packed beef would be sold locally or export-
ed, either to other colonies or abroad.134
2. The Modern Meat Industry Changes the Way Americans Purchase Meat
The modem, industrial food era began in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. New food products and technologies appeared, which al-
lowed items such as baking powder, oleomargarine, canned foods, and
MAKING OF AMERICA (Robert M. La Follette ed. 1907); Joanne Bowen, To Market, to
Market: Animal Husbandry in New England, 32 HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY 137, 141 (1998);
Karen J. Friedmann, Victualling Colonial Boston, 47 AGRIC. HIST. 189, 197-204
(1973); Elmer R. Kiehl & V. James Rhodes, Historical Development of Beef Quality
and Grading Standards 728 U. Mo. C. AGRIC. RES. BULL. 1, 10-11 (1960). Sarah F.
McMahon, A Comfortable Subsistence: The Changing Composition of Diet in Rural
New England, 1620-1840, 42 WM. & MARY Q. 26, 34-37 (1985).
127. FIELDS, supra note 126, at 96.
128. Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large
Corporation, 1875- 1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 643 (1978).
129. FIELDS, supra note 126, at 96.
130. Id.; SUSANNE FREIDBERG, FRESH: A PERISHABLE HISTORY 53 (2009); McMahon,
supra note 126, at 36.
131. McMahon, supra note 126, at 36.
132. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 25, 92; FREIDBERG, supra note 130, at 53; McMah-
on, supra note 126, at 35.
133. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 8; McMahon, supra note 126, at 34-35.
134. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 3.
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chemical preservatives to be shipped from afar without fear of spoilage.'35
The nation underwent wrenching changes that affected the food industry
and food safety. As a result of the Civil War, the country began to indus-
trialize and urbanize.1 3 6 The new national railroad network allowed more
food to be transported into the growing cities. 137 The railroads, as well as
the development of new lands in the West, where livestock could be pas-
tured, and the invention of the refrigerated boxcar, allowed a national beef
industry to develop and thrive in the 1870's.'" For the first time, ranchers
and meatpackers could ship live cattle and dressed meat long distances.
Unfortunately, these developments came with a dark side; the large Mid-
western meatpackersl 39 centered in Chicago now had the power, which they
used collusively to destroy the traditional, local meat trade.140
The newly industrializing and urbanizing cities became overcrowd-
ed, increasing the spread of disease, 14 1 and ultimately leading to federal
food regulation.14 2 The increased urbanization also damaged the relation-
ship between the consumer and the food producer; consumers were now
increasingly buying products about which they knew little.14 3 With the loss
of the consumer's relationship with the food producer came a loss of trust.
This new dependence on impersonal markets "eroded consumers' tradi-
tional methods of identifying quality food, beverage, and drug products,"
which was the connection with the local producer or seller.14 4 But even in-
135. Dennis R. Johnson, The History of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act and the
Meat Inspection Act, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 5, 6 (1982); Marc T. Law, The Origins
of State Pure Food Regulation, 63 J. EcON. HIST. 1103, 1105 (2003) [hereinafter Law,
Origins]; MARC T. LAW, HISTORY OF FOOD AND DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-food-and-drug-regulation-in-the-united-
states/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Law, History].
136. Johnson, supra note 135, at 5.
137. FIELDS, supra note 126, at 98; Peyton Ferrier & Russell Lamb, Government
Regulation and Quality in the U.S. Beef Market, 32 FOOD POL'Y 84, 87 (2007); John-
son, supra note 135, at 5.
138. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 6; Ferrier & Lamb, supra note 137, at 86.
139. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 3 (noting that the term "packing" originally meant
to cure and smoke meat for local use during the winter).
140. Id. at 173, 225; FIELDS, supra note 126, at 92, 95; Ferrier & Lamb, supra note
137, at 87; McCurdy, supra note 128, at 643.
141. Johnson, supra note 135, at 6.
142. Ilyse D. Barkan, Industry Invites Regulation: The Passage of the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 18, 21-22 (1985).
143. Id. at 20; Johnson, supra note 135, at 6; Law, Origins, supra note 135, at 1105;
Law, History, supra note 135.
144. Barkan, supra note 142, at 20.
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to the twentieth century, farmers continued to sell slaughtered animals di-
rectly to the consumer.145
B. Meat Inspection Under Colonial and State Law
1. The Earliest Days
Much has been written about the ubiquity of colonial and state food
regulations prior to the modem, federal food regulation era,14 6 but the earli-
est colonial food safety laws were "largely designed to protect colonial
trade."l 47 Dating back to 1641,148 these laws focused on inspection of ex-
ports, food adulteration, and weights and measures. 149 Just about every
colony and state regulated food to some degree.150 Nevertheless, despite
the occasional food adulteration law, in those days, as one historian put it,
consumers "were their own food and drug inspectors."151 After the Revolu-
tion, the majority of early state food safety laws continued to focus on the
export trade,15 2 requiring that the merchant submit the product for inspec-
tion and repacking before export.153
145. Louis D. HALL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEAT SITUATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, PART V, METHODS AND COST OF MARKETING LIVE STOCK AND MEATS 5, 8, 60
(1916), available at https://ia601809.us.archive.org/26/items/meats ituationi-
nul l unit 2/meatsituationinul l unit 2.pdf.
146. See, e.g., ALBERT A. GIESECKE, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE
1789 74-80 (1910); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 84-112 (1996); Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 35-
44; Wallace F. Janssen, America's First Food and Drug Laws, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 665, 666-69 (1975); Arthur L. Jensen, The Inspection of Exports in Colonial Penn-
sylvania, 78 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 275, 276-77 (1954); Law, Origins, supra
note 135, at 1103.
147. Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 38.
148. Id. at 35.
149. GIESECKE, supra note 146, at 75; Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 38-39; Janssen,
supra note 146, at 667; Jensen, supra note 146, at 276 (stating that "[n]o economic leg-
islation of the eighteenth century was more characteristic than the attempt to maintain
the quality of exports by means of compulsory inspection laws").
150. See GIESECKE, supra note 146, at 74-80; NOVAK, supra note 146, at 88-89.
151. Janssen, supra note 146, at 665.
152. Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 38-39.
153. Jensen, supra note 146, at 277-278.
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2. Early State Meat Inspection Statutes
Using the HeinOnline databases,' 54 I researched colonial and state
food inspection statutes prior to the enactment of the comprehensive 1907
Meat Inspection Act to determine whether they affected farm to consumer
sales of fresh meat or poultry in any way. This search revealed that, while
many states had some type of meat inspection statute, these statutes typical-
ly did not affect direct farm to consumer meat purchases. The statutes fell
into a number of categories. First, there were the meat inspection statutes
that applied only to exports.15 5 Second, while some states did require in-
spection of intrastate meat sales, they almost invariably governed only
cured meat that was sold in barrels.15 6 The third category consisted of in-
spection statutes that applied only to public markets.'57 The fourth catego-
ry required only inspection of the slaughtered animal's ears and hide.'58 A
fifth category provided for mandatory meat inspection, but only for meat
sold in urban areas.159 Sixth were the four states that passed mandatory
meat inspection laws in the late 1880's, however, these statutes were not
based on safety concerns. Rather, these laws were passed solely on eco-
nomic grounds, and the Supreme Court almost immediately held these stat-
utes to be unconstitutional in 1890, as will be discussed in Section V.C.2,
infra.
Only the following four states and territories required either ante-
mortem or postmortem inspection, or both, of all meat, fresh or cured, sold
within the state by 1907: a) Arizona;160 b) Massachusetts;' 6' c) Oklaho-
154. HeinOnline has two important databases of historical state statutes. The first is
its Session Laws Library, which "contains exact replications of the official bound ses-
sion laws of all fifty states" back to inception. HEINONLINE, SESSION LAWS LIBRARY,
http://heinonline.org/HeinDocs/DigitalSessionLaws.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
The second is the HeinOnline State Statutes: A Historical Archive, which contains su-
perseded statutes for all fifty states going back to 1717. HEINONLINE STATUTES, A
HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Welcome?collection=ssl (last visited
Dec. 26, 2013). These databases give a nearly complete picture of state and colonial
laws going back to the seventeenth century.
155. See, e.g., Act to Regulate the Inspection of Beef and Pork, ch. CXLVIII (codi-
fied as 1821 Me. Laws 499).
156. See, e.g., An Act to Provide for Inspecting Pork and Beef, 1840 Mo. Laws 92.
157. NOVAK, supra note 146, at 97.
158. See, e.g., 1895 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4949.
159. See, e.g., 1889 Ind. Acts 150 (codified as IND. CODE § 8145 (1881)), invalidated
by State v. Klein, 126 Ind. 68, 25 N.E. 873 (1890); 1901 Mont. Laws 65 (codified as
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1540-43 (1907)), repealed by 1921 Mont. Laws 582.
160. 1905 Ariz. Sess. Laws 65, 89 (codified as ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 3739 (1913)).
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 75, § 105 (1901).
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ma;162 and d) Utah.16 3 This left forty-four states and territories with no
comprehensive mandatory inspection requirements at that time.'6
States remained reluctant to require comprehensive meat inspection
until well into the twentieth century. Even as late as 1967, the year Con-
gress enacted the Wholesome Meat Act, which required inspection of intra-
state meat sales for the first time, only twenty-eight states had mandatory
antemortem and postmortem meat inspection laws.16 5 Moreover, at least
six of those states had only passed their laws within the previous six
years.166 By 1967, about 15% of commercially slaughtered animals and
25% of commercially processed meat food products were sold intrastate,
and so they were still not federally or state inspected to a significant de-
167gree.16
3. Meat Inspection: The Exemptions
Many states had exemptions in their meat inspection statutes large
enough to drive a truck through. The statutes featured two types of exemp-
tions: a) the farm slaughtered meat exemption; and b) the rural district, or
"no inspector available" exemption. The ubiquity of the farm slaughtered
exemption shows that many state legislatures had carefully considered the
need to regulate meat sales, but affirmatively decided that the safety of
farm slaughtered meat meant that it did not warrant regulation.' 68
The farm slaughtered exemption typically exempted all meat
slaughtered by a farmer from otherwise mandatory state meat inspection.
At least fourteen states had enacted such exemptions over the years. Of the
twenty-eight states with mandatory meat inspection laws in 1967, twelve
had farm or other type of local slaughtered exemption.169 These statutes
162. 1897 Okla. Sess. Laws 237, 246 (codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 3, § 19 (1903)).
163. 1907 Utah Laws 223 (codified as UTAH CODE ANN. § 1990 (West 1917)).
164. South Dakota passed a comprehensive mandatory meat inspection law in 1905,
but repealed it two years later. 1905 S.D. Sess. Laws 62, repealed by 1907 S.D. Sess.
Laws 80.
165. FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 90-653, at 4 (1967).
166. 1967 Ark. Acts 761; 1965 Iowa Acts 264; 1967 Mo. Laws 371; 1967 Nev. Stat.
1350; 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 900; 1966 Vt. Acts & Resolves 572.
167. FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 90-653, at 2 (1967).
168. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286 (1995).
169. California (CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 307 (Deering 1933), as amended by 1963 Cal.
Stat. 1223); Illinois (1959 111. Laws 1944); Indiana (1967 Ind. Acts 1104); Iowa (1965
Iowa Acts 264); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 327.111 (1948)); Missouri (1967 Mo.
Laws 371); North Carolina (1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 459 and 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 900);
Oregon (1961 Or. Laws 156); Utah (1907 Utah Laws 223 (codified as UTAH CODE
ANN. § 3-10-68 (1943), as amended by 1957 Utah Laws 24 (limiting consumption of
meat to the farmer's own family)); Vermont (1966 Vt. Acts & Resolves 572); Wash-
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were passed at various times from 1901 to as late as just months before the
passage of the federal Wholesome Meat Act in 1967, and were from two of
the top three cattle producing states in 1966, Iowa and California, and four
of the top nine.170 Two other states, Idaho and Montana, had passed meat
inspection acts with farm slaughtered exemptions that were repealed or su-
perseded before World War 11.171 Indiana also had a prior farm slaughtered
exemption that was included in a state inspection statute that the Supreme
Court invalidated in Minnesota v. Barber in 1890, as will be discussed in
Section V.C.2, infra.17 2 Thus, of all of the states that had even passed
comprehensive meat inspection statutes prior to the passage of the compre-
hensive 1967 Wholesome Meat Act, fully half of them had specifically ex-
empted farm or other locally slaughtered meat.
The second type of exemption was the rural district or "no inspector
available" exemption. In states with this exemption, if no inspector was
available or if an inspector could not conveniently get to the farm in ques-
tion to inspect the meat, the farmer need not have the meat inspected before
sale. Four states had enacted such statutes over the years: a) Colorado; b)
Florida; c) Montana; and d) Oklahoma.17 3
That the American colonies and states had for centuries carefully
and affirmatively regulated food safety is obvious from the plethora of such
statutes. That many states carefully and affirmatively exempted fresh meat
from inspection for hundreds of years is also obvious from the sheer num-
ber and scope of food safety statutes. The only way to buy fresh meat until
after the Civil War was from one's local butcher, and, as discussed previ-
ously, no state required inspection of fresh meat for any reason until well
after then. Because most states required inspection of goods other than
fresh meat, putting two and two together tells us that state legislatures pre-
sumably considered whether fresh meat needed to be inspected, and con-
cluded that it did not. Finally, that many states carefully and affirmatively
ington (WASH. REV. CODE §16.49.210 (1951)); and West Virginia (1966 W. Va. Acts
685).
170. STATISTICAL REPORTING SERV, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER
40 (1966).
171. Idaho (1911 Idaho Sess. Laws 607, amended by 1913 Idaho Sess. Laws 365
(codified as IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1326 (1932)), superseded by 1933 Idaho Sess.
Laws 108); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 1542 (1907), repealed by 1921 Mont. Laws
582).
172. IND. CODE § 8145 (1881), invalidated by State v. Klein, 126 Ind. 68, 25 N.E.
873 (1890).
173. 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 244, invalidated by Schmidt v. People, 18 Colo. 78, 31 P.
498 (1892); 1885 Fla. Laws 57, repealed by 1891 Fla. Laws 84; 1901 Mont. Laws 65
(codified as MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1540-43 (1907)), repealed by 1921 Mont. Laws 582;
1905 Okla. Sess. Laws 44, 47 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 2 § 8807 (1931)).
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exempted farm slaughtered meat from otherwise mandatory inspection is
similarly apparent from the number of such exemptions. Thus, farm-to-
consumer transactions can by no means be considered a traditionally un-
regulated area of commerce such that it is not deeply rooted in American
history and tradition.
C. Federal Law Affirmatively Preserved the Consumer's Right to
Purchase Meat Directly from the Farmer Without Inspection Until 1967
1. The Meat Inspection Acts
Consideration of the federal Meat Inspection Acts of 1890, 1891,
1906, and 1907, plus the 1938 amendment, dictates the same conclusion
that can be drawn from the state laws; until 1967, Congress affirmatively
regulated meat sales and affirmatively exempted farm slaughtered meat
from regulation. The original Meat Inspection Act of 1890 was very lim-
ited, requiring inspection only of "salted pork and bacon intended for ex-
portation." 74 The revised 1891 Act was more comprehensive, requiring
inspection of all live cattle intended for export and antemortem inspection
of "all cattle, sheep, and hogs which are subjects of interstate commerce
and which are about to be slaughtered at slaughter-houses, canning, salting,
packing or rendering establishments in any State or Territory."1 7 5 Postmor-
tem inspection was made optional.176 The Act contained an explicit farm
slaughtered exemption that stated that "none of the provisions of this act
shall be so construed as to apply to any cattle, sheep, or swine slaughtered
by any farmer upon his farm, which may be transported from one State or
Territory or the District of Columbia into another State or Territory or the
District of Columbia." 77
The 1906 and 1907 Meat Inspection Acts'"8 then reversed the 1891
Act's inspection requirements.' 79 Previously, antemortem examinations of
174. An Act Providing for an Inspection of Meats for Exportation, Prohibiting the
Importation of Adulterated Articles of Food or Drink, and Authorizing the President to
Make Proclamation in Certain Cases, and for Other Purposes, 26 Stat. 414 (1890).
175. An Act to Provide for the Inspection of Live Cattle, Hogs, and the Carcasses and
Products Thereof Which are the Subjects of Interstate Commerce, and for Other Pur-
poses, 26 Stat. 1089 (1891).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. An Act Making Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal
Year Ending June Thirtieth, Nineteen Hundred and Seven, 34 Stat. 669, 674-79 (1906);
An Act Making Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year
Ending June Thirtieth, Nineteenth Hundred and Eight, 34 Stat. 1256, 1260-65 (1907),
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animals intended for interstate commerce had been compulsory, and post-
mortem examinations were discretionary. Now, postmortem inspections
became mandatory and antemortem inspections became discretionary.
Both Acts retained the farm slaughtered exemption. The 1907 Act stood,
with only minor change, for sixty years until Congress replaced it in 1967
with the Wholesome Meat Act, which, for the first time, subjected all intra-
state meat sales to mandatory inspection and also removed the farm slaugh-
tered exemption for meat to be sold, substituting it with very limited ex-
emptions from inspection for meat to be used exclusively by the farmer's
family and for custom slaughtered beef.'80
2. The History of the Meat Inspection Acts
The legislative history of the Meat Inspection Acts, combined with
the history of non-Congressional events of those eras, shows that Congress
had never been concerned about the safety of farm slaughtered meat and
that it had "affirmatively determined that requiring [mandatory inspection
of farm slaughtered beef] was substantively inappropriate."' ' Thus, these
Acts do not raise the problem of the traditionally unregulated right ques-
tioned by Professor Barnett, Abigail Alliance II, and Williams.
a. Economic Concerns, Not Safety, Drove the Passage of the First Meat
Inspection Act
The 1890 Act's legislative history reveals that it was not food safety
concerns, but two unrelated economic concerns, that motivated Congress.
First, Europe started boycotting American pigs and pork in 1879 due to al-
leged safety concerns.182 Wanting to reclaim their business, the large
meatpackers sought governmental inspection as a way to demonstrate the
wholesomeness of their products.'83 Second, local butchers had been trying
codified as 21 U.S.C. §71 (1925). The farm slaughtered exemption appeared at 21
U.S.C. § 91.
179. 29 Op. Att'yGen. 355, 358 (1912).
180. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967) (codified as 21
U.S.C. § 601 (2012)). The current exemption appears at 21 U.S.C. § 623.
181. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286 (1995) (stating that "the lack of
federal regulation did not result from an affirmative decision of agency officials to re-
frain from regulating"); Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598, 612 (5th Cir.
2000) (applying Freightliner in a preemption case), abrogated by Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
182. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 320; KOLKO, supra note 40, at 98; Barkan, supra
note 142, at 23.
183. KOLKO, supra note 40, at 98; Kiehl & Rhodes, supra note 126, at 15.
20131 199
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
to stave off the large meatpackers' intrusion into their markets by claiming
that the national meatpackers slaughtered diseased cattle and that "dressed
beef was unwholesome.", 84 In the hopes of slowing the national meatpack-
ers' incursion into their livelihood, they lobbied state governments to pass
meat inspection laws requiring local antemortem inspection of cattle, ulti-
mately convincing three states and one territory, Minnesota, Indiana, Colo-
rado, and New Mexico, to pass such laws.185 Nothing was said about food
safety; the rationale for these laws was strictly economic. 186 Such a re-
quirement would have made the interstate meat trade economically infeasi-
ble, and so the national meatpackers challenged the constitutionality of
these laws, ultimately convincing the Supreme Court in 1890 to invalidate
the laws on the grounds that they unfairly affected interstate commerce. 187
To solve these two problems, a Senate Committee (the Vest Committee)
recommended in 1890 a national meat inspection scheme, as well as anti-
trust legislation (which became the Sherman Antitrust Act).'88 After Bar-
ber, the national meatpackers then joined the Vest Committee's call for
federal inspection as a permanent solution to the problem of local inspec-
tion.189
Either way, no evidence of any significant health issues over domes-
tic beef consumption emerged,190 and the demand for federal meat inspec-
tion requirements was certainly "not because Congress had in view the pro-
tection of the people of this country from the result of eating diseased
meats."' 9' In fact, the House Agriculture Committee report on the 1890
meat inspection bill flatly stated that the Committee did not believe the Eu-
ropean allegation of diseased pork and that it had no knowledge of the ex-
istence of disease in American pork, but that it was the Committee's duty
to do what needed to be done to satisfy European concerns over American
pork.1
92
184. Libecap, supra note 110, at 244.
185. INSPECTION OF LIVE CATTLE, ETC., H.R. REP. No. 51-3262, at 1 (1890); Libecap,
supra note 110, at 253.
186. McCurdy, supra note 128, at 646.
187. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); FIELDS, supra note 126, at 133-34.
188. Libecap, supra note I10, at 255.
189. McCurdy, supra note 128, at 643-48.
190. Libecap, supra note 110, at 246, 251.
191. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 323.
192. FUNSTON, INSPECTION OF MEATS FOR EXPORTATION, ETC., H.R. REP. No. 51-
1792, at 1 (1890) (Conf. Rep.).
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b. Congress was not Concerned with the Safety ofFarm Slaughtered Meat
In passing the Meat Inspection Acts, Congress implicitly and explic-
itly concerned itself only with food safety at the big meatpacking plants,
not with the safety of farm slaughtered fresh meat. For example, a clue to
Congress's implicit intent comes from an unusual juxtaposition of Con-
gressional findings for the 1891 Act. On the one hand, Congress acknowl-
edged that the layman could not detect unsafe or unwholesome meat, but,
on the other hand, in the same document, it considered inspection of farm
slaughtered meat to be impractical. First, the House Commerce Commit-
tee, in considering the Senate bill that became the basis for the 1891 Act,
quoted quite positively a letter from the Minnesota state veterinarian that
opined that "it is impossible for the masses" to determine the safety of
meat. 193 Nevertheless, the House subsequently "almost unanimously re-
volted"'9 4 against the Senate bill and demanded, among other changes, the
farm slaughtered exemption, which had not been in the original bill,'95 as
the price of passing the 1891 Act. 19 6 The most reasonable inference to
draw from this combination of statements is that Congress simply was not
concerned with any safety issues from farm slaughtered meat. Otherwise,
how else could the House pronounce the average consumer incapable of
ascertaining meat quality, but then allow farm slaughtered meat to be sold
to the consumer without inspection?
The year of 1906 proved no different. A House Committee report
that year pleaded that "the most rigid inspection of the meat and meat food
products which constitute so large a part of the food of the country must be
insured."' 97 But the plea fell on deaf ears. The Committee approved the
continued exemption from inspection of farm slaughtered meat.198
More explicitly that year, in the House Agriculture Committee hear-
ings for an amendment (the Beveridge Amendment) to the bill that became
the 1906 Act, a Department of Agriculture solicitor, George P. McCabe,
testified that "[t]he impression that we have had in regard to that is that this
legislation was directed toward the proprietors of canning, slaughtering,
193. STOCKBRIDGE, INSPECTION OF LIVE CATTLE, ETC., H.R. REP. NO. 51-3262, at 1
(1890) (Conf. Rep.).
194. 22 CONG. REC. 43,713 (1891).
195. 22CONG.REC. 1422 (1891).
196. HATCHER, INSPECTION OF LIVE CATTLE, ETC., H.R. REP. No. 51-3761, at I
(1891) (Conf. Rep.).
197. WADSWORTH, AMENDMENTS TO AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATION BILL, H.R. REP.
No. 59-4953, at 5 (1906) (Conf. Rep.).
198. Id.
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rendering, and packing establishments."' 99 For McCabe, the conditions in
the Chicago packing houses were the single reason for the passage of the
Meat Inspection Act. 20 0 In fact, "Conditions in Chicago Stock Yards" was
the running header of the hearing testimony published by the House Agri-
culture Committee.20 1
President Roosevelt agreed with McCabe. The only area of concern
to the President was the conditions in the Chicago stock yards.20 2 A 1906
Attorney General opinion confirmed that:
[i]t is well known that [the 1906 Meat Inspection Act] was
enacted by Congress immediately in response to the mes-
sage of the President of June 4, 1906, transmitting the re-
port of Messrs. Reynolds and Neill, who had been appoint-
ed by him to investigate the conditions in the Chicago
stock yards and packing houses.2 03
And even when focus is limited to the conditions in the Chicago stock-
yards, freshly slaughtered (dressed) beef was not a concern; it was only
packaged beef that people were worried about. Solicitor McCabe later
wrote that, "[a]t no time during the investigation of the packing-house con-
ditions was there any considerable complaint against fresh meats (which
would have included farm slaughtered meat). The criticism was directed
199. Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture on the So-called "Beveridge
Amendment" to the Agricultural Appropriation Bill (H.R. 1853) as Passed by the Sen-
ate May 25, 1906 - To Which are Added Various Documents Bearing Upon the "Beve-
ridge Amendment, " 59th Cong. 93 (1906) (statement of George P. McCabe, Solicitor
for the Department of Agriculture) [hereinafter Hearings on the Beveridge Amend-
ment].
200. George P. McCabe, The New Meat-Inspection Law and its Bearing Upon the
Production and Handling of Meats, 101 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUS. CIRCULAR 5, 14 (1907).
201. See Hearings on the Beveridge Amendment, supra note 199, at 261.
202. Id
203. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 50, 51 (1906). Later, an opinion repeated this position, stating
that:
[t]he meat inspection and sanitation provisions were ... introduced
late in the debate and was directed to curing the "evils" of the pack-
ing industry. The debate in the Senate centered not on the types of
establishments to be subjected to the inspection and sanitation re-
quirements, but on the issue of whether the "packers" or the federal
government should pay the costs of inspection.
42 Op. Att'y Gen. 459, 462 (1972).
202 [VOL. 9
FOOD CHOICE IS A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY RIGHT
against conditions of filth and uncleanliness in the preparation and handling
of prepared meat-food products."204
The following year, the Chief of the Department of Agriculture's
Bureau of Animal Industry, Dr. Alonzo D. Melvin, testified in the commit-
tee hearings for the 1907 Act in response to questions about whether the
previous year's expos6 of unsafe conditions in the meatpacking industry (as
depicted in Upton Sinclair's The Jungle) had affected American meat ex-
ports. He testified that, "I think that the meat that was affected by this agi-
tation was almost entirely confined to canned meats. I do not think our
fresh meat suffered at all." 2 05 Farmers, of course, produced fresh meat.
Three decades later, Congress amended the Meat Inspection Act.206
It was a minor amendment, but it should be interpreted as another affirma-
tive Congressional statement of confidence of the safety of farm-raised
meat. The amendment was passed in order to define the term "farmer," be-
cause unscrupulous livestock buyers were buying unwholesome calves and
taking advantage of the farm slaughtered exemption (which also included a
limited retailer exemption) to sell them without inspection.2 07 Congress
could have shut the whole thing down right then and there; it could have
simply eliminated the farm slaughtered exemption and moved on. But it
did not. The amendment was an unspoken Congressional vote of confi-
dence in the farmer's continued ability to provide safe meat for the con-
sumer.
Finally, and significantly, at no point in any of the Congressional
debates on any of the four Meat Inspection Acts did any legislator raise any
concerns over the safety of farm slaughtered meat.208 Nor did Congress,
when it eliminated the farm slaughtered exemption in 1967, express any
concerns over the safety of farm slaughtered meat.209
204. McCabe, supra note 200, at 14.
205. Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture on the Estimates of Appropria-
tions for the Department ofAgriculture for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1908, 59th
Cong. 244 (1907) (statement of Alonzo D. Melvin, Chief of the Bureau of Animal In-
dustry).
206. Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1260 (codified as 21 U.S.C. §
71).
207. FLANNAGAN, AMEND. MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 75-2310, at 3
(1938) (Conf. Rep.).
208. GEORGE P. MCCABE, U. S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., INDEX TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ACTS OF CONGRESS INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 1,
6-7, 26-27, 30 (1912). This publication contains an index to the Congressional debates
for, among other acts, the four Meat Inspection Acts. With this document as a guide, I
was able to read the Congressional debates for the Meat Inspection Acts. Whenever
any Congressman raised food safety, it was always about the meatpackers. There were
no negative statements about farm-raised meat.
209. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 30,508-551 (1967).
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This evidence is more than sufficient to show that farm raised meat
is not a traditionally unregulated right. For eight decades, Congress had
considered national meat safety and always believed that farmers could be
trusted to raise and produce safe meat.
D. Farm Slaughtered Meat: The Statistics
Farm slaughtered meat was still very common at the turn of the
twentieth century. By 1903, 11% of American cattle was still farm slaugh-
tered. 210 By 1909, after the passage of the 1906 and 1907 Meat Inspection
Acts, that figure had decreased only slightly, to 10 .3%.211 However, it was
far higher for veal calves (17.4% of the total) and for hogs (28.9% of the
total). 212 By 1916, farm slaughtered cattle maintained a substantial pres-
ence in many states, including New Hampshire (13% of the total), Maine
(12.3%), North Carolina (11.7%), and Florida (11.0%).213 While farm
slaughtered animals were generally sold to local butchers, farmers would
still sell them on the farm directly to consumers at that time.214 The
amount of farm slaughtered beef decreased substantially during the twenti-
eth century, but even as late as 1961, six years before the passage of the
1967 federal Wholesome Meat Act, farmers still farm slaughtered 3.2% of
American cattle, and, in 1965, 2.5% of cattle were still farm slaughtered. 2 15
E. Poultry Develops from a Trade to an Industry
Poultry was a strictly local commodity that did not become big
business until well after World War 11.216 As late as the early 1920's, there
was still no American poultry industry to speak of.217 Approximately 90%
of all American farms as of that time kept a small flock of chickens for
eggs; chicken sales in this era were primarily a byproduct of egg produc-
210. HALL ET AL., supra note 145, at 16.
211. Id. at 12.
212. Id. at 15.
213. Id. at 8-9.
214. Id. at 60.
215. STATISTICAL REPORTING SERV, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 170, at 5.
216. 103 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1957) (statement of Rep. Leonor Sullivan); STEVE
STRIFFLER, CHICKEN: THE DANGEROUS TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA'S FAVORITE
FOOD 32 (2005); James A. Albert, A History ofAttempts by the Department ofAgricul-
ture to Reduce Federal Inspection of Poultry Processing Plants - A Return to the Jun-
gle, 51 LA. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1991).
217. Marc Linder, I Gave My Employer a Chicken that Had No Bone: Joint Firm-
State Responsibility for Line-Speed-Related Occupational Injuries, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 33, 43 (1995).
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218tion. The modem broiler industry began in the mid 1920's in Delaware,
although it was not until the 1940's and 1950's that it really began to take
off due in part to American war policies and price subsidies during World
War 11.219 One can better appreciate how the broiler industry went from ze-
ro to a chicken in every pot by taking in the consumption statistics-from
0.5 pounds of chicken eaten per capita in 1934 to 60.3 pounds per capita in
1987.220
1. State Poultry Inspection Statutes
Even as late as 1968, only twelve states had mandatory poultry in-
221spection laws, and only four had active inspection programs. Moreover,
eight of those twelve states exempted either farm slaughtered poultry or
poultry sold very locally. 22 2 A total of 13% of American poultry was still
slaughtered without federal inspection at that time.2 23 However, this pauci-
ty of regulation should still not be interpreted as a traditionally unregulated
industry. As stated above, poultry was barely an industry until the Great
Depression; Americans simply did not eat poultry in any significant
amount until after World War II. They ate eggs and the occasional chick-
en. Accordingly, poultry was not a traditionally unregulated industry; ra-
ther, it had not been an industry at all until the 1930's and 1940's. To be
218. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Legislation Affecting the Food and Drug
Administration of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 84th Cong. 23 (1956)
(statement of Earl L. Butz, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture) [hereinafter Statement of
Earl L. Butz]; WRIGHT PATMEN ET AL., PROBLEMS IN THE POULTRY INDUSTRY, H.R.
REP. No. 85-2717, at 2 (1959); DONALD D. STULL & MICHAEL J. BROADWAY,
SLAUGHTERHOUSE BLUES: THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY IN NORTH AMERICA 43-
44 (2nd ed. 2013).
219. Statement of Earl L. Butz, supra note 218, at 23. (noting that "[c]ommercial
broiler production was hardly recognized as an industry in the late thirties");
STRIFFLER, supra note 216, at 33-35, 43.
220. FLOYD A. LASLEY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC
REPORT No. 591: THE U.S. BROILER INDUSTRY 8-9 (1988).
221. WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-1333, at 4 (1968)
(Conf. Rep.).
222. California (1955 Cal Stat. 3417, 3418-19), Delaware (191 Del. Laws 628, 638
(1967)), Illinois (1959 Ill. Laws 1944), Iowa (1965 Iowa Acts 264), and Missouri (1967
Mo. Laws 371) had straightforward farm slaughtered exemptions. Indiana (1967 Ind.
Acts 1104) and North Carolina (1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1183, 1184) exempted intra-
country poultry sales from inspection. Tennessee exempted farm slaughtered poultry
from inspection when the farmers slaughtered the animals for their own consumption
and sold the excess directly to consumers. 1967 Tenn. Pub. Acts 261.
223. WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, S. REP. No. 90-1449, at 3 (1968) (Conf.
Rep.).
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concerned with the lack of poultry regulations before World War II would
be equivalent to being concerned with the lack of internet regulations prior
to the 1990's. Then, once the industry arose, governmental regulation fol-
lowed. But, just as with meat inspection, a substantial number - in fact, a
majority - of state poultry inspection statutes recognized the safety of farm
slaughtered or locally raised poultry and exempted such poultry from oth-
erwise mandatory inspection.
2. The Poultry Inspection Acts
Although an early draft of the 1906 meat inspection bill called for
poultry inspection, only meat remained in the final bill, 2 24 and so the Poul-
try Products Inspection Act of 1957 became the first federal poultry inspec-
tion act.225 The Act required both antemortem and postmortem inspection
of all poultry slaughtered in "any official establishment processing poultry
or poultry products for commerce or in, or for marketing in a designated
city or area."226 Like the Meat Inspection Acts, the Poultry Products In-
spection Act exempted from inspection poultry raised by poultry producers
on their own farms which are sold directly to household consumers or res-
taurants, hotels, and boarding houses for use in their own dining rooms or
in the preparation of meals for sales direct to consumers only.227 But only
eleven years later, Congress passed the Wholesome Poultry Products Act,
which substantially limited the farm slaughtered exemption. 2 28 As rewrit-
ten, the Act exempted farm slaughtered poultry from inspection only for
farmers who slaughter or process the products of more than 5000 turkeys or
20,000 chickens or other domesticated birds per year.229 Congress later re-
vised the exemption to eliminate the chicken and turkey distinction, and the
exemption now applies to all farmers who slaughter fewer than 20,000
birds per year.230
224. KOLKO, supra note 40, at 104.
225. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codi-
fied as 21 U.S.C. §451 (1958)).
226. Id. at § 6(a).
227. Id. at § 15(a)(1).
228. Wholesome Poultry Products Act, Pub. L. No. 90-492, 82 Stat. 791 (1968) (cod-
ified as 21 U.S.C. §451 (2012)).
229. Id. at § 14(c)(3).
230. 21 U.S.C. § 464(c)(1)(A-D) (2006).
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3. The Poultry Inspection Acts: Legislative History
In debating the Poultry Inspection Acts, Congress strongly vouched for
the safety of farm raised and slaughtered poultry. Congressmen and Con-
gresswomen went out of their way to emphasize the safety of the poultry
raised by the local farmer. For example, in debating the 1957 Act, several
legislators pointedly recounted, without rebuttal, how they and their neigh-
bors would buy their poultry from the local farmer without any need for in-
spection and without any safety concerns over potentially unsanitary pro-
cessing.231 It was Congresswoman Leonor Sullivan who hit the nail right
on the head by stating:
Now let me explain how the need for this poultry leg-
islation has arisen. One might ask why we suddenly need
poultry inspection laws when we have managed to get
along for 51 years since the passage of the Meat Inspection
Act without having poultry included along with the red
meats-beef, pork, lamb-under a compulsory inspection
system.
There are two answers to that question. One is that
until food technology and refrigeration engineering made
possible freezing and nationwide distribution of poultry by
big firms, you usually bought a chicken or turkey raised
not far from where you lived, and sold by a farmer from
his truck or sold by a neighborhood storekeeper whom you
knew had a good reliable supplier from a nearby farm.
But in recent years, poultry has gone bigtime and big
business. The small farmer is not a factor. As a matter of
fact, under this bill, the farmer can still raise his chickens
and take them to town and sell them directly to the house-
wife without having to worry about inspection. But when
you buy his poultry you know where that chicken comes
from. 232
231. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Legislation Affecting the Food and Drug
Administration of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare United States Senate,
84th Cong. 2 (1956) (statement of Senator James Murray) (stating that "I have been
convinced that S. 3176 should be amended to exempt from inspection poultry slaugh-
tered, dressed, and sold to the ultimate consumer by farmers themselves"); 103 CONG.
REC. 11,122-123 (1957) (statements of Congresswomen Cornelia Knutson and Leonor
Sullivan).
232. 103 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1957).
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Congresswoman Sullivan told the truth that dared not to be told. Small
and local was safer than big and distant, or so people believed. As was
seen in Section I, supra, this is one of the factors that now drives the local
food movement.
The House Agriculture Committee's formal reason for the farm
slaughtered exemption was twofold and particularly telling: first, it did not
want to burden small farmers "who are marketing wholesome poultry
products" as a side business, and second, requiring inspection of all poultry
sold in the country would simply be impracticable.23 3 The Committee thus
assumed that the small farmers would be marketing wholesome poultry
products.
F. Conclusion
The main conclusion to be drawn from the history of the Meat and
Poultry Inspection Acts is that meat has been subject to heavy governmen-
tal regulation since the 1600's, but that governments, both state and federal,
maintained a hands-off approach to farm to consumer meat transactions un-
til relatively recently in our history. There was far less government regula-
tion of poultry throughout the years, but there was also far less commerce
in poultry. Once the poultry trade matured into an industry, governmental
regulation appeared to control it, again with a hands-off approach to farm
to consumer poultry transactions. For these reasons, Americans can make a
strong argument that they have a deeply rooted tradition of purchasing meat
and poultry directly from their local farmer without governmental interfer-
ence.
VI. THE CONSUMER'S RIGHT To PURCHASE MEAT AND POULTRY
DIRECTLY FROM THE FARMER WITHOUT MANDATORY GOVERNMENT
INSPECTION Is A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
In Section IV, I defined the proposed right carefully. In Section V, I
showed that the right is deeply rooted in American history and tradition.
Now we will see that the right to purchase meat and poultry of one's choice
directly from the farmer who raised the animals, without mandatory gov-
ernmental inspection, is indeed a fundamental liberty right protected by the
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
233. WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-1333, at 14 (1968)
(Conf. Rep.).
208 [VOL. 9
FOOD CHOICE IS A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY RIGHT
A. The Surprisingly Inclusive Definitions ofLiberty and Privacy
The Supreme Court has defined liberty very broadly over the years.
One seeking to show that he has a protected right to purchase food of his
choice directly from the farmer or producer, or that food choice is essential
to one's self-identity or self-expression, can point to many expansive defi-
nitions of the concept over the years. A logical starting point is the Su-
preme Court's famous 1923 definition, in which it stated that liberty:
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men.234
Given that American history and traditions have long included the
right to purchase meat and poultry directly from the farmer without gov-
ernmental interference, the common law surely recognizes that activity as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. And with respect
to the pursuit of happiness, our most philosophical Founding Father,
Thomas Jefferson, who knew a little about that quest, once warned that:
[t]he legitimate powers of government extend to such acts
only as are injurious to others.... Was the government to
prescribe to us our medicine and diet, our bodies would be
in such keeping as our souls are now. Thus in France the
emetic was once forbidden as medicine, and the potatoe as
an article of food.235
Today, by barring the door to the purchase of farm slaughtered meat and
poultry without governmental interference, governments are, as Jefferson
counseled against, prescribing our diet to us.
Governmental prohibition of private farm to consumer transactions
also limits Americans' liberty to take the risks that they wish to take. As
food lawyer Peter Hutt wrote:
234. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
235. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 235-36 (3d American
Ed. 1801).
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even the most unsophisticated citizen can readily deter-
mine that the risks from some of the dangers charged to the
food supply are far smaller than the risks that we willingly
accept without question as we go about our daily busi-
ness. . . . Since we are free to choose or reject many other
risks, it is difficult for the public to perceive why we
should not also be free to choose, on an individual basis,
the risks that we will accept in the food we eat.236
All forms of living entail some amount of risk. To the extent that eat-
ing uninspected, farm slaughtered meat and poultry is riskier than consum-
ing industrial meat and poultry from Big Food, which is a subject beyond
the scope of this article, it should be for the consumer to determine how
much governmental protection and how much risk she wants.
The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Assistant Commission-
er for Professional and Consumer Programs acknowledged decades ago
that "[c]onsumers want to know, 'How much risk exists?' At the same
time, they want to retain the right to take risks, if they feel the benefits are
great enough," and that "[r]ealistically, we know that consumers do not and
will not have their food habits dictated to them by a regulatory agency."2 3 7
The then Acting Director of the FDA's Bureau of Foods bluntly stated that
"we should stop pretending that absolute safety for food is possible. It
isn't, for there is virtually no food that is without some risk to some person.
We should acknowledge and explain this to the public." 2 38 A dissenting
opinion from the Minnesota Supreme Court in a dispute over the sale of un-
inspected meat touched on this issue, perhaps even touching a nerve with a
demand for the evidence of comparative risk between farm slaughtered
meat and Big Food's meat, opining that:
[d]espite the fact that custom processors may return unin-
spected, processed meats to an unlimited number of quali-
fying persons for individual use, a farmer may not sell his
own custom-processed meats to the public. If the former
does not present a public health risk, it is difficult to see
236. Peter Barton Hutt, The Basis and Purpose of Government Regulation of Adul-
teration and Misbranding ofFood, 33 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 505, 528 (1978).
237. William V. Whitehom, Consumer Interests - Do We Get the Foods We Want?,
31 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 656, 657, 661 (1976).
238. Peter Barton Hutt, Unresolved Issues in the Conflict between Individual Free-
dom and Government Control of Food Safety, 33 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 558, 563
(1978) (citing 124 CONG. REC. E1310 (1978)).
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how the latter does, especially considering the low volume
of sales normally associated with sales by a single
farmer.239
B. Liberty and Philosophy
For the philosophers, the idea of liberty means that a person has "the
'right' to make his own choices no matter how foolish or self-defeating
such choices may be." 240 Advocates of this school of thought included
John Locke, "the ideological father of the American revolution,"24 1 and
John Stuart Mill, the great nineteenth century proponent of liberty. For
Locke, "individuals do not give up to the government those rights of self-
autonomy that do not threaten to invade the rights of others or to cause
harm to others." 242 Mill wrote more explicitly, stating that:
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise
or even right.243
Liberty, for Mill, clearly "entails the right to make bad decisions and
poor choices."244 According to Mill, "[t]he only part of the conduct of any
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, abso-
lute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sover-
eign." 245 While the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted this position,
239. Minnesota v. Hartmann, 700 N.W.2d 449, 461 (Minn. 2005) (G. Barry Ander-
son, J., dissenting).
240. ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE
LIBERTY 63 (1986).
241. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 815 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
242. Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative To Substantive
Due Process Analysis Of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 112-13
(2000); Kevin S. Toll, The Ninth Amendment and America's Unconstitutional War on
Drugs, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 417, 420 (2007).
243. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS 5, 15 (1966).
244. THOMAS FLEINER-GERSTER & LIDIJA R. BASTA FLEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY IN A MULTICULTURAL AND GLOBALISED WORLD 205 (2009).
245. Mill, supra note 243.
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lower courts have traced the modem American notions of personal auton-
omy and the right of self-determination back to Locke and Mill's ideas on
liberty.246 At least several lower court judges have explicitly agreed with
Mill's idea that liberty grants one the right to be wrong.247 Locke's and
Mill's views on liberty and autonomy thus clearly point the way to a consti-
tutional right to be free from governmental involvement in a private farm to
consumer meat or poultry sale.
However, the food rights advocate should be aware that Mill is not
the last word on liberty. Although courts, including the Supreme Court,
have invoked Mill from time to time, 248 Supreme Court Justice Powell, sit-
ting by designation on the Eleventh Circuit after his retirement from the
Supreme Court, sniffed that "the impressive pedigree of [Mill's] political
ideal does not readily translate into a constitutional right." 249
C. Liberty Includes the Right to Self-Identity
In 1984, the Supreme Court explicitly included self-identity within
the ambit of protected liberty interests, holding in a case involving the right
to association that the ability to "define one's identity" is "central to any
concept of liberty." 2 50 Another indispensable element of liberty is the abil-
246. See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. at 815-16; Arm-
strong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 372-73 (Mont. 1999); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 950
(Me. 1987).
247. In re Fisher, 552 N.Y.S.2d 807, 813 n. 17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (noting that
"[t]he fact that someone else might, or could make better choices is not the point. In a
constitutional system such as ours which prizes and protects individual liberties to
make decisions, even bad ones, the right to make those decisions must be preserved");
Richards v. State, 743 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that "'[liberty'
also necessarily implies one's acceptance of the risks involved in being free to make
mistakes, to be foolish, to err, to blunder, without being punished by the social organi-
zation unless harm is thereby inflicted on others") (Levy, J., dissenting); State v. Betts,
21 Ohio Misc. 175, 184 (1969) (noting that "[i]ncluded in man's 'liberty' is the free-
dom to be as foolish, foolhardy or reckless as he may wish, so long as others are not
endangered thereby. The State of Ohio has no legitimate concern with whether or not
an individual cracks his skull while motorcycling; that is his personal risk").
248. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 465, 467 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "[t]he Framers of the Constitution would doubtless have agreed with
the great English political philosopher John Stuart Mill"); New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 n. 13 (1964).
249. Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Williams v. At-
torney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11 th Cir. 2004) (stating that "[r]egardless of
[Mill's] force as a policy argument, however, it does not translate ipse dixit into a con-
stitutionally cognizable standard").
250. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
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ity to further personal bonds "by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals
and beliefs." 25 1 Then there is the plurality opinion in Casey, which stated
that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of ex-
istence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Be-
liefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State." 25 2 The right to define one's
own concept of existence surely includes the right to decide what foods one
wants to eat and where and how one wants to purchase them. 253 Lawrence
continued this theme, holding that "[1]iberty presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct ... [both in] its spatial and in its more transcendent dimen-
sions." 254 Even brief definitions from the Supreme Court include such pro-
nouncements as: "[i]n a Constitution for a free people, there can be no
doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed," 25 5 and liberty
"extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pur-
sue."256 Once again, the full range of conduct that one might want to pur-
sue is buying one's meat and poultry in a private transaction, without gov-
ernmental interference, from the farmer who raised the animals.
D. Liberty Includes the Right to Self-Expression
Americans' liberty rights have long since included self-
expression.25 7 As the Supreme Court has held, "it is a prized American
privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste,
on all public institutions." 258
251. Id.
252. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
253. See Alan Rubel, Local Trans Fats Bans and Consumer Autonomy, 10 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 41, 42 (2010) (stating that "[t]he freedom to choose what we eat is im-
portant insofar as it is a function of persons' autonomy over their food choices. That is,
personal autonomy is what underwrites the value of choosing what we eat.").
254. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
255. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
256. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
257. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 847 F. Supp. 178,
196 (D. Mass. 1994) (noting that "[o]f course, the party seeking to communicate has an
individual liberty interest in self-expression.").
258. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783 (1985) (stating that "[t]he free speech
guarantee gives each citizen an equal right to self-expression").
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E. Concurring and Dissenting Supreme Court and Lower Court Opin-
ions on Liberty are Even Broader
Concurring and dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court have
been particularly far reaching. Justice Blackmun wrote in Casey that "per-
sonal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny
should be largely beyond the reach of government." 25 9  Concurring in
Glucksberg, Justice Stevens cited his earlier Seventh Circuit holding that
the liberty clause "brings to mind the origins of the American heritage of
freedom - the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state
intrusions on the citizen's right to decide how he will live his own life in-
tolerable."' 26 0 Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton, the
companion case to Roe v. Wade, contains as broad a definition of liberty as
has been seen in American jurisprudence. For Justice Douglas, liberty in-
cludes, among other rights: a) "the autonomous control over the develop-
ment and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality;"
and b) "the freedom to care for one's health and person, freedom from bod-
ily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf."2 6 1
Appellate decisions also paint with a broad brush. In reversing
summary judgment for the defendant police department in a hair grooming
case, the Second Circuit held that "[p]ersonal liberty is not composed simp-
ly and only of freedoms held to be fundamental but includes the freedom to
make and act on less significant personal decisions without arbitrary gov-
ernment interference." 26 2 In another hair length case, the First Circuit held
that liberty "seems to us an incomplete protection if it encompasses only
the right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with
those personal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the abil-
ity of others to enjoy their liberty." 2 63 Given that food choice is somewhat
less momentous than such life-altering decisions as abortion or marriage,
259. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring and dissenting).
260. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 744-45 (1997) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'1 Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)
(footnotes omitted).
261. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). A feder-
al judge cited this concurrence in ruling that the constitutional liberty guarantee pro-
tected parents' right to name their child whatever they wanted. Jech v. Burch, 466 F.
Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979).
262. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973); see also BAM Historic
Dist. Ass'n v. Koch, 723 F.2d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that liberty "includes the
opportunity to make a range of personal decisions concerning one's life, family, and
private pursuits").
263. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970).
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Dwen and Richards, as well as Justice Douglas's Doe concurrence, protect
a right to food choice by showing that our constitutional liberty rights pro-
tect the smaller things in life as well as the big.
F. Defining Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized two separate types of privacy
rights: a) "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters;" and b) "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions." 264 The first right is often referred to as the "confidenti-
ality" branch, and the second the "autonomy" branch.265  Only the
autonomy branch is relevant for the practitioner advocating a consumer's
right to food choice. While the Court has not defined the "outer limits" of
the right to privacy, 266 it has only explicitly found privacy rights in matters
involving marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
childrearing and education.267 However, Justice Douglas would add to the
right to privacy "the privilege of an individual to plan his own affairs, for,
'outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape
his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases."' 2 68
Lower courts have made clear that, at least in the medical treatment
context, the right to privacy means "the sanctity of individual free choice
and self-determination." 2 69 In finding a privacy right in a patient's right to
receive acupuncture from a traditional acupuncture practitioner, as opposed
to a licensed physician, the Southern District of Texas in Andrews v. Bal-
lard defined Carey 's "important decision" requirement as a decision that
"must profoundly affect one's development or one's life." 2 70 Andrews' rea-
soning is helpful to the food rights campaign. If choices in food are im-
portant decisions, perhaps even very important decisions that profoundly
affect one's life, then certainly our constitutional right to privacy should
protect such choices.
264. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
265. Pouliot v. Town of Fairfield, 226 F. Supp.2d 233, 247 (D. Me. 2002).
266. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85.
267. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
268. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
269. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
(Mass. 1977).
270. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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G. You Are What You Eat: Food Choice as a Part of Self-Identity and
Self-Expression
1. What are Self-Identity and Self-Expression?
As an academic term, "self-identity refers to the understanding that
an individual has of himself or herself."27 1 Another way to put it is that
self-identity is one's "life story." 2 72 Self-expression is closely related to
self-identity. Then, if self-identity is one's life story, self-expression is tell-
ing one's life story to someone else; it is the "assertion of one's individual
traits."273 A person might use his self-identity and self-expression to an-
swer the question, "who am I?",274 And, in academia, the question "who am
I?" necessarily incorporates the question "what do I eat?"
2. What is Food Choice?
Modem sociological research has confirmed the obvious; you truly
are what you eat. Human food preferences are some of the oldest human
inclinations; in fact, food choice is "close to the center of [human] self-
definition."275 It is religious and cultural expression.276 For millennia, hu-
mans have traditionally thought of food choice as a means of distinguishing
between their tribe, group, or culture and the alien, enemy tribes or
groups.277 Modern social science research recognizes that food choice is
"fundamental to our sense of self,"278 a method of assigning identity to
oneself and to others,279 a way to act upon one's personal ideologies,280 a
271. RONALD L. JACKSON II, ED., 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IDENTITY 547 (2010).
272. Id.
273. Heejung S. Kim & David K. Sherman, "Express Yourself': Culture and the Ef-
fect of Self-Expression on Choice, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2007)
(quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2006)).
274. E.g., PAMELA GOYAN KITTLER & KATHRYN P. SUCHER, FOOD AND CULTURE 15
(4th ed. 2004); Jostein Rise et al., The Role of Self-Identity in the Theory of Planned
Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1085, 1087 (2010).
275. SIDNEY W. MINTZ, SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLACE OF SUGAR IN MODERN
HISTORY 3 (1986).
276. See Rencher, supra note 23, at 431-36.
277. Id
278. Avi Brisman, Fair Fare? Food as Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails,
15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 49, 52 (2008).
279. Bisogni, supra note 12, at 129.
280. J. Pollard et al., Factors Affecting Food Choice in Relation to Fruit and Vegeta-
ble Intake: A Review, 15 NUTRITION RES. REv. 373, 381-82 (2002).
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28 1 282way to make sense of the world,28' a political statement, and a way to
create meaning in one's life. 2 83 Food choice is "a basic form of self-
creating, self-expression, and self-definition."284 It is so basic that the "cor-
relation between what people eat, how others perceive them, and how they
characterize themselves [has been called] striking." 2 85 Even a brief review
of the social science literature on the subject shows that there are no contra-
ry views.
3. Social Science is Valid Evidence
While American courts have not yet acknowledged food choice as a
component of self-identity or self-expression, this does not necessarily pre-
clude the possibility in the future. American jurisprudence unquestionably
accepts social science opinions. For more than a century, the Supreme
Court has employed social science opinions in constitutional disputes, 28 6
notably utilizing it in Brown v. Board of Education, in which it cited nu-
merous such studies in support of its opinion.28 7 Since Brown, the Court
has frequently consulted social science research in cases involving school
desegregation, the death penalty, obscenity, and juvenile delinquency,
among other topics.288 As of 1986, all nine sitting Justices of the Supreme
Court had "either authored or joined opinions using social science research
to establish or criticize a rule of law." 289 Parties can present social science
research through expert testimony or include it in a brief (e.g., the famous
"Brandeis" brief),290 although such evidence would certainly be more cred-
281. Bruce Pietrykowski, You Are What You Eat: The Social Economy of the Slow
Food Movement, 17 REV. OF Soc. EcoN. 307, 310 (2004).
282. Johnson & Endres, supra note 3, at 56; Bean, supra note 13, at 50.
283. Bean, supra note 13, at 37-40.
284. Assya Pascalev, You Are What You Eat: Genetically Modified Foods, Integrity,
and Society, 16 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICs 583, 588 (2003).
285. KITTLER & SUCHER, supra note 274, at 3, quoted in Rencher, supra note 23, at
426.
286. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477-78 (1986).
287. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 494 n.11 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of To-
peka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n. 11 (1954); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101-
02 (1970) (citing social science studies on jury size).
288. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Sci-
ence: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 111-12 (1993).
289. Monahan & Walker, supra note 286, at 477 n. 2.
290. Id. at 496; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 888 (11th Cir. 1985)
(noting that "[h]istorically, beginning with 'Louis Brandeis' use of empirical evidence
before the Supreme Court . .. persuasive social science evidence has been presented to
the courts"') (quoting Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, Sentencing and Social Science: Re-
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ible if a qualified expert testified and was subject to cross-examination on
the issue. But either way, a trial court must consider properly introduced
social science opinions as to the significance of food choice.
H. American Jurisprudence Has Acknowledged the Significance of
Food Choice
The legal world uses the same definition as the academic world for
self-identity and self-expression.291 In the courts, just as in academia, a
person would employ his self-identity and self-expression to answer the
question, "who am I?",292 However, no decision has addressed the relation-
ship between liberty, self-identity and self-expression, and food choice.
The question of whether any aspect of food choice is a fundamental right
has not to date been presented to an American court.
But the courts have offered some fleeting acknowledgments of the
significance of food choice. The first known instance of an American court
recognizing, even in passing, a citizen's right of food choice was in a nine-
teenth century dispute over a Missouri oleomargarine statute.293 In that
case, the Missouri Court of Appeals criticized the nascent oleomargarine
industry, stating that:
[a] practice has sprung up which operates to defraud the
people of their right of choice as to what they will eat [i.e.,
ostensibly counterfeit food such as oleomargarine], with
reference to an article of food of constant and universal
consumption. The legislature has passed an act which, if
properly administered, will nip the practice in the bud.294
Most significant for the food rights advocate is that the court cited no
authority for its proposition that food choice is a right. 2 95 In 1882, in Mis-
souri, the right to food choice was so natural that the Court of Appeals did
not need to look in any law book to determine whether it was a right or not.
search for the Formulation of Federal Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 355, 355
(1979)).
291. Richenberg v. Perry, 909 F.Supp. 1303, 1310 (D. Neb. 1995).
292. Id (noting that a prohibition on plaintiff stating that he is a homosexual "may
result in a denial of self-identity").
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In the Show-Me state, the Court of Appeals did not need to be shown. The
right to food choice is no less natural and obvious for us today.
The most eloquent account of the American's right to choice in food
came from Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field in his dissenting opinion
in Powell v. Pennsylvania, another oleomargarine case.2 96 The majority
had upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute banning the sale
of certain types of imitation dairy products, and Field dissented. 2 9 7 He ar-
gued that the right to one's choice of food was part of the liberty right
guaranteed by the Constitution.29 8 He began bluntly, "I have always sup-
posed that the gift of life was accompanied with the right to seek and pro-
duce food, by which life can be preserved and enjoyed, in all ways not en-
croaching upon the equal rights of others." 2 99 He even connected the
pursuit of happiness with food rights in stating that:
[t]he right to procure healthy and nutritious food, by which
life may be preserved and enjoyed, and to manufacture it,
is among these inalienable rights, which, in my judgment,
no state can give, and no state can take away, except in
punishment for crime. It is involved in the right to pursue
one's happiness.300
But this was no mere dissenting rant; Field fit food rights into a mag-
isterial portrayal of liberty that is the law today. For Field, liberty meant
the freedom "to follow such pursuits as may be best adapted to his facul-
ties, and which will give to him the highest enjoyment." 301 Field's interpre-
tation thus differed only insubstantially from the Supreme Court's 1954
version, in which "[1]iberty under law extends to the full range of conduct
which the individual is free to pursue."302 And the full range of conduct
that the locavore wishes to pursue includes purchasing her meat and poultry
from the farmer of her choice, without governmental interference.
Finally, two more recent cases briefly touched on food's signifi-
cance and meaning. In 1973, the North Carolina Supreme Court weighed a
workers' compensation claim with a most unfortunate set of facts involving
food.303 An employee had been on a business trip and met a friend for din-
296. See generally Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
297. Id. at 690 (Field, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 698.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 692.
301. Id.
302. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
303. Bartlett v. Duke Univ., 200 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 1973).
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ner at a restaurant, where he accidentally choked to death on his food.3 0 4
The court, in justifying its ruling that the employee's death did not arise out
of his employment, noted that "eating is not peculiar to traveling; it is a
necessary part of daily living, and one's manner of eating, as well as his
choice of food, is a highly personal matter." 305 This statement was not dic-
ta; it was an integral part of the framework for the court's opinion that eat-
ing was not related, at least in this instance, to one's employment.
Most recently, the Washington Supreme Court, in answering a certi-
fied question regarding emotional distress damages in a contaminated food
tort case, noted, "[c]ommon sense tells us that food consumption is a per-
sonal matter." 306 This aphorism succinctly illustrated the court's belief that
every person has different and independent views on food and that every
person must be allowed the freedom to react differently to food related is-
sues.
VII. CONCLUSION: FOOD CHOICE, As NARROWLY DEFINED, Is A
LIBERTY RIGHT DEEPLY ROOTED IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND TRADITION
If liberty is the freedom to make one's own choices in life, why can
we not make those choices with respect to our food? This dilemma was
foremost in food lawyer Peter Hutt's mind when he wrote, "the constitu-
tional authority of the government to determine the food that can lawfully
be marketed, and the constitutional right of the individual to personal free-
dom and control over his own destiny, will at some junctures inevitably
conflict."3 07 The day of this conflict has now arrived.
A court hearing a food right claim must accept that the Bill of
Rights is not the final word on our liberty rights,30 8 and that even Glucks-
berg conceded that our constitutional liberty rights have never been "fully
clarified."3 09 The courts must acknowledge that the right to purchase cer-
tain types of food free from governmental interference can be carefully de-
scribed and that the American custom and practice of buying meat and
poultry directly from the farmer is deeply rooted in American history and
tradition. That leaves the advocate with trying to prove that this custom
and practice is indeed a liberty right, which can be shown with the follow-
ing syllogism: the Supreme Court has placed such rights as self-identity
and self-expression squarely within liberty's domain; social science em-
304. Id. at 195.
305. Id. at 234.
306. Bylsma v. Burger King Corp., 293 P.3d 1168, 1171 (en banc) (Wash. 2013).
307. Hutt, supra note 238, at 513.
308. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).
309. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
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braces food choice as part of self-identity; the courts, from the Supreme
Court on down, accept social scientists' opinions; thus, the courts should
logically accept food choice as part of liberty. If only it were that easy.3t o
Food choice is not a new right; it is a right and a practice as old as
civilization. It allows us to "define [our] own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 3 11 As one so-
ciologist put it, governmental limitation on one's right "to choose what
goes into her body represents a violation of one's authenticity and author-
ship in life that limits greatly that person's ability to live according to her
conception of the good life." 312 However, it was not until industrialization
and regulation that citizens felt the need to assert such a right, and now
courts and legislators will increasingly have to take this right into account.
But, to the extent that the right to food choice might be considered a
new right, it can be analogized to John Adams' famous May 12, 1780, let-
ter to his wife Abigail, where he lamented and prophesied, "I must study
Politicks and War that my sons may have liberty to study Mathematicks
and Philosophy. My sons ought to study Geography, natural History, Na-
val Architecture, navigation, Commerce and Agriculture, in order to give
their Children a right to study Painting, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Stat-
uary, Tapestry and Porcelaine."313 Perhaps the search for food, too, can be
compared to the passage of the generations. First, our distant ancestors
hoped to find food - any food; second, our forefathers sought food that
would allow them to thrive physically; and third, locavores and alternative
food movement advocates now seek the liberty to consume food that allows
them to thrive mentally and live their version of the good life.
310. Chemerinsky, supra note 45, at 1521-22 (stating that "I think that when you read
Bowers v. Hardwick and Washington v. Glucksberg together, it becomes extremely dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to persuade courts to recognize any additional unenumerated rights,
given the importance of the interests involved in those cases and the fact that they were
not recognized"); see also Minnesota v. Wright, 588 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that "[t]he right to sell or peddle farm products is not a fundamental lib-
erty").
311. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
312. Pascalev, supra note 284, at 588.
313. JoHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 174-75 (1992).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since their introduction in the mid-twentieth century, antibiotics have
become a mainstay of poultry production for purposes ranging from growth
promotion to disease treatment and control. Nevertheless, for almost as
long, there have been concerns about the role that these agricultural uses
play in the development of antibiotic resistant bacteria. The issue of
antibiotic resistance in general is fast becoming a public health crisis and
scrutiny of agriculture as a contributing cause continues. Nevertheless, to
date, neither regulatory efforts to curb agricultural usage nor private sector
actions in response to consumer demand and public-interest campaigns
have led to significant changes in addressing the problem.
This article will argue that the most effective course for dealing with
the role of agriculture in this public health issue is to enact regulations that
* Dorinda L. Peacock is a partner in the corporate and securities practice group of
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice LLP, focusing on mergers and acquisitions and
other complex commercial transactions. In addition, she has served in an outside
general counsel role for various clients in the food industry, advising them on all
aspects of their business. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and
are not made on behalf of any current or former client of the author. Special thanks to
Neal D. Fortin, Director of the Institute for Food Laws & Regulations at the Michigan
State University College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, for his review and
feedback on this article.
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allow the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS)1 to promulgate more
robust labeling requirements for companies making claims about
antibiotics use on their poultry products. These requirements should
empower consumers with the information they need to encourage change in
the industry and align consumer choices with principles for the judicious
use of antibiotics backed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA),2 without prematurely forcing producers to abandon tools valuable
in protecting food safety and animal welfare.
Part I will set forth the issue presented by antibiotic resistant bacteria
and the role the poultry industry plays in its development. In Parts II and
III, respectively, this article will describe the regulatory and marketplace
responses to antibiotic resistance, including the labeling of poultry products
produced without antibiotics. Part IV will take a closer look at the use of
antibiotics in the poultry industry, and Part V will consider the problem
presented by confusing, inaccurate, or misleading labeling by looking
specifically at an advertising and labeling campaign launched by poultry
giant Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) in 2007. Finally, in Part VI, this article
will suggest that the adoption of improved labeling policies would not only
prevent future problems such as those presented by Tyson's campaign, but
would strengthen the market for poultry raised either without antibiotics or
through the judicious use of antibiotics by empowering consumers with
clear and consistent information.
II. THE PROBLEM OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
Antibiotics are powerful medical tools for treating bacterial infections
in both humans and animals.3  Their availability has made previously
1. FSIS is an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture with responsibility
for, among other things, making sure that poultry products are safe, safely packaged,
and labeled in compliance with the Poultry Products Inspection Act. U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., ABOUT FSIS, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/AboutFSIS/index.asp (last visited Jan.
6,2014).
2. The FDA is an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. As part of its broad jurisdiction over the safety of food and drugs pursuant to
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, it has responsibility over approval of new animal
drugs, including those used in food-producing animals. See generally U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., FDA ORGANIZATION, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices
/default.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
3. See generally Ctr. for Veterinary Med.., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Guidance for Industry: The Judicious Use of Medically Important Antimicrobial Drugs
in Food-Producing Animals, 209 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 1 (2012), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/animalveterinary/guidancecomplianceenforcement
/guidanceforindustry/ucm216936.pdf [hereinafter Guidance for Industry # 209]; Ian
Phillips et al., Does the Use of Antibiotics in Food Animals Pose a Risk to Human
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deadly conditions highly treatable, but the use of an antibiotic naturally
results in bacteria gradually becoming resistant to it.4 When this occurs, a
drug that once was capable of curing an infection will no longer be
effective against it.' There is wide agreement that the misuse or overuse of
antibiotics leading to more rapid development of resistant bacteria is a
6major public health concern. However, the issue is complex and there is
little agreement over how best to address it, as antibiotics are used
extensively in both human and animal medicine.7 Nevertheless, because
agriculture is a major consumer of antibiotic drugs, food producers have
come under scrutiny.
Specifically, there is evidence that animals treated with antibiotics
become carriers of strains of bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics of that
type or class.9 When humans consume products from those animals, they
are exposed to those drug-resistant bacteria.' 0 If a person exposed to drug-
Health? A Critical Review of Published Data, 53 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY
28 (2003), available at http://www.vet.k-state.edu/depts/dmp /pdf/ANTIBIOTICS.pdf,
see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F. Supp.2d 127,
127 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 872 F.
Supp.2d 318, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Antibiotics are a kind of antimicrobial agent and
this article, as well as much of the literature on this subject, sometimes uses the terms
interchangeably. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define antimicrobial
agents this way: "[a] general term for the drugs, chemicals, or other substances that
either kill or slow the growth of microbes. Among the antimicrobial agents in use
today are antibacterial drugs (which kill bacteria), antiviral agents (which kill viruses),
antifungal agents (which kill fungi), and antiparisitic drugs (which kill parasites)."
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, GLOSSARY, http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance
/glossary.html#antimicrobialagents (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
4. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 28; Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., supra note 3, at 4; see also Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at
131; Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at 323.
5. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 28; Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., supra note 3, at 4; see also Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at
131; Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at 322.
6. See generally Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
supra note 3, at 5-17; see also Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at 131; Natural
Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at 323.
7. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 29; see also Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp.
2d at 131-34; Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at 322.
8. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 28-29; Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., supra note 4, at 3; Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at
131-132; Natural Res. Def Council, F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
9. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 32-33.
10. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 33 (stating that "[i]t is well known that antibiotic-
resistant bacteria that have been selected in animals may contaminate meat derived
from those animals and that such contamination also declines when the selecting
antibiotics are not used").
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resistant bacteria in this way becomes ill, the infection may not be treatable
by the antibiotic to which those bacteria are resistant or by others in its
class." Evidence also suggests that farm workers exposed to these animals
may become infected with these bacteria, whether or not they become ill.12
The drug-resistant bacteria may spread to the environment as well.13 While
there is not agreement on how to fix the problem, concern continues to
14
grow.
III. MARKETPLACE RESPONSE TO ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
In response to growing consumer awareness of the dangers of
antibiotic resistance, however poorly understood by consumers, food
companies have begun to take steps to curb their use.' 5
11. Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at
4.
12. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 33 (stating that "[a]nimals that carry, or in certain
cases are infected by, resistant organisms are a hazard to those who work with them
since the organisms can be transferred by direct contact").
13. THE PEW COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL FARM PRODUCTION, PUTTING MEAT ON
THE TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA, 23, 25 (2008),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
IndustrialAgriculture/PCIFAP_FINAL.pdf (noting that antibiotics are present in
animal waste and have been found in surface waters near agricultural facilities)
[hereinafter PEW COMMISSION].
14. There does not appear to be agreement even among scientists as to the extent of
the problem or the best way to address it. For example, some have advocated banning
the use of antibiotics for growth promotion in agriculture, as has been done in a number
of European Union countries, including Denmark and Sweden. Phillips et al., supra
note 3, at 44. However, a coalition of scientists reviewing the evidence regarding use
of antibiotics in agriculture point out a countervailing argument to that approach:
An important finding, for policy purposes, is that risk management strategies that focus
on eliminating resistance are expected to create less than one percent of the public
health benefit of strategies that focus on reducing microbial loads (resistant or not). An
even more disturbing conclusion was that, if the banning of fluoroquinolones gave even
a modest increase in the variance of microbial loads on chickens leaving the processing
plant, it would create far more cases of human infection than cases of resistant infection
that it might prevent. Id. at 42.
15. See Elizabeth Weise, 'Natural' Chickens Take Flight, USA TODAY, Jan. 23,
2006, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com /news/health/2006-01-23-natural-chickens
x.htm. Ms. Weise notes that:
[flour of the nation's top 10 chicken producers have virtually ended
a practice that health and activist groups for years charged was
causing a public health crisis: feeding broiler chickens low doses of
antibiotics to make them grow faster and stay healthy. Tyson Foods,
Gold Kist, Perdue Farms and Foster Farms say they stopped using
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A recent survey by Consumer Reports indicated that eighty-six
percent of those surveyed thought that meat raised without antibiotics
should be available for purchase in their local market.16 Customer surveys
by Tyson, conducted in preparation for a failed "raised without antibiotics"
marketing campaign it launched in 2007, indicated that ninety-one percent
of consumers thought it was "important to have chicken produced and
labeled 'raised without antibiotics"' and that they were willing to pay more
for such a product.17
Representative Louise Slaughter, a member of the House of
Representatives for the Twenty-Eighth District of New York and a
microbiologist, has made antibiotic resistance one of her signature issues.'8
In February 2012, she surveyed over sixty food companies and producers
to determine their stance on the issue.' 9  Thirty-one companies and
producers responded to the request for information and Representative
Slaughter gathered information from publicly available sources on the
policies of an additional twenty-two companies and producers.20
Responses indicated that many national brands have moved away from the
routine use of antibiotics for growth promotion, though they are still used
regularly by most companies for prevention and control of disease.2 ' The
antibiotics for growth promotion. In addition to ending a practice
that Europe banned and McDonald's ended a month ago, the four
companies also have severely limited antibiotic use for routine
disease prevention, though antibiotics are still used to treat disease
outbreaks.
16. CONSUMER REPORTS, MEAT ON DRUGS: THE OVERUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS IN FOOD
ANIMALS & WHAT SUPERMARKETS AND CONSUMERS CAN DO TO STOP IT 3 (2012),
http://www.consumerreports.org/content/dam/cro/news-articles/health/CR%20
Meat%200n%2ODrugs%20Report%2007-12b.pdf.
17. Tyson Chickens 'Raised Without Antibiotics,' WORLD POULTRY, June 20, 2007,
http://www.worldpoultry.net /Home/General/2007/6/Tyson-chickens-Raised-Without-
Antibiotics-WPOO 1465W/ [hereinafter WORLD POULTRY].
18. BIOGRAPHY, http://www.louise.house.gov/biography/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
19. Press Release, Slaughter Asks Fast Food Companies, "What's in the Beefr"
(Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.louise.house.gov/index.php?option=com
content&task=view&id=2662&temid=100069; see also Letter from Louise M.
Slaughter, Congresswoman, to Fast Food Restaurant Companies (Feb. 16, 2012),
available at http://louise.house.gov/images/user images/gt/stories/Fast Food_
Letter.pdf.
20. "WHAT'S IN THE BEEF?" SURVEY RESULTS, http://www.louise.house
.gov/survey-results (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Survey Results]; DIRECT
SURVEY RESPONSES, http://www.louise .house.gov/uploads/master_ ist responses
FINAL_final.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
21. Survey Results, supra note 20; see also DIRECT SURVEY RESPONSES, supra note
20.
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response rate as well as the ready availability of corporate policies on
antibiotic use speaks to the level of prominence the issue has gained in
corporate consciousness.
IV. REGULATORY RESPONSE TO ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
At the same time that companies and producers have been voluntarily
moving away from reliance on antibiotics in production, efforts to address
this public health issue head on by banning or restricting the use of
antibiotics in agricultural production have moved forward in fits and starts
in the courts and the legislative and administrative branches.
As far back as 1970, the FDA was sufficiently concerned about the
potential risks raised by the use of medically important antibiotics in
livestock production to convene a task force to study the issue.2 2 As the
regulatory body with jurisdiction over approval of all new animal drugs,
the FDA was responsible for having approved the use of antibiotics in food
producing animals, as well as the conditions and restrictions on such use.
In order for it to approve a new drug, the FDA must find that it is safe and
effective; in the case of food-producing animals, this means safe for the
humans that will consume that food, as well as safe for the animals.23 Once
a drug is approved, the FDA may suspend the drug's application if new
evidence (or other information) shows that the drug is not, in fact, safe.24
The FDA's task force concluded that the use of antibiotics, "especially in
growth promotant and subtherapeutic amounts" encourages the
development of bacteria strains resistant to antibiotics.25 The task force set
forth recommendations that included restricting the use of specific
antibiotics in animal feeds for certain uses.26 In response to the task force's
recommendations, the FDA initiated a process with respect to the specified
22. Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at
6.
23. 21 C.F.R. §514.1(b)(8) (2013).
24. 21 U.S.C. §360b(e)(1)(B) (2013). The FDA also establishes safe residue levels
for all animal drugs and withdrawal periods necessary to remain below those maximum
residue levels. See infra note 101. The approved uses of the drug are set forth in its
label, but "extralabel" uses-uses different from what is set forth in the label, such as
variations in doses, frequencies, routes of administration, species, etc.-are also
permitted pursuant to the Animal Medicinal Drug Clarification Act of 1994. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360b(a)(4)(A). However, the FDA may prohibit extralabel use by order if it finds
that the extralabel use could lead to an adverse event affecting the public health. 21
U.S.C. § 360b(a)(4)(D).
25. Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in Animal Feeds, 37 Fed. Reg. 2444 (Feb. 1,
1972).
26. Id. at 2445.
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antibiotics to withdraw approval unless such drugs were shown to be safe
based on criteria established by the FDA.27 However, the process stalled
for myriad reasons, including the complexities of the scientific and political
issues that surrounded it and was ultimately given up more than twenty-five
28years later.
A similar initiative to ban the extralabel use of cephalosporin, a
critically important and widely used antibiotic for the treatment of disease
in humans, in food producing animals was published in the Federal
Register in 2008, pursuant to the FDA's authority under § 512(e)(1)(B) of
the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act.29 Cephalosporins are commonly used in
food-producing animals, including for controlling E. coli infections that
often lead to early mortality in newly-hatched chicks and turkey poults.30
However, they are also the most frequently prescribed antibiotic for human
diseases, and certain cephalosporins are the preferred drug for treating a
number of serious infections in people, including systemic infections
arising from Salmonella. 31 Nevertheless, the action was withdrawn some
months later in order to allow the FDA the opportunity to consider the
numerous comments it received from various concerned parties on the
matter. 32 In 2012, FDA issued a more narrowly tailored notice regarding
cephalosporin in response to the comments received in 2008." The
modified response would limit certain uses, but continue to allow others.34
The FDA's current policy relies on other strategies it deems more
expedient and, perhaps, less controversial than those reflected in these
earlier initiatives. Currently, the FDA's stated approach is to seek
27. Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at
6; see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F. Supp.2d
127, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
872 F. Supp.2d 318, 322-325 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
28. Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at
6-7; see also Natural Res. Def Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
29. New Animal Drugs; Cephalosporin Drugs; Extralabel Animal Drug Use; Order
of Prohibition, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,110 (July 3, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 30).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. New Animal Drugs; Cephalosporin Drugs; Extralabel Animal Drug Use;
Revocation of Order of Prohibition; Withdrawal, 73 Fed. Reg. 71,923 (Nov. 21, 2008)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 530).
33. New Animal Drugs; Cephalosporin Drugs; Extralabel Animal Drug Use; Order
of Prohibition, 77 Fed. Reg. 735 (Jan. 6, 2012) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 530).
34. Id.
35. See generally Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in Animal Feeds, 37 Fed. Reg.
2444, 2445 (Feb. 1, 1972); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., 884 F. Supp.2d 127, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., 872 F. Supp.2d 318, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). See generally
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voluntary compliance by all stakeholders in the judicious use of antibiotics
as outlined in its Guidance for Industry #209 and supplemented with
specific recommendations in its Guidance for Industry #213.6 This would
include adoption of two basic principles:
Principle 1: The use of medically important antimicrobial drugs in
food-producing animals should be limited to those uses that are considered
necessary for assuring animal health.
Principle 2: The use of medically important antimicrobial drugs in
food-producing animals should be limited to those uses that include
veterinary oversight or consultation.3 8
With respect to medically important antibiotics currently available on
an over-the-counter basis, FDA's Guidance for Industry #213 calls on
pharmaceutical companies to take action voluntarily in furtherance of the
above principles by revising their labeling to require a prescription from or
oversight by a veterinarian for use in food-producing animals. 39
Frustrated with the time it would take the FDA to review use of
existing antibiotic drugs on a case-by-case basis under the current
regulatory framework, Representative Louise Slaughter sponsored a bill
called the Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2011
(PAMTA).40  If enacted, PAMTA would require approval for the non-
therapeutic use in food-producing animals of any drug used or intended for
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA's STRATEGY ON
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, http://www.fda.gov/Animal
Veterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/Guidanceforindustry/ucm216939.htm
(last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
36. Guidance for Industry #209, supra note 3, at 20; See generally Ctr. for
Veterinary Med, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Guidance for Industry: New
Animal Drug Combination Products Administered in or on Medicated Feed or
Drinking Water of Food-Producing Animals: Recommendations for Drug Sponsors for
Voluntarily Aligning Product Use Conditions with GFI #209 , 213 GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY 1 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/
GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/Guidanceforlndustry/UCM299624.pdf [hereinafter
Guidance for Industry #213].
37. Guidance for Industry #209, supra note 3, at 21.
38. Id. at 22. For an analysis of the unique ways these principles would affect the
poultry industry, see David A. Pyle, Judicious Use of Antimicrobials in Poultry
Production, ZOOTECNICA INT'L (July 1, 2006), http://www. zootecnicainternational.
com/article-archive/veterinary/755-judicious-use-of-antimicrobials-in-poultry-
production-.html.
39. Guidance for Industry #213, supra note 36, at 4-5.
40. H.R. 965, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
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use in humans to prevent or treat disease or infection caused by
microorganisms within two years of enactment, unless there has been
shown a "reasonable certainty of no harm to human health due to the
development of antimicrobial resistance that is attributable in whole or in
part" to such use.4 ' The bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on
Health on March 14, 2011.42 No further action has been taken. 43
In June 2012, Judge Theodore H. Katz issued the second of two
orders likely to lead to further restrictions on the use of certain medically
important antibiotics in livestock production.4 The first order required the
FDA to follow through on the actions it initiated back in the 1970's with
respect to penicillin and tetracycline-related drugs.45 The second requires it
to reconsider its response to two citizen petitions asking the FDA to ban
certain uses of all antibiotics in the production of food animals. 4 6 The FDA
had argued in both cases that withdrawal hearings would be too time
consuming and resource-intensive and that, instead, it was addressing the
public health concern through the voluntary process set out in its guidance
documents.4 7
Thus, in many ways the voluntary response of food companies to
consumer demands has effected greater and speedier change than the legal
maneuvering has or is likely to do in the near future. However, as will be
discussed below, the current labeling process at FSIS is an impediment to
the effective working of the market.
V. USE OF ANTIBIOTICS IN COMMERCIAL POULTRY PRODUCTION
In May 2007, FSIS approved Tyson's proposed use of the label
"raised without antibiotics" on chicken products, 4 8 and Tyson launched a
$70 million advertising and marketing campaign related to its new product
4 1. Id.
42. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 1 12 T CONGRESS (2011 -
2012), H.R. 965, ALL INFORMATION, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 12:
HR00965:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
43. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 112TH CONGRESS (2011 -
2012), H.R. 965, ALL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?dl 12:HR00965:@@@X (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
44. See generally Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F.
Supp.2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., 872 F. Supp.2d 318, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
45. Natural Res. Def Council, 884 F. Supp.2d at 151.
46. Natural Res. Def Council, 872 F. Supp.2d at 341-42.
47. Natural Res. Def Council, 884 F. Supp.2d at 140; Natural Res. Def Council,
872 F. Supp.2d at 325.
48. WORLD POULTRY, supra note 17.
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line.4 9 Tyson had determined that a large proportion of its customer base-
over ninety percent-may be willing to purchase chicken raised without
antibiotics and were willing to pay a premium to do so.5 o Tyson's then-
Senior Vice President of Fresh Meal Solutions, Dave Hogberg, was quoted
as saying, "[w]e are the first major poultry company to offer fresh chicken




Intensive animal agriculture began in the early twentieth century,
when the production of crops such as corn and soybeans outstripped the
food demands of population growth and could be redirected to feed for
animal production. 5 2 "Vertically integrated" poultry production is now the
norm, meaning that one company controls all aspects of production from
when the eggs are laid to when the packaged meat product is stocked at the
grocery. 3 While large-scale production has enabled greater quantities of a
more cost-effective, consistent-quality product to be produced, it also
increases the risks associated with disease in flocks. More animals raised
49. Tyson and USDA Reach an Agreement on Antibiotics Label, WORLD POULTRY,
Dec. 21, 2007, http:// www.worldpoultry.net/Home/General/2007/12/Tyson-and-
USDA-reach-an-agreement-on-antibiotics-label-WP002026W/.
50. WORLD POULTRY, supra note 17.
5 1. Id.
52. PEW COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 5. Traditionally, in the United States,
individuals and families raised small crops of grains, fruits, and vegetables and small
numbers of farm animals in order to produce the food needed to support themselves.
Id. at 1. This "subsistence farming" continued on a widespread basis until well into the
1800's when the development of mechanical agricultural tools made more intensive
production possible. Id. The production of crops on an industrial scale, supported by
advances in transportation, food preservation, genetic selection, chemical fertilizers and
pesticides, etc., fueled the growing urbanization of the country. Id. at 1, 3. Food could
now be produced in the countryside and transported to cities. Id.
53. Id. at 5. The poultry company typically contracts with independent growers to
raise the chicks or turkey poults until they are ready to be slaughtered and processed,
but supplies and controls what they are fed, whether and how they are medicated, and
other aspects of their care. Id. See also AM. ACAD. OF MICROBIOLOGY, THE ROLE OF
ANTIBIOTICS IN AGRICULTURE (2002), available at http://www.fws.gov/fisheries
/aadap/PDF/the%20role%20of/o2Oantibiotics%20in%20agriculture%202002%2OAmer
%20Acad%2OMicrobiologistspdf.pdf. This vertical integration grew out of the process
employed in meeting contracts with the War Department during World War II for
poultry products for the troops and has continued as the preferred model for large scale
animal production. PEW COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 5; see also H. STEINFELD ET
AL., LIVESTOCK'S LONG SHADOW: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS (2006),
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep /fao/010/a070Ie/a0701e.pdf. Vertical integration
allows the producer to take advantage of economies of scale and exercise greater
control over all the factors affecting the quality and safety of the product. PEW
COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 5; see also STEINFELD ET AL., supra.
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in close quarters means greater possibility of disease outbreaks, the ability
for disease to spread more quickly and for the producer to experience
greater losses if it does. 5 As a result, availability of antibiotics has been
essential to the success of large-scale animal production.
Antibiotics are used to treat disease outbreaks in livestock as they are
in humans. In poultry production, though, rather than treating individual
sick birds, medicine is administered in food or water to the entire flock.56
The reasons for this are two-fold: a) due to the large numbers of birds
comprising a flock, it is impractical to identify, separate, and treat each
individual chicken or turkey experiencing symptoms;5 7 and b) because of
the close quarters and densely populated houses, the remainder of the flock
is at great risk of contracting or having already contracted the illness by the
time an outbreak is identified. Accordingly, treatment of the whole flock
serves both a therapeutic and prophylactic role.
In addition, in the 1940's, researchers trying to understand the
makeup of animal proteins accidentally discovered that poultry fed
antibiotics grew faster than others. 59 As a result, producers began routinely
54. David Tilman et al., Agricultural Sustainability and Intensive Production
Practices, 418 NATURE 671, 671 (2002), available at http://www.nature.com
/nature/journal/v418/n6898/pdf/nature0 014.pdf.
55. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 28.
56. Id. at 29 (stating that "[w]hen antibiotic treatment is necessary, it often has to be
administered to food animals in feed or water. Individual animal treatment is almost
never practical for poultry").
57. Id.; see also AM. ACAD. OF MICROBIOLOGY, supra note 53, at 3 (noting that
"[p]oultry generally are given antibiotics in feed or water since individual treatment is
impractical and not economical; this method of dispensing antibiotics exposes all the
animals to antibiotics, but the individual dose is unknown and inconsistent").
58. Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 29 (stating that "[i]n livestock production, the
objective is to limit progression of disease in the population, since illness decreases
animal performance. Herd or flock treatment is often indicated when illness is first
recognized in a small proportion of the animals").
59. F.T. Jones & S.C. Ricke, Observations on the History of the Development of
Antimicrobials and Their Use in Poultry Feeds, 82 POULTRY Sci. 613, 613 (2003),
available at http://ps.fass.org/content/82/4/613.full.pdf+html; Phillips et al., supra note
3, at 29. Phillips et al. note that:
[t]he growth promoting effects of antibiotics were first discovered in
the 1940s when chickens fed by-products of tetracycline
fermentation were found to grow faster than those that were not fed
those by-products. Since then, many antimicrobials have been
found to improve average daily weight gain and feed efficiency in
livestock in a variety of applications, and this is known as 'growth
promotion'.
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adding antibiotics to feed to promote growth.o Veterinarians now
understand that the antibiotics work to prevent or control coccidiosis and
other diseases of the intestinal tract which interfere with effective feed
conversion. 6 1 Thus, even though still referred to as "growth promotants,"
they are doing so by preventing or controlling disease.6 2
VI. CONFUSING, INACCURATE, AND MISLEADING LABELING
After Tyson's new products had already gone to market, FSIS
withdrew its consent for the label after realizing that Tyson used
ionophores in its feed to prevent coccidiosis. 6 3 Ionophores are a class of
antibiotics used, not for treating bacterial infections but, rather, to treat
parasites in the intestinal tract.64 Though not used in human medicine and
not deemed antibiotics by the FDA, ionophores were considered antibiotics
by FSIS. 65 After negotiations, FSIS and Tyson agreed on a new, revised
60. The goal of large-scale, intensive animal production is to produce the greatest
number of pounds of safe, high-quality product for the lowest cost. See generally, Jay
P. Graham et al., Growth Promoting Antibiotics in Food Animal Production: An
Economic Analysis, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 79 (2007), available at http://www.
jhsph.edu/sebin/s/a/ antibioticspoultry07.pdf. To measure success in this effort, the
poultry industry uses the feed conversion ratio. Id; see also PEW COMMISSION, supra
note 13, at 5. Factors that affect the cost of feed, the amount of feed consumed, or the
amount of weight gained will all affect the feed conversion ratio. In addition, disease
also affects the cost of production, as money spent on raising the chicks or turkey
poults prior to the death of the animal will not contribute to marketable product,
additional expense will be incurred in dealing with the consequences of the outbreak
(including treatment of animals and disposition of carcasses). Further, even if diseased
birds do not die, they may, nevertheless, be excluded from sale due to safety or quality
issues-known in the industry as "condemnations." Something that increases weight
gain without requiring additional feed (after taking into account the cost of the growth-
promoting additive) will improve the feed conversion ratio. See Graham et al., supra,
at 83.
61. Video: Poultry Insight: Why and When are Antibiotics Used in Poultry
Production?, WORLD POULTRY, Nov. 13, 2012, http://www.worldpoultry.net/
Home/General/2012/1 1/Poultry-Insight-Why-and-when-are-antibiotics-used-in-
poultry-production- 1104566W/ [hereinafter Poultry Insight].
62. Id.
63. USDA Wants Removal of Tyson's "No Antibiotics Label", WORLD POULTRY,
Nov. 20, 2007, http://www.worldpoultry.net/Broilers/Markets-Trade/2007/1 1 /USDA-
wants-removal-of-Tysons-ano-antibiotics-labela-WPOO1924W/ [hereinafter WORLD
POULTRY 11].
64. Poultry Insight, supra note 61.
65. WORLD POULTRY II, supra note 63.
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label - "raised without antibiotics that impact antibiotic resistance in
humans."66
In January, however, Tyson was sued by several of its major
competitors, claiming that the labeling was inaccurate and misleading,
initially because the label implies that the other producers are using those
types of drugs, which is not the case, and later because Tyson, in fact,
injected the eggs with the antibiotics gentamicin and ceftiofur, in
conjunction with certain vaccinations made prior to hatch. The suit by
68competitors was followed by a class action lawsuit by consumers and a
withdrawal of approval of the label by the FSIS, in light of the new
information about in ovo injections of antibiotics that are approved for use
with humans.69
Ultimately, Tyson stopped using the labeling and brought suit against
the USDA, saying that the regulatory process was flawed.70
66. Tyson and USDA Reach an Agreement on Antibiotics Label, supra note 49;
Tyson to Use New Label for 'Raised Without Antibiotics Chicken', WORLD POULTRY,
Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.worldpoultry.net/Broilers/Markets-Trade/2008/l/Tyson-to-
use-new-label-for-Raised-Without-Antibiotics-Chicken-WP002036W/.
67. Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, 547 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. Apr. 22,
2008); Tyson Appeal Denied in 'Raised Without Antibiotics' Case, WORLD POULTRY,
May 2, 2009, http://www.worldpoultry.net/Home/General/2008/5/Tyson-appeal-denied
-in-raised-without-antibiotics-case-WP002485W/; U.S. Court Says Tyson Must Stop
Advertising Claims, WORLD POULTRY, Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.worldpoultry.net
/Broilers/Markets-Trade/2008/4/US-court-says-Tyson-must-stop-advertising-claims-
WP002460W/; U.S. Poultry Giants Fight Over Antibiotic Use, WORLD POULTRY, Apr.
11, 2008, http://www.worldpoultry.net/Broilers/Markets-Trade/2008/4/US-poultry-
giants-fight-over-antibiotic-use-WP0024 11 W/; see also Second Amended Complaint,
Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, No. 1:08-cv-00210, 2008 WL 4334901 (D. Md.
May 5, 2008) (noting that "[g]entimicin is an antibiotic approved for use in human
medicine" and "[c]eftiofur is a third generation cephalosporin; cephalosporins are
approved for use in human medicine").
68. Rory Harrington, Tyson Agrees to Pay $5m in "Antibiotic-free" Chicken
Settlement, FOODPRODUCTIONDAILY.COM, Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.foodproduction
daily.com/Processing/Tyson-agrees-to-pay-5m-in-antibiotic-free-chicken-settlement;
Tyson Removes 'Raised Without Antibiotics' Label, WORLD POULTRY, June 4, 2008,
http://www.worldpoultry.net /Broilers/Markets-Trade/2008/6/Tyson-removes-raised-
without-antibiotics-label-WP002596W/; Tyson Settles Suit Over Antibiotic Labeling,
WORLD POULTRY, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.worldpoultry.net/Home/General
/2010/1/Tyson-settles-suit-over-antibiotic-labelling-WP006982W/.
69. Am. Veterinary Med. Ass'n, USDA Rescinds "Raised Without Antibiotics"
Label on Tyson Chicken, July 15, 2008, https://www.avma.org/News/JAV
MANews/Pages/080715s.aspx.
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FSIS is responsible for approving the types of claims a company may
make on its labeling regarding use of antibiotics.71 Unlike food labels
regulated by the FDA, the content of all meat and poultry food labels must
be approved by FSIS in advance.72 Certain information is mandatory, such
as product name, country of origin, list of ingredients, and certain nutrition
information, but other information may be included at the discretion of the
producer, if it is truthful and not misleading. 73
A particular category of discretionary information is known as
"animal raising claims" or "production claims" and has to do with how the
animal that produced the food product was raised.74  Examples include
"vegetarian fed diet," "free-range," or "not fed animal by-products."75
Within this category are claims about whether or under what circumstances
the animal was treated with antibiotics.76
Currently, while any such claim must be approved by FSIS, there is
not a defined set of acceptable claims or claim language dictated by FSIS
or established guidelines for how an animal must be raised to satisfy the
requirement that the claim is truthful and not misleading.7 7
The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of the USDA plays a
different but related role in the labeling of meat products, by offering
voluntary "Process Verified" programs. 7 8  These programs enable
companies to have their facilities audited to verify specific production or
animal raising claims.79 Once verified, they may include a "USDA Process
71. Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-72 (2012).
72. Id.; OFFICE OF POLICY, PROGRAM, & EMP. DEv., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRic., A GUIDE
To FEDERAL FOOD LABELING REQUIREMENTS FOR MEAT, POULTRY, AND EGG
PRODUCTS 4 (2007), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Labeling
RequirementsGuide.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE]; See generally 9 C.F.R. §§ 300-592.
73. See Am. Veterinary Med. Ass'n, supra note 69.
74. OFFICE OF POLICY, PROGRAM, & EMP. DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL
PRODUCTION CLAIMS OUTLINE OF CURRENT PROCESS 1, available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/larc/Claims/RaisingClaims.pdf.
75. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL RAISING
CLAIMS IN THE LABELING OF MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS, POWERPOINT
PRESENTATION FROM PUBLIC MEETING REGARDING ANIMAL RAISING CLAIMS SLIDE 4
(2008), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/ClaimsPoretta 101408.pdf.
76. GUIDE, supra note 72, at 18, 21.
77. Id. at 18-21; see also FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
supra note 75, at slides 6-8.
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Verified" seal on their labels along with the approved claim."o As with
animal raising claims in general, most claims that have been verified
through this program were put forth by the company and include "All
Vegetarian Diet," "No Animal By-Products," "Humanely Raised,"8'
"Raised Cage Free," and "No Antibiotics Ever," among others.82 However,
the AMS also develops programs with which companies and producers
may choose to comply, with the expectation that it will bring added value
to their products.83 One such program that touches on antibiotics usage is
called "Never Ever 3": no antibiotics, no growth promotants, and no animal
by-products-"never ever".8 4 This program was launched in April 2009,
but does not appear to have gotten much traction; as of the October 4,
2012, update, no poultry products are listed on the Official Listing of
80. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., QUALITY SYSTEMS VERIFICATION
PROGRAMS GENERAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 1 (2010), available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/getfile?dDocName=stelprdc5O73953 [hereinafter
Quality Systems]; AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC, USDA PROCESS
VERIFIED PROGRAM 9 (2011), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.O
/getfile?dDocName=stelprdc5097560 [hereinafter Verified Program].
81. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICIAL LISTING OF APPROVED
USDA PROCESS VERIFIED PROGRAMS 9 (2013), http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMS
v1.0/getfile?dDocName= STELPRDC5081908 [hereinafter Approved Programs],
noting that the Humanely Raised Program claim is in accordance with Perdue's Best
Practices, which include:
* Education, training, and planning
* Hatchery Operations
* Proper Nutrition and Feeding
* Appropriate Comfort and Shelter
* Health Care
* Normal Patterns of Behavior
* On-Farm Best Practices
* Catching and Transportation
* Processing
Humanely Raised Program claim is based on the principles outlined in the National
Chicken Council's Animal Welfare Guidelines to ensure the proper care, management,
and handling of broiler chickens. See generally NAT'L CHICKEN COUNCIL, ANIMAL
WELFARE GUIDELINES AND AUDIT CHECKLIST FOR BROILERS, available at http://www.
nationalchickencouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/NCC-Animal-Welfare-
Guidelines-20 10-Revision-BROILERS.pdf.
82. Approved Programs, supra note 8 1, at 1.
83. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL RAISING CLAIMS 25-27
(2008), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/AnimalRaisingClaims_101408
.pdf [hereinafter Transcript].
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Approved USDA Process Verified Programs as complying with this
program.
Tyson's foray into the market for no antibiotic products is illustrative
of the dilemmas posed by the current labeling system. But it is not an
isolated incident. In conjunction with Consumer Reports' survey of
consumers noted above, the organization also researched the availability of
meat that was labeled in a manner indicating that antibiotics had not been
used in its production.8 6 Their researchers identified a plethora of labels in
the marketplace, not all of which had been approved by the USDA and
many of which had the potential to be confusing if not actually
misleading. 87
In response to the Tyson fiasco, USDA began a process of reviewing
its policies with respect to animal raising claims in meat and poultry
product labels.88 The agency published a notice to solicit public input and
held a public meeting.89
VII. TRUTHFUL AND NON-MISLEADING LABELING ABOUT
ANTIBIOTICS IS NEEDED
Participants in the meeting represented stakeholders ranging from
farmers to the Union of Concerned Scientists, poultry production
companies to consumer protection interest groups.90 Surprisingly, given
the diverse backgrounds of the group, the comments were consistent in
calling on the USDA to promulgate clear and coherent standards for animal
raising claims, rather than approving such claims on a case-by-case basis,
and for making the standards and the process more transparent. 91
Comments also highlighted the need for compliance with standards to be
verified by either the AMS process verified program or certified third party
85. See generally Approved Programs, supra note 81.
86. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 16, at 3.
87. Id. at 3-4; see also Joanne Chen, Meaty Confusion, Clarified, HEALTH, Apr.
2006, at 161, available at http://www.keepantibioticsworking.com/new/KAW
files/64_2_80789.pdf, Gosia Wozniacka, Food Labels Confuse Consumers As 'Eco-
Label' Options Multiply, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 11, 2012, http://www.huffington
post.fr/2012/1 1/12/food-labels-confusing n_211 6609.html.
88. Am. Veterinary Med. Ass'n, supra note 69.
89. Product Labeling: Use of the Animal Raising Claims in the Labeling of Meat
and Poultry Products, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,228 (Oct. 10, 2008); FOOD SAFETY &
INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 75, at slides 24-30; Transcript,
supra note 83, at 16-17.
90. See generally Transcript, supra note 83.
91. See generally id.
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auditors.92 Participants in the meeting were clear that both producers and
consumers suffer when false or confusing claims are put forth in the
marketplace.9 3
We have seen that consumer demand affects supply in the context of
antibiotic use. When a purchaser, such as McDonalds or Bon Appetit,
adopts a policy precluding or restricting antibiotics usage, then their
suppliers will follow suit.94 Large purchasers have the leverage to
negotiate requirements in supply contracts not only regarding how product
is produced, but also rights to audit production facilities or take other steps
to ensure compliance. Consumers, however, do not have these options.
They are handicapped by a lack of adequate, trustworthy information to
make the purchasing decision before them. The issue is complex, as
consumers do not understand the potential risks and the tradeoffs,
companies control information about production methods, and there is no
way for consumers to verify claims being made.
The Tyson case highlights these dilemmas: Are ionophores antibiotics
or not and why are they used? What is meant by "raised" without
antibiotics"? Do other poultry companies use antibiotics? Which
antibiotics impact antibiotic resistance in humans? Are there other risks
associated with using antibiotics? Without an understanding of the
scientific issues raised by these questions or the information about the
production practices of the various producers offering products in the
marketplace, consumers are unable to evaluate the superiority of a product.
They cannot determine whether additional value is present (e.g., whether
the differentiating factor really does make the product safer) or trust that
the product is what it purports to be (i.e., that the company is telling the
truth about its unique production practices). As a result of this
"asymmetrical information," the consumer will not be willing to pay a
premium for specially labeled products. 95  In turn, if consumers are
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Weise, supra note 14.
95. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). George A.
Akerlof was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 jointly with A. Michael
Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz "for their analyses of markets with asymmetric
information." See THE SVERIGES RIKSBANK PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN MEMORY
OF ALFRED NOBEL 2001, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/economics
/laureates/2001/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). Akerlof's work was set forth in this article
exploring the effect of asymmetrical information on markets in the context of the
market for used cars. See generally Akerlof, supra. He noted that though some used
cars were high quality and other used cars were "lemons," only sellers had access to the
information needed to evaluate the quality of a given used car. Id at 489. As a result,
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unwilling to buy any "no antibiotic" products because their trust has been
compromised, then companies will not choose to incur added expense to
change production methods.96
The USDA has developed new guidance on such labeling, currently
in the process of being cleared for release to the public, which will
establish the minimum requirements for a "no antibiotics" label.
However, it will allow producers to make such a claim on a time limited
basis, such as "within X days of finish." 98 Claims will not be required to be
verified by third party certification.99
It remains to be seen what the new guidance will actually be.
However, what has been suggested does not look promising. While it
would establish a minimum standard for a "no antibiotics claim," it would
not ensure such claims were verified, and would allow for the possibility of
different versions of similar claims, some of which may not be meaningful
in terms of having an appreciable difference in combating the spread of
antibiotic resistance (for example, as to the number of days prior to finish
that antibiotic usage is withdrawn). Likewise, no allowance seems to have
been made for appropriate and beneficial uses of antibiotics supporting
food safety or animal welfare, such as the use of antibiotics to treat
diagnosed disease outbreaks under the supervision of a veterinarian.
It appears that FSIS will be proposing clear requirements for what "no
antibiotics" means and that standard will likely specify that there be no in
ovo injections of antibiotics and no usage of ionophores in raising
poultry.100 If this standard is adopted, it will be a step forward from the
current state of the law. It will most likely be used by smaller operations
that are set up to employ the husbandry and management practices
conducive to protecting animal welfare and food safety at a premium price
because buyers could not tell a "lemon" from a high-quality used car, they would be
unwilling to pay a price representative of the value of the quality cars for fear that they
might, in fact, be over-paying for a lemon. Id. As a result, sellers of good cars would
be unlikely to sell in a market where they could not command a fair price and,
eventually, the market would be made up entirely of lemons. Id. at 490. Akerlof saw
government regulation mandating disclosure as one possible method for allowing
buyers and sellers to reach the equilibrium of information necessary to allow the
market to function properly. Id. at 488.
96. See generally Akerlof, supra note 95.
97. Letter from Thomas J. Vilsack, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Agric., to Urvashi
Rangan, Director of Consumer Safety and Sustainability, Consumer Reports (July 6,
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as well as larger producers who can dedicate a portion of their operations to
these practices. For larger producers, if antibiotic treatment becomes
necessary to respond appropriately to disease outbreaks, they have the
option to re-direct treated flocks to conventional markets.
Nevertheless, verification is essential. As FSIS's experience with
Tyson illustrates, relying on company-provided information to establish the
appropriateness of a claim is insufficient. Whether this inability is as a
result of intentional misrepresentation by an applicant or more benign
causes, FSIS will not always be able to determine whether a claim is, in
fact, truthful and not misleading. There may be confusion arising from a
lack of standardized terms, or from a failure by FSIS to ask for additional
information or clarification regarding an applicant's practices or
procedures. In any case, onsite verification is needed to overcome this
problem. Currently, FSIS does not have the authority to compel companies
to obtain third-party verification nor the jurisdiction to conduct such
verification procedures directly. Accordingly, legislative action would be
required to enact this requirement. However, obtaining approval from
Congress for such regulatory authority may well be easier than obtaining
the approval of more sweeping legislation dealing with antibiotic
resistance, such as PAMTA. PAMTA would immediately restrict the
production practices of the majority of meat and poultry producers,
potentially having an adverse impact on the cost of consumer products with
a corresponding effect on sales, production levels, jobs, and grower
contracts, as well as, ultimately, company profits and share prices. By
contrast, authorizing FSIS to require verification of animal raising claims
would involve merely an additional regulatory burden on companies
choosing to adopt a voluntary marketing label on their products. This
should make it more palatable to members of Congress and, therefore,
more likely to be enacted. In addition, a similar program has already been
successfully put into practice in the National Organic Program, allowing
companies to use either third party certification or the AMS "Process
Verified" program.or
In addition, the diversity of language that is likely to arise as a result
of FSIS evaluating and approving claims on a case-by-case basis, means
that the confusion associated with labeling will remain, as well as the
potential for misleading claims and misinformation. As with Tyson,
labeling that indicates a distinction that is not scientifically meaningful or
101. 7 C.F.R. § 205; AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL
ORGANIC PROGRAM, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.O/ams.fetchTemplateData.
do?template=TemplateA&navlD=NationalOrganicProgram&leftNav=NationalOrganic
Program&page=NOPNationalOrganicProgramHome&acct=AMSPW (last visited Jan.
10,2014).
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advertises a practice that does not differ materially from that of the industry
in general are or have the potential to be misleading. By way of example,
is there scientific evidence that treating food producing animals with
antibiotics for a portion of their lives but then removing them from the
drugs for a specified period before processing would make an appreciable
difference in the levels of antibiotic-resistant microorganisms such animals
carried? By law, food producing animals are already required to be
removed from antibiotics for a mandated withdrawal period sufficient to
ensure no antibiotic drug residue remains in their tissues, so a label
highlighting such a practice must not imply that the purpose of such
extended time period is related to residues, or suggest that this practice is
superior to that of competitors in removing residues. 10 2  If there is no
evidence that fewer antibiotic-resistant microorganisms are present in such
animals than in others which are merely removed from antibiotics for the
mandatory withdrawal period, then the claim would be misleading in
implying superiority in this respect as well.
In the Tyson case, the court found, based on consumer survey data
provided by the plaintiff, that "[p]laintiffs have demonstrated that
consumers are in fact misled by [Tyson's] advertisements," even the
qualified version stating "raised without antibiotics that impact antibiotic
resistance in humans.", 0 3 Given the difficulty with this language, other
102. The FDA is responsible for establishing tolerances for animal drugs under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Under the authority of the Poultry Products
Inspection Act, as well as the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Egg Products
Inspection Act, and as spelled out in the National Residue Program, FSIS monitors
chemical residues in poultry, meat, and egg products to ensure they fall within the
FDA-established tolerances. See generally FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL RESIDUE PROGRAM 2010 SCHEDULED SAMPLING PLANS
(2011), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/2010 blue book.pdf; OFFICE OF
PUB. HEALTH SC., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2008 FSIS NATIONAL RESIDUE PROGRAM
DATA (2009), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/2008 RedBook.pdf.
103. Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, 547 F. Supp. 2d 491, 503 (D. Md. Apr.
22, 2008). Plaintiffs expert, Professor Mazis, conducted a consumer survey regarding
the advertising language (which mirrored the labeling) used by Tyson in its new
product line. Id. at 498-99. Based on the survey results, he reached the following
conclusions:
First, the individuals that participated in the survey largely
responded the same way to the qualified "Raised Without
Antibiotics that impact antibiotic resistance in humans" claim as
they did to the unqualified "Raised Without Antibiotics" claim.
Second, participants viewed both the unqualified and qualified
claims as implying that Tyson's chicken is safer and healthier than
competitors' chicken. Id. at 499.
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qualifications or nuanced distinctions are likely to be similarly confusing, if
not misleading. Terms like subtherapeutic, therapeutic, growth promotion,
prevention, prophylaxis, or control do not have standard definitions and
there is disagreement even within the industry and scientific community as
to how to define and monitor the use and purpose of antibiotics. For
example, in the poultry industry, would it be possible to assert that
antibiotics are used solely for therapeutic uses given the practice of treating
an entire flock when an outbreak is detected in some birds? Some birds
within a flock may be treated for disease while the rest of the flock is
considered at risk and treated as well. Would such use necessarily be both
therapeutic and preventative? How would such a determination be made?
Without an in depth understanding of husbandry practices, the consumer
would not be able to appreciate the issues surrounding such use. Therefore,
any use of these terms in labeling should not be permitted.
Clearly, evaluating differing claims regarding antibiotics requires a
knowledge and understanding of complex scientific issues with respect to
which the scientific community is, as yet, unable to agree. Accordingly,
case-by-case approval of claims should give way to a limited set of
acceptable claims, designed to convey information and allow consumers to
choose between reasonable alternatives.
One of those alternatives should take into account the issue of animal
welfare and allow consumers to support the continued move to more
responsible uses of antibiotics in the industry that is beginning to take
place, with the assurance that animal welfare and food safety issues will not
be compromised during the transition. Certainly, the industry is
implementing improvements to husbandry and management practices that
make routine use of antibiotics for disease prevention less necessary.
However, in the context of large-scale animal production, it is not possible
to completely eliminate disease outbreaks and alternative therapies are not
widely available, if at all.' 05 If companies were unable to market products
In addition, the court noted that, based on a series of open-ended questions asked to
consumers about the advertising, covering both the original "Raised Without
Antibiotics" claim and the later, qualified, "Raised Without Antibiotics That Impact
Antibiotic Resistance in Humans" claim, "consumers process [both] messages in the
same fashion. In short, consumers believe that there are no antibiotics given to Tyson's
chickens." Id. at 499-500.
104. Video: Poultry Insight: What Would Happen if We Stop Using Antibiotics All
Together in the Poultry Industry?, WORLD POULTRY, Nov. 13, 2012, http://www.world
poultry.net/Home/General/2012/l 1/Poultry-Insight-Why-and-when-are-antibiotics-
used-in-poultry-production-1 104566W/ [hereinafter Poultry Insight II].
105. Id.; see also Michael J. Crumb, Organic Livestock: Few U.S. Vets Trained To
Treat Organic Livestock, SALON, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.salon.com/2012/01/04
/few us vets trained to treat organic livestock_2/.
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from animals treated with antibiotics, the concern is that treatment would
be withheld or delayed, with animal suffering or poorer food safety
compliance being the result. 10 6 Judicious use of antibiotics for treatment,
under the supervision of a veterinarian, represents a step in the right
direction for purposes of combating antibiotic resistance, and companies
complying with this standard should be able to inform consumers of their
policies and practices. In addition, adopting this standard as an acceptable
raising claim would not only help along the changes already underway in
the market but would align with the process unfolding more slowing at
FDA. By permitting companies to label their products "judicious use of
antibiotics only," or words to that effect, companies should be able to
market a product at a somewhat higher price than products unable to make
this claim. This would incentivize them to adopt and comply with the
voluntary principles set forth in FDA's Guidance for Industry #209, as the
additional market price would compensate for the added costs associated
with the more labor intensive husbandry and management practices
required to comply with these principles.' 07
Consumers, in turn, would have the option of purchasing
conventionally raised products at the lowest available price, products
"raised without antibiotics," presumably offered at the highest price (other
than organic products, which impose a variety of requirements on the
raising of the animal in addition to prohibiting use of antibiotics at any time
in the lifecycle), or products complying with the FDA's voluntary
principles for the judicious use of antibiotics, which would presumably be
offered at a price somewhere in between.
In addition to allowing for the free flow of information that should
positively impact buying and selling decisions in the market, this robust,
mandatory labeling scheme can also serve a consumer education role. By
aligning FSIS and AMS labeling guidelines regarding antibiotics with the
FDA's current thinking on judicious antibiotic usage, the agencies can
present a unified message regarding the issue and better inform the public
106. See generally Letter from Members of the Coalition for Animal Health to Nancy
Pelosi & Steny Hoyer, U.S. House of Rep. (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.
meatami.com/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/51781; JOINT AVMA-FEDERATION OF
VETERINARIANS OF EUROPE STATEMENT ON RESPONSIBLE AND JUDICIOUS USE OF
ANTIMICROBIALS, https://www.avma.org /KB/Policies/Pages/Joint-AVMA-Federation-
of-Veterinarians-of-Europe-Statement-on-Responsible-and-Judicious-Use-of-
Antimicrobials.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2013); Video: Poultry Insight: Why and When
are Antibiotics Used in Poultry Production?, WORLD POULTRY, Nov. 13, 2012,
http://www.worldpoultry.net/Home/General /2012/1 1/Poultry-Insight-Why-and-when-
are-antibiotics-used-in-poultry-production- 104566W/.
107. Ctr. for Veterinary Med., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at
20.
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of the different roles each agency plays in addressing the public health
issues related to it.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has provided a brief overview of the myriad and complex
issues related to the role the agricultural industry and, specifically, poultry
companies and producers, play in the development of antibiotic resistant
bacteria. As with any complex problem, there is no one solution-no
magic pill-that will effect a cure. The FDA must protect the efficacy of
antibiotics and other antimicrobial drugs on a case-by-case basis through its
jurisdiction over new animal drugs. As new evidence emerges, the
withdrawal of drugs or restriction of their use may be appropriate as well,
but the process to do so is necessarily time consuming and demanding on
the resources of the agency. As such, realistically, these changes can be
instituted only at a slow pace.
Even while we wait for FDA to take action, industry may be spurred
to action by the demands and preferences of the consumer, provided they
are able to recoup the added cost of transition and innovation and
consumers have the confidence needed in the improved product to pay
more for it. If these incentives are reinforced by appropriate regulation
enforced by FSIS, then before the FDA is able to reconsider all of the
existing animal drug approvals, the industry's reliance on antibiotics in
poultry production may have flown the coop.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While staying surprisingly low profile amongst the general populace,
the issue of horse slaughter has become hotly contested in the last decade,
evolving into a multifaceted controversy that intertwines questions
regarding ethics, international commerce, and contemporary law and
politics. Horses were slaughtered in the U.S. in United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) regulated plants until 2007, when an appropriations
bill suspended funding for federal inspections of horsemeat.1 The U.S. was
home to three domestic slaughterhouses-two in Texas and one in
Illinois 2-that slaughtered an average of about 115,003 horses per year
from 1990 to 2007.' Currently, American horses are shipped by the
thousands to Canada and Mexico for slaughter and processing or are sent
* Professor, Department of Agriculture and Applied Economics, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University.
**Research Assistant, Department of Agriculture and Applied Economics, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. 109-07, 119 Stat. 2120 (2005).
2. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- 11-228, HORSE WELFARE: ACTION
NEEDED TO ADDRESS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FROM CESSATION OF DOMESTIC
SLAUGHTER 8 (2011).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 9.
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to horse retirement at a horse hostel.5 Following a 2012 appropriations bill
that technically allows horse slaughter 6 in the U.S., strong efforts have been
put forth to open equine slaughterhouses in the U.S.,7 sparking controversy
and causing groups against domestic equine slaughter to mobilize.8
Although polls show that eighty percent of Americans oppose slaughtering
horses,9 many groups support its renewal on grounds of ensuring humane
slaughter,' 0 decreasing horse abandonment," more efficiently allocating tax
dollars,12 and improving economic efficiency.' 3  Anti-slaughter groups
claim that horse slaughter can never be truly humane,14 is a betrayal to a
useful companion animal,'" and that responsible breeding is the solution to
horse abandonment.' 6  Though seemingly narrow and specific, North
American horse slaughter affects a large plurality of stakeholders,
5. T.D. Byars et al., Retirement and Adoption Farms: A Step in the Right
Direction, 50 AAEP PROCEEDINGS 171, 171 (2004), available at http://www.unwanted
horsecoalition.org/resources/RetirementAdoptionFarms AAEP.pdf.
6. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 2112, 112th
Cong. § 4 (2012).
7. Charles Abbott, Iowa Horse Slaughterhouse Approved by U.S. Government,
HUFFINGTON POST, July 2, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/02/iowa-
horse-slaughterhouse n_3535096.html.
8. Id.
9. Vickery Eckhoff, Over Public Outcry, Governor Signs Horse Slaughter Bill,
FORBES, Apr. 2, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/vickeryeckhoff/2013/04/02/over-
public-outcry-govemor-signs-horse-slaughter-bill/.
10. See generally Brief of The Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, No. 07-962, 2008 WL 1803448
(U.S. Apr. 16, 2008).
11. Id.at"*10.
12. Dan Flynn, Letter From The Editor: Thoughts About Elderly Victims, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS, July 28, 2013, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/07/letter-from-
the-editor-thoughts-about-elderly-victims/#.UoFCID-6evw.
13. Economic inefficiency is inherent in a process where commodities (horses) are
shipped long distances from their places of origin to places of processing (Canadian
and Mexican slaughterhouses) before being exported, especially when compared to a
system that could locate processing facilities nearer to horses' places of origin.
14. Mike Stuckey, Debate Over Slaughtering Horses Gains New Life: Congress
Pressed to Ban U.S. Trade in Meat Destined for Dinner Tables, NBC NEWS, Sept. 24,
2008, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26860570/ns/us-news/t/debate-over-slaughtering-
horses-gains-new-life/.
15. ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, HORSE SLAUGHTER, https://awionline.org/content/
horse-slaughter (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
16. UNWANTED HORSE COALITION, OwN RESPONSIBLY, http://www.unwantedhorse
coalition.org/?id=3 (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
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involving the meat processing industry,17 farmers and ranchers,18
19 -20international horsemeat consumers, animal welfare groups, equestrian
industry organizations,2 1 horse rescue programs,22 and taxpayers.23 Horse
slaughter is an issue immersed in complexity and riddled with intricacies
that make practical solutions difficult to find; like many problems in our
world, all possible actions to remedy the issue carry significant tradeoffs,
ensuring that some parties will suffer economic or ideological losses.
II. JUST THE FACTS- HORSEMEAT
Horsemeat is the major product of horse slaughter.24 Horsemeat has
been served since man has been able to harness or kill horses25 and has
been served in the finest establishments-it even held a revered place on
the Harvard Faculty Club luncheon menu until the 1980's.26 Nutritionally
speaking, horsemeat is healthy and useful.27  Some critics of horse
slaughter worry about the possibility of "bute," an equine painkiller, having
17. Jeri Clausing, Horse Slaughterhouse in New Mexico Gets Go-Ahead From
USDA Officials, HUFFINGTON POST, June 28, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/06/28/horseslaughterhouse n 3517963.html.
18. Feds Consider Euthanizing Wild Horses in West: Population in Holding Pens
Jumps in Nevada, Elsewhere as Adoptions Dip, NBC NEWS, June 30, 2008,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25465974/ns/us-news-environment/t/feds-consider-
euthanizing-wild-horses-west/#.UdxrQWD5bH8 [hereinafter Euthanization].
19. HUMANE Soc'Y INT'L, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE AVAILABILITY OF
HORSEMEAT IN BELGIUM, FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS 7 (2012), available at
http://www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/horsesEU-horsemeat-retail-investigationOct 2012
.pdf.
20. ANIMAL WELFARE INST., ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS OPPOSED TO HORSE
SLAUGHTER, https://awionline.org/content/organizations-and-individuals-opposed-
horse-slaughter (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
2 1. Id.
22. Id.
23. HUMANE Soc'Y OF THE U.S., FACT SHEET: OPPOSE HORSE SLAUGHTER,
http://www.humanesociety.org /assets/pdfs/legislation/horseslaughter key_points.pdf
(last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
24. A MILLION HORSES: DOCUMENTING ABANDONED, ABUSED & NEGLECTED
HORSES, THE HISTORY OF HORSE MEAT, http://amillionhorses.com/horsemeat.htm (last
visited Jan. 16, 2014).
25. Id.
26. Christopher Moraff, What's Wrong With Eating Horse Meat? 5 Fun Facts
About the "Other Red Meat," PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 21, 2013, http://blogs.philly
mag.com/thephilly_post/2013/02/21/eat-horse-meat-ok-wrong/.
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a dangerous presence in horsemeat.28 Veterinary experts say there is little
risk from consuming small amounts in horsemeat,29 yet the European
Union (EU) still requires that slaughter-bound horses have traceable
veterinary records in order to keep contaminated meat out of the market.3 0
The following table compares important nutritional values of horsemeat,
beef, chicken, pork, and lamb per 100 gram serving of cooked, roasted
meat:
Nutritional Data for Selected Meats (per 100 g serving)
Horsemeat31 Beefe2  Chicken 3 3  Pork34  Lamb 35
Calories 175 242 165 142 235
Protein 28g 21g 31g 24g 26g
Fat 6g 14g 4g 5g 14g
Cholesterol 68mg 86mg 85mg 53mg 85mg
Sodium 55mg 79mg 74mg 234mg 64mg
In addition, horsemeat is leaner and "slightly sweeter in taste" when
compared to beef.36 The most popular cuts of horsemeat are "tenderloin,
28. Eckhoff, supra note 9.
29. Jill Lawless, Britain Finds Horsemeat in School Meals, Hospitals and
Restaurants as Scandal Spreads, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 15, 2013, http://www.startribune.
corn/world/1 91375971.html.
30. Ben Bouckley, Tainted U.S. Horse Meat Puts World Consumers at Risk:
Welfare Body, FOOD PRODUCTION DAILY, Sept. 29, 2011, http://www.foodproduction
daily.com/Safety-Regulation/Tainted-US-horse-meat-puts-world-consumers-at-risk-
welfare-body.
31. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S.D.A. PROMOTES
HORSE & GOAT MEAT, http://www.igha.org/USDA.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
32. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD USDA FOODS FACT SHEET: BEEF, GROUND,
FROZEN, http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/HHFSBEEFGROUND 100159
October20l2.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
33. SELF NUTRITION DATA, NUTRITION FACTS: CHICKEN, BROILERS OR FRYERS,
BREAST, MEAT ONLY, COOKED, ROASTED, http://nutritiondata.self.com/facts/poultry-
products/703/2 (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
34. SELF NUTRITION DATA, NUTRITION FACTS: PORK, FRESH, ENHANCED, LOIN, ToP
LOIN (CHOPS), BONELESS, SEPARABLE LEAN AND FAT, COOKED, BROILED,
http://nutritiondata.self.com/facts/pork-products/1 0299/2 (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
35. SELF NUTRITION DATA, NUTRITION FACTS: LAMB, AUSTRALIAN, IMPORTED,
FRESH, LEG, SIRLOIN CHOPS, BONELESS, SEPARABLE LEAN AND FAT, TRIMMED TO 1/8"
FAT, COOKED, BROILED, http://nutritiondata. self com/facts/lamb-veal-and-game-
products/4772/2 (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
36. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 31.
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sirloin, fillet steak, rump steak and rib," usually consumed as a roasted cut
or in ground-up form. 37 According to a retail study conducted by Humane
Society International38 in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands in 2012,
market prices for chilled, fresh horsemeat ranged from E8.40 to C3 1.11 per
kilogram, with the average price for all products recorded at E18.05 per
kilogram. 3 9  These numbers equate to $10.81, $40.02, and $23.22 per
kilogram respectively. Additionally, the prices of individual packages of
processed horsemeat products ranged from E1.45 to 3.05, or $1.87 and
$3.92 respectively. 40 In comparison, the price of a fresh cut of beef in the
Netherlands in 2012 was E28 per kilogram, which equates to $37.17, while
a 500g package of processed, minced beef cost C3, which equates to
$3 .98.41
Horsemeat is eaten in many different cultures and countries around
the globe.42 The EU is the largest regional importer of equidae meats, with
France and Italy accounting for two-thirds of all intra-EU horsemeat
imports and nations such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Finland,
and Hungary also importing significant amounts of horsemeat.43 In total,
the EU imported 54,853,400 kg (54,853.4 metric tons) of horsemeat in
2012." Russia, however, leads all nations in horsemeat imports, having
brought 28,574 metric tons into the country in 2012.45 In addition,
horsemeat is consumed in other countries such as Chili, China, Iceland,
Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. 4 6 Currently, China is far and
away the world leader in horsemeat exports after supplying 170,848 metric
37. Id.
38. Humane Society International is the international division of the Humane
Society of the United States.
39. HUMANE Soc'Y INT'L, supra note 19, at 7.
40. Id.
41. COST OF LIVING AMSTERDAM - SUPERMARKET, http://www.amsterdamtips.com
/tips/cost-of-living-supermarket-amsterdam.php (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
42. A MILLION HORSES: DOCUMENTING ABANDONED, ABUSED & NEGLECTED
HORSES, THE HISTORY OF HORSE MEAT, supra note 24.




45. Mike Stewart, Australian Inst. of Food Safety, The Great Horsemeat Scandal
Explained, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.foodsafety.com.au/2013/02/the-great-horsemeat-
scandal-explained/.
46. A MILLION HORSES: DOCUMENTING ABANDONED, ABUSED & NEGLECTED
HORSES, THE HISTORY OF HORSE MEAT, supra note 24.
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tons to the global market in 2012.47 Kazakhstan and Mexico followed with
73,088 and 69,130 metric tons of horsemeat exported respectively. 48
Until domestic slaughter operations ceased in 2007, the U.S. supplied
large amounts of horsemeat to international consumers. 4 9 In 2006, the last
full year of operations for equine slaughterhouses in the U.S., domestic
facilities slaughtered 104,899 horses for human consumption,o equating to
over 17,000 metric tons of horsemeat for export, which was valued at about
$65 million. 1 While there is no current domestic demand for horsemeat
and no equine slaughterhouses currently operate in the U.S., the number of
American horses slaughtered for human consumption has not seen any
profound changes. In 2008, the year after the closing of all U.S. equine
slaughterhouses, 99,049 American horses were exported to Mexico and
Canada for the purpose of slaughter, a number that rose to 109,487 in 2009,
and then again to 137,984 in 2010.52 This is because horse auctions
continued to operate throughout the U.S., allowing kill buyers to continue
their business with no difference other than longer and costlier
transportation to slaughter facilities.53
Horse auctions are an important part of the argument presented by
groups supporting the renewal of domestic slaughter. 5 4 Many people,
including individuals employed by the auction and horse sellers, rely on
horse auctions to supplement their incomes. 5 According to the GAO
report on horse welfare, "the cessation of domestic horse slaughter led to an
8- to 21-percent decline-depending on sale price-in the per head price of
horses sold at those auctions."5 This lowers the total revenue acquired per
auction, thereby lowering the income earned by auction employees and
horse sellers; this drop in income can be devastating when auctions are in
low income areas, such as the New Holland auction site operated and
attended by people of Amish and Mennonite communities.57 Groups
supporting the renewal of domestic horse slaughter often use the decreasing
prices of horses and its harmful impacts on sellers and auctions as a key
component of their argument.
47. Mike Stewart, Australian Inst. of Food Safety, supra note 45.
48. Id.
49. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 12-13.
53. Lisa Couturier, Dark Horse, ORION MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 2010, http://www.
orionmagazine.org/ index.php/articles/article/5620/.
54. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 13.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Couturier, supra note 53.
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Though the U.S. played a significant role as a supplier, horsemeat is
not consumed in the country. This is due to the way that Americans
perceive the horse with regard to American history and companionship.
Many Americans are against the consumption of horsemeat due to "the
horse's iconic role in helping to settle the American West; its former
importance as a work and transportation animal on farms and in rural
communities; and its continued value as a show, racing, and recreation
animal."58 In addition, many believe that "horses are companion animals,
similar to dogs, cats, or other domestic pets," 59 although equines are
technically classified as livestock under the Code of Federal Regulations.60
Opponents of horse slaughter often employ comparisons that question the
ethics of killing companion animals, even asking if one would open up a
puppy mill just because "people in China and France want to eat dog
meat." 61 They also argue that current human society is above eating
horsemeat, saying that we have "standards" and "values in society." 62
This raises some important questions regarding the relationship
dynamics between animals and humans because even though American
society has deemed horse slaughter as taboo, equines are viewed differently
and perform varying roles depending on the culture and country.63 For
example, horse sausage is considered an essential delicacy to Kazakhstan
cuisine and is eaten with pleasure.6 Do the ethical sentiments of horse
slaughter opponents in the U.S. justify the domestic shutdown of an entire
industry, especially when the product in question is exported directly to
international consumers that have no cultural or ethical problem with eating
horsemeat? And how should horses be addressed with regard to ethics and
economics when federal classification of that animal 65 fails to reflect
society's widely accepted designation of horses as pets or companion
animals? 6 6 Understanding the economic, ethical, and social implications of
these questions is central to finding comprehensive solutions for the issue
58. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 1.
59. Id.
60. 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2012).
61. Frank Morris, Pets or Livestock? A Moral Divide Over Horse Slaughter, NPR:
THE SALT, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesaIt/2013/09/11/221371617/
pets-or-livestock-a-moral-divide-over-horse-slaughter.
62. Id.
63. Eckhoff, supra note 9.
64. Peter Kenyon, In Kazakhstan, No Horror At Horse Meat, NPR: THE SALT, Mar.
4, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/03/04/173448013/in-kazakhstan-no-
horror-at-horse-meat.
65. 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2012).
66. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 1.
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of horse slaughter that maximize the utility and happiness of those both in
support of equine slaughter and against it.
III. IS THE PROCESS OF HORSE SLAUGHTER HUMANE?
In order to evaluate whether the suspension of domestic horse
slaughter improves or degrades overall welfare for American horses, it is
necessary to investigate how humane the industry was before its domestic
cessation versus how humane its current continuation is in Mexico and
Canada. An analysis of the transportation process for slaughter-bound
horses is a fitting place to begin. Although the domestic slaughter of
horses ceased in 2007, the USDA's Slaughter Horse Transport Program
(SHTP) continues to operate, intending "to ensure that horses traveling to
slaughter are fit to travel and handled humanely en route." 67 The program
has adopted a rule that specifically details the regulations on the transport
of slaughter bound horses. It requires that:
the equines have access to food, water and the opportunity
to rest for at least 6 hours prior to transit and following 28
consecutive hours or more of transit; adequate space
during transit to prevent injury or discomfort; segregation
of stallions or other aggressive equines; use of electric
prods only in life-threatening situations; and certification
of each equine's fitness to travel, including notation of any
special handling needs.68
In addition, the rule bans the use of double-deck trailers when transporting
equines and applies "to entities that transport equines within the United
States for slaughter in Canada and Mexico." 69
Although the regulations are clearly stated and publicly available,
many violations occur because enforcement is made difficult due to
funding issues with the USDA 70 and insufficient controlling methods used
by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)." One of the
violations often recorded is the transportation of late term pregnancy mares.
Out of a sample of 505 horses transported by horse kill buyer Dennis
Chavez during three separate deliveries in April of 2010, three late term
67. Id. at 3.
68. Commercial Transportation of Equines to Slaughter, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,213 (Sept.
7, 2011) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 88).
69. Id.
70. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 1.
71. Id. at 9.
254 [VOL. 9
YEA OR NEIGH?
pregnancy mares were discovered; two of these mares had their aborted
foals hanging halfway out of their vulva, while the third calved her foal in a
holding pen at the inspection facility. 7 2 Subsequently, Chavez was fined
$3750.73 Other common violations associated with the physical and mental
welfare of horses during the transport process include shipping equines that
are blind, injured, or unable to bear their own weight, failure to separate
aggressive equines from the general population, and transporting equines
for over twenty-eight hours without rest breaks.74 In 2010 there were a
total of approximately seventy violators of the SHTP that committed
violations such as the ones previously listed, reflecting growing
effectiveness of SHTP regulations, as a steady downward trend can be seen
from the 162 violators documented in 2005.
Investigating the treatment of equines at slaughter facilities before
domestic slaughter ceased is essential to revealing how humane the process
of horse slaughter actually was prior to its transfer to Mexico and Canada.
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, horses must "be stunned in
a manner that they will be rendered unconscious with a minimum of
excitement and discomfort." 76 In all three of the horse slaughter facilities
formerly located in the U.S., the preferred method of achieving humane
slaughter was through use of the captive bolt gun, which fires a blank rifle
cartridge, driving a piston-like bolt forward and delivering a lethal blow to
the brain. 77 If perfonned properly, this method of euthanasia is classified
78as humane by the U.S. government.
However, there is much dissent as to whether captive bolt guns
actually deliver a humane death. According to the testimony of Dr.
Nicholas H. Dodman, a highly accredited veterinarian and founding
member of the Veterinarians for Equine Welfare, use of the captive bolt
method is "one of the most egregious aspects of horse slaughter." 7 9 In a
72. EQUINE WELFARE ALLIANCE & WILD HORSE FREEDOM FED'N, INVESTIGATION
REPORT 4 (2013), available at http://www.equinewelfarealliance.org/uploads/
FOIA.Response.transport.2013.02.11 .pdf.
73. Id. at 53.
74. FOlA REQUESTS, http://www.animalsangels.org/the-issues/horse-slaughter/foia-
requests.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
75. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 39.
76. 9 C.F.R. § 313.15 (2011).
77. BOB WRIGHT ET AL., ONT. MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS,
EUTHANASIA OF HORSES 2 (2009), available at http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english
/livestock/horses/facts/info euthanasia.htm.
78. 9 C.F.R. § 313.15 (2011).
79. The Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, I 10th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Dr. Nicholas
H. Dodman).
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hearing before a United States House of Representatives subcommittee, he
went on to say:
[a]ccording to the AVMA's guidelines, the head of the
animal to which the captive bolt is being applied must be
restrained or still and a highly skilled individual must
administer the fatal blow. In the slaughterhouse none of
these scenarios is in place: the horse is often panicked, its
head is unrestrained, and the person administering the
captive bolt is a low-paid worker who is expected to move
horses through the kill line at high speed. Herein lays the
problem with the use of the captive bolt in horse
slaughter.80
Assuming that Dr. Dodman's statement is accurate, captive bolt
euthanasia would then fail to render the horse "unconscious with a
minimum of excitement and discomfort" in some cases.81 Captive bolt
euthanasia is fundamentally humane; in practice, however, it relies on the
ability of the worker to place the gun on the correct spot on the equine's
head to ensure a humane death.8 2 Therefore, the actual act of killing horses
in American slaughter plants operates within humane parameters, but it is
impossible to tell how many equines have suffered from panic, discomfort,
and improper captive bolt firing due to the mistakes or apathy of workers.
Although the actual euthanasia of horses in slaughter facilities is the
focal point of regulations regarding humane treatment of these animals,
other aspects of slaughter facilities can play host to inhumane activity as
well. The handling and driving of equines from trailers to holding pens and
other parts of the slaughter facility is another activity that sees frequent
violations concerning the humane treatment of animals. According to a
USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service noncompliance record from
2006, a USDA inspector witnessed and investigated an incident at the
Beltex Corporation's facility in Fort Worth, Texas, where a plant worker
engaged in activities that caused unprovoked and unnecessary cruelty to
equines.83 The inspector stated:
80. Id.
81. 9 C.F.R. § 313.15 (2011).
82. Id.
83. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NONCOMPLIANCE




[w]e observed a plant employee attempt to drive three
horses from one pen to the next by whipping three horses
across the face with a fiberglass rod. These rods are
normally used as prods to move the horses but this
employee used his as a whip. One bay horse ran forward
into a gate and then reared up and flipped over backwards,
landing on his head. He received a laceration above one
eye and a contusion above the left eye. After getting to his
feet, the horse shook his head and continued to open and
close his mouth.84
The actions of the worker clearly violate the provisions of the Code of
Federal Regulations, as the driving of livestock must be done with a
minimum of excitement and discomfort to the animals and "electric prods,
canvas slappers, or other implements employed to drive animals shall be
used as little as possible in order to minimize excitement and injury.,85
Although this is but one violation observed in slaughter facilities, one
must consider the fact that this worker violently whipped these horses,
causing lacerations and contusions as if it were not out of the ordinary and
without fear of reprimand from supervisors; what's even more indicative of
these actions being considered acceptable by employees is that the worker
did so in the presence of a USDA inspector. Though not certain by any
means, it is likely that cruel handling of equines in domestic slaughter
facilities is commonplace (especially when USDA officials are not present)
if the worker was so comfortable with his actions. Undercover videos
taken by the Humane Society of the United States have uncovered similar
type violations in the pork,8 6 beef,87 and poultry" industries.
When horse slaughter facilities moved across borders to Canada and
Mexico in 2007, many concerns were raised regarding equine welfare and
humane treatment because horses were no longer protected under U.S. laws
and regulations. One widely held concern pertains to increased travel
distances for slaughter bound horses. According to a Government
84. Id.
85. 9 C.F.R. § 313.2 (2011).
86. Press Release, Humane Soc'y of the U.S., Undercover Video Documents Abuse
of Pigs at Okla. Factory Farms (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.humane
society.org/news/press-releases/2012/01 /piggestation_ investigation_ 013112.html.
87. Press Release, Humane Soc'y of the U.S., Rampant Animal Cruelty at
California Slaughter Plant (Jan. 30, 2008), available at http://www.humane
society.org/news/news/2008/0 1/undercover investigation 013008.html.
88. Eric Fiegel, Humane Society: Undercover Video Shows Alleged Abuse at Egg
Farm, CNN, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/20 10/US/Il I/1 7/humane. society
.abuse/index.html.
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Accountability Office (GAO) report on horse welfare, "before domestic
slaughter ceased, horses traveled an average of 550 miles after being
designated for slaughter," while after domestic slaughter ceased, their
"analysis showed horses intended for slaughter traveled an average of 753
miles-an increase of about 203 miles."89 This increase in travel time and
distance makes it much more difficult for APHIS to effectively implement
transport regulations such as the twenty-eight hour rule, as well as ensuring
that equines have sufficient food, water, rest, and space. 90 Cooperation
between APHIS and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) led to
their mutual signing of a letter of intent to help each other enforce their
respective regulations, making horse shipping regulation enforcement
much less of an issue in the northern U.S. 9' Once horses have entered
Canada, however, they can legally be transported without food, water, or
rest for up to thirty-six hours, 9 2 and the use of dangerous and
uncomfortable double-deck trailers is allowed,93 both of which pose greater
risks for horse welfare than those seen in the U.S. After completing the
transport process and arriving at Canadian slaughter facilities, horses are
protected from avoidable distress and pain, as well as from goading and
prodding in sensitive areas under the Canadian Meat Inspection
Regulations of 1990.94 Similar to the U.S., many alleged animal rights
violations in Canadian slaughter facilities have been recorded and
publicized. These violations include a fear-inducing environment, lack of
food and water in holding pens, injured and unfit horses, faulty
documentation, and improper stunning.95
Contrary to those of American and Canadian equine slaughter
facilities, conditions in the Mexican horse slaughter industry are alleged to
be inhumane and brutal.96 According to an amicus curiae brief submitted
in support of the legality and practicality of American horse slaughter,
89. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 40.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 33.
92. HUMANE Soc'Y INT'L, FAST FACTS ON HORSE SLAUGHTER IN CANADA 1,
available at http://www.hsi.org /assets/pdfs/horseslaughterin_canada.pdf.
93. CANADIAN HORSE DEF. COAL., HORSES AND DOUBLE DECKER TRAILERS 1,
available at http://defendhorsescanada.org/doubledeckerdoc.pdf
94. MINISTER OF JUSTICE, Gov'T OF CANADA, MEAT INSPECTION REGULATIONS,
1990 57 (2013), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-90-288.pdf.
95. CANADIAN HORSE DEF. COAL., PASTURE TO PLATE: THE TRUE COST OF
CANADA'S HORSEMEAT INDUSTRY 9-18 (2011), available at http://canadianhorse
defencecoalition.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/pasture-to-plate.pdf.
96. Animal Law Coal., Horse Slaughter in Mexico's San Bernabe Market, May 18,
2008, http://animallawcoalition.com/horse-slaughter-in-mexicos-san-bernabe-market/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
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horse owners who previously might have sold their unwanted horses to the
regulated and inspected facilities formerly in the U.S. now sell them to
slaughter houses in Canada and Mexico. 9 7 Mexico subjects the equines to
"longer (and unregulated) trailer rides and less regulated or unregulated,
and potentially less humane methods." 98
The most brutal and publicized of these methods is known as puntilla,
"a traditional slaughter method in which a knife is plunged into the back of
the neck to sever the spinal cord." 9 According to Temple Grandin, 00 a
renowned animal rights and livestock slaughter expert, while some horses
are lucky enough to be slaughtered in an E.U. inspected plant, there are
only two in Mexico, 0' and therefore many others are sent to local abattoirs
that use the puntilla knife technique.' 0 2 Horses in unregulated Mexican
slaughter facilities are "stabbed repeatedly in the neck," an action that
"simply paralyzes the animal," leaving the horse "fully conscious at the
start of the slaughter process, during which he or she is hung by a hind leg,
his or her throat slit and body butchered."' 0 3  An article in the journal
Animal Welfare that analyzes puntilla as a slaughter method found that "it
is difficult in practice to penetrate the spinal cord with a single puntilla
stab" and that it is "highly likely that the animals remain conscious in at
least some modalities for the next part of the slaughter procedure." 04 This
confirms that the process described has a high potential for brutality and
causes pain, terror, and unnecessary excitement to the equine. In the words
of Temple Grandin, "the worst outcome from an animal welfare
perspective is a horse going to a local Mexican abattoir.'0 5
97. Brief of The Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, No. 07-962, 2008 WL 1803448, at *16 (U.S. Apr. 16,
2008).
98. Id.
99. G Limon et al., A Review of the Humaneness of Puntilla as a Slaughter Method,
21 ANIMAL WELFARE 1, 3 (2012).
100. BIOGRAPHY: TEMPLE GRANDIN, PH.D., http://www.grandin.com/temple.html
(last visited Jan.1 8, 2014).
101. INT'L FUND FOR HORSES, HORSE SLAUGHTER: IMAGES AND DESCRIPTION,
http://www.horsefund.org/horse-slaughter-images.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
102. TEMPLE GRANDIN, ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT ANIMAL WELFARE DURING
HORSE SLAUGHTER, http://www.grandin.com/humane/questions.answers.horse.
slaughter.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
103. ANIMAL WELFARE INST., HORSE SLAUGHTER, https://awionline.org/content/
horse-slaughter (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
104. Limon et al., supra note 99, at 3.
105. GRANDIN, supra note 102.
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IV. HOW DO HORSE SLAUGHTER FACILITIES IMPACT THEIR HOST
COMMUNITIES?
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the benefits and
drawbacks of the cessation of U.S. domestic horse slaughter, it is necessary
to examine the impact that horse slaughter facilities have on the
communities surrounding them. A case study of the former slaughter town
of Kaufman, Texas is a fitting way to achieve this. According to an official
report prepared for the United Nations Environment Programme, "the main
environmental issues associated with meat processing are the high
consumption of water, the discharge of high-strength effluent and the
consumption of energy," while "noise, odour, and solid wastes may be
issues for some plants." 06
Dallas Crown, a Belgian owned horse slaughter plant, imposed these
environmental and social costs of operation upon their former host town of
Kaufman, Texas, a community of 7000 residents located thirty miles
southeast of Dallas.107 Slaughter operations like Dallas Crown's consume
immense amounts of water in order to carry out actions such as cleaning,
hide treatment, and casing and offal processing.'os In turn, high rates of
water consumption can strain local water resources used by communities
and hasten the depletion of reservoirs and regional aquifers. 0 9
In addition to consuming large quantities of water, Dallas Crown
placed major burdens on the Kaufman community through issues with its
effluent discharge. It is important to note that effluent from horse slaughter
facilities is particularly difficult to deal with because "[h]orses have 1.74
times as much blood per pound of body weight as cows, and it is harder to
treat because the antibiotics in the blood kill bacteria used in the treatment
process.""l0 According to a court affidavit submitted by the former mayor
of Kaufman, Paula Bacon, "[t]wenty-nine citations for wastewater
violations [had] been issued to Dallas Crown, each carrying with them a
106. PouL-IVAR HANSEN, KIM CHRISTIANSEN & BENT HUMMELMOSE, COW1
CONSULTING ENG'RS & PLANNERS AS, DENMARK, CLEANER PRODUCTION ASSESSMENT
IN MEAT PROCESSING 14 (Bob Pagan et al. eds., 2000), available at http://info
house.p2ric.org/ref/24/23224.pdf.
107. COMMUNITY PROFILE, http://www.kaufmantx.org/business/community_profile
12.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
108. HANSEN, CHRISTIANSEN & HUMMELMOSE, COW1 CONSULTING ENG'RS &
PLANNERS AS, DENMARK, supra note 106, at 14-17.
109. ARIz. DEP'T OF WATER RES., SECURING ARIZONA'S WATER FUTURE,
http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/PubliclnformationOfficer/documents/supplydemand.
pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
110. Laura Allen, Horse Slaughter a Fraud on the Public, ANIMAL LAW COAL. (Mar.
23, 2012), http://animal lawcoalition.com/horse-slaughter-a-fraud-on-the-public/.
260 [VOL. 9
potential fine of $2,000.""' These violations and other instances of
misconduct concerning the handling of wastewater were "about to cost
Kaufman $6 million for a new waste water treatment plant," but "[w]ithin
two weeks of the plant's closure, waste water plant capacity increased
dramatically.""12 If Dallas Crown had been allowed to continue operations,
the cost of internalizing the consequences of their actions (i.e. building a
new water treatment plant) would have been paid by taxpayers, an unfair
and burdensome prospect for the city of Kaufman. Dallas Crown also
negatively impacted the Kaufman community through carelessness and
lack of responsibility with regard to waste disposal.' '3 In May 2002, city
officials identified a serious public health hazard from bones and horseflesh
that had fallen off of the company's trailers and been dispersed throughout
the community by dogs and other animals.' 14 As a result, "vultures, snakes,
cockroaches, and flies plagued neighbors while Dallas Crown was
operating,""' making the spread of sickness and disease amongst humans a
real threat.
In addition to dealing with the environmental consequences of hosting
a horse slaughter facility, Kaufman also experienced serious economic and
social issues resulting from Dallas Crown's presence. Robert Eldridge, a
resident of a Kaufman neighborhood that bordered the processing facility,
recalls that "one by one, [his] neighbors couldn't take it and left the
neighborhood," asserting that "it stunk like manure and decaying flesh" and
that "the noise from clanging and whinnying when they unloaded the
horses at midnight was just awful.""'6  Paula Denmon, a licensed,
experienced, and successful realtor who specializes in equine properties,
saw firsthand the effects that horse slaughter operations have on property
values and development in their host communities. In a letter she wrote to
Congress, Denmon says she was "completely stunned to find that clients
completely ruled out very nice properties at extremely good prices in and
111. Bacon Aff. 5, Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Johanns, No. 06-265, 2007 WL
1120404 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006).
112. Life in a Slaughter Town: Kaufman, Texas, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/
pictures/eldj45jfi/dallas-crown-horse-slaughter-plantkaufman-texas-2005/.
113. Lisa Sorg, Violations Dog Beltex, Dallas Crown, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT, June
26, 2003, http://www2. sacurrent.com/news/story.asp?id=57194.
114. Id.
115. Life in a Slaughter Town: Kaufman, Texas, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com
/pictures/eldj45jfi/vulture-in-treekaufman-texas-2005/.
116. Life in a Slaughter Town: Kaufman, Texas, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com
/pictures/eldj45jfi/dallas-crown-holding-penskaufman-texas-2006/.
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around Kaufman.""17 She goes on to say this about why her clients refused
to buy property in the area:
[m]y clients did not want to buy property in the county.
They were worried that they would come home from work
to find their horses gone, stolen, and already slaughtered at
the nearby plant. Others had heard that the town was
"[r]ough", teeming with aliens and [e]x-convicts who were
the only ones that would do this disgusting work. And
some just loved horses, and did not want anything to do
with an area close to where people killed them to be
food." 8
After Dallas Crown was shut down via litigation," 9 Kaufman saw a
rise in real estate prices and began to attract business that had been
previously deterred due to Kaufman's former reputation as "that place that
slaughtered horses." 20
Another effective way to evaluate the economic and social impact that
horse slaughter facilities have on their host communities is to analyze crime
rates from before and after the closing of said facilities. From 2002 to 2007
there were nineteen total rapes recorded in the city of Kaufman; no rapes
have been recorded from Dallas Crown's closure in 2007 through 201 1.121
Kaufman also experienced a significant drop in many other types of crimes
after Dallas Crown's closure. When comparing the four years before the
slaughterhouse shut down (2004-2007) to the four years after (2008-2011),
one can see that burglaries decreased by 58%,122 theft decreased by 42%,123
and auto theft decreased by 63%.124 When comparing the three years
117. Letter from Paula Denmon, Realtor, Town & Country Girls Real Estate, to the
U.S. Congress (Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://blogs.usda.gov/2011/12/09/setting-
the-record-straight-on-congress%E2%80%99-lifting-of-the-ban-on-horse-slaughter/.
118. Id.
119. See generally Empacadora de Cares de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V., v. Curry, 476
F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing the legality of processing, selling, or transferring
horsemeat for human consumption in Texas).
120. Vickery Eckhoff, Texas Mayor Paula Bacon Kicks Some Horse Slaughter Tail,
FORBES, Jan. 10, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/vickeryeckhoff/2012/01/10/texas-
mayor-paula-bacon-kicks-some-tail/4/.
121. CRIME RATE IN KAUFMAN, TEXAS: MURDERS, RAPES, ROBBERIES, ASSAULTS,
BURGLARIES, THEFTS, AUTO THEFTS, ARSON, LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, POLICE
OFFICERS, CRIME MAP, http://www.city-data.com/crime/crime-Kaufman-Texas.html






before and after the closing of Dallas Crown, a 25% drop in violent crimes
can be seen.12 This trend indicates that workers employed by the
slaughterhouse and other individuals involved with its operation may be
more likely to increase crime rates of the host community. Research done
by University of Windsor criminologist Amy Fitzgerald supports this
notion, as her "findings indicate slaughterhouse employment increases total
arrest rates, arrests for violent crimes, arrests for rape, and arrests for other
sex offenses in comparison with other industries," which is probably due to
"the existence of a 'Sinclair effect' unique to the violent workplace of the
slaughterhouse."1 26
Another way that the Dallas Crown slaughter operation had a negative
impact on Kaufman can be seen through the facility's direct economic costs
to the city. According to a document submitted by Paula Bacon, former
mayor of Kaufman, to the Montana state senate, Dallas Crown requested
twenty-nine separate jury trials in response to twenty-nine wastewater
violation citations, greatly increasing legal costs for the city.127 In the same
document, Bacon stated that one year the city had to "spend $70,000 in
legal fees because of Dallas Crown problems, which was the entire legal
budget for the fiscal year." 2 8 Along with expenses associated with the
environmental ramifications of Dallas Crown (e.g., high water usage,129
organic waste cleanup,' 30 and wastewater treatment),'3 ' these costs unfairly
hinder the community. What's worse is that Dallas Crown's tax records
show little reinvested in the city of Kaufman. In 2004, Dallas Crown paid
only $5 in federal taxes on a gross income of over $12 million.132 This
proves that the industry is not overly profitable for the community; the
difference between Dallas Crown's costs imposed on Kaufman and revenue
generated for Kaufman highlights the extent of horse slaughter's negative
economic impact on the city.
125. KAUFMAN, TX PROFILE, http://www.idcide.com/citydata/tx/kaufman.htm (last
visited Jan.18, 2014).
126. Amy J. Fitzgerald et al., Slaughterhouses and Increased Crime Rates: An
Empirical Analysis of the Spillover From "The Jungle" Into the Surrounding
Community, 22 ORG. & ENV'T 158, 158 (2009).
127. Animal Law Coal., Open Letter to State Legislatures Considering Pro-Horse
Slaughter Resolutions, Feb. 13, 2009, http://animallawcoalition.com/open-letter-to-
state-legislatures-considering-pro-horse-slaughter-resolutions/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2014).
128. Id.
129. HANSEN, CHRISTIANSEN & HUMMELMOSE, COWI CONSULTING ENG'RS &
PLANNERS AS, DENMARK, supra note 106, at 117.
130. Sorg, supra note 113.
131. Life in a Slaughter Town: Kaufinan, Texas, supra note 112.
132. Eckhoff, supra note 120.
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One final impact that horse slaughter plants have on their host
communities is that they provide employment opportunities. The Dallas
Crown facility had forty-six non-unionized employees,133 while the three
slaughterhouses that operated in the U.S. until 2007 employed a total of
only 170 individuals. 134 Though these figures seem insignificant when
added to state and national employment records, it is important to realize
that forty to fifty employment opportunities can make a significant
difference in a community's economic well being and in an individual's
quality of life. Conversely, one must also consider that the individuals that
take slaughterhouse jobs are more likely to commit crimes in the
community.' 35 In addition, according to Congressman John E. Sweeney's
testimony in a subcommittee hearing, "it is widely suspected that many of
the laborers in these facilities are undocumented illegal immigrants." 36
Therefore, horse slaughter facilities can provide employment opportunities
to their communities that can be instrumental in providing income to
individuals who otherwise would have no means of providing for
themselves, but it is possible that some of these laborers could negatively
impact the community.
V. WHAT IS THE UNWANTED HORSE ISSUE?
The most significant and convincing argument proposed by entities in
support of the renewal of domestic horse slaughter hinges on the
seriousness and urgency of a problem in the U.S. is known as the unwanted
horse issue. According to a study conducted by the Unwanted Horse
Coalition (UHC), thousands of horses are abandoned, abused, and
neglected because their owners could not or did not wish to properly care
for the horse; write-in comments from survey respondents in the report cite
equines found tied to strangers' trailers, horses left to die without food or
water, and horses turned out into the wild or onto other peoples'
properties.'3 7 Abandoning horses increases the amount of suffering that
133. Id.
134. PATIENCE O'DOWD & MARY McNICHOLS, WILD HORSE OBSERVER Ass'N,
EQUINE SLAUGHTERHOUSE FEASIBILITY: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FOR US 34,
(2013), available at http://whoanm.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
UN ITED-STATES-equine-slaughter-feasibility.pdf.
135. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 126, at 158.
136. The American Horse Slaughter Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 109th Cong. 26 (2006) (statement of
Rep. Sweeney).
137. UNWANTED HORSE COAL., 2009 UNWANTED HORSES SURVEY: CREATING




they endure because they no longer have the food, water, and care that have
been provided to them throughout their lives, usually leading to
malnourishment or death.
In addition, the abandonment of horses unjustly imposes the cost of
caring for that horse upon an unfortunate property owner. A fitting
example of the cost of feral horses imposed on others is seen in the state of
Washington on the Yakama Reservation. According to attorney John
Dillard, the lands of the Yakama Nation have the carrying capacity to
sustain about 1000 wild horses, yet the current population of feral horses
exceeds 12,000 and doubles every four years.1 3 8 Dillard asserts that "the
lack of domestic horse slaughter has left the Yakama Nation without an
economically viable outlet for managing the horse population on their
, ,139reservation.
The issue of unwanted horses is not limited to just Washington,
though. According to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), there are
an estimated 40,605 wild horses and burros on the range in ten Western
states; 140 the maximum appropriate management level has been set at
26,677 animals 4 1 due to budget concerns and the fact that sheep and cattle
ranchers see the mustangs as competition for feed.142 According to a BLM
fact sheet, costs from gather and removal efforts and holding operations
amounted to $50.8 million, which was approximately 70.1% of the funds
appropriated to the agency by Congress in fiscal year 2012.143 Therefore,
owners that abandon their unwanted horses to public lands are actually
costing American taxpayers because the money spent to address these
horses comes from the federal budget.
There are many reasons that drive horse owners to abandon their
animals. The American Veterinary Medical Association listed many of the
reasons in a 2012 newsletter:
'[u]nwanted horses' represent a subset of horses within the
domestic equine population. These may be healthy horses
that their owners can no longer afford to keep or feed;
horses that are dangerous to handle and have injured (or
are likely to injure) people; horses with an injury,
138. Flynn, supra note 12.
139. Id.




142. Euthanization, supra note 18.
143. Gorey, supra note 140.
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lameness, or illness for which their owners are unwilling to
[or] unable to provide care; or horses that are no longer
able to perform as their owner desires, whether that be for
racing, pleasure riding, or some other purpose.
Groups supporting the renewal of domestic horse slaughter contend
that the closing of American equine slaughterhouses have contributed
greatly to the unwanted horse issue. According to an amicus curiae brief
submitted in support of the legality of domestic horse slaughter, "the
unavailability of humane horse processing, conducted under federal
standards and supervision, has ended what had been a viable humane
alternative to neglect or abandonment for many horse owners who were
either unable or unwilling to care for their horses."04 5 After the closing of
this key domestic avenue of unwanted horse disposal, states with large
equine industries like California, Texas, and Florida have reported "more
horses abandoned on private or state land since 2007," and a rise in
investigations for horse neglect, suggesting that the unwanted horse issue
could be exacerbated by the prohibition on domestic horse slaughter.14 6
Veterinary euthanasia is another option available to owners of
unwanted horses, but it has certain drawbacks that have limited its
practicality and popularity. One serious issue with equine euthanasia is its
cost.147 According to the UHC's 2009 survey of horse owners, the average
cost of euthanasia and carcass disposal was $385,148 which can be a
"significant obstacle to many owners, more than a third of whom have
household incomes of less than $50,000."l49 Another key disadvantage of
veterinary euthanasia stems from concerns over the ethicality and morality
of voluntarily ending a horse's life, especially if that horse has no health or
behavioral issues that would justify euthanasia. According to a survey
conducted by the Colorado Unwanted Horse Alliance, sixty percent of
144. Nat T. Messer IV, The Unwanted Horse and Horse Slaughter, AVMA WELFARE
Focus NEWSLETTER (Am. Veterinary Med. Ass'n/Schaumberg, 111.), Feb. 2012,
available at https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Reference/AnimalWelfare/Pages
/AVMA-Welfare-Focus-Featured-Article-Feb-2012.aspx.
145. Brief of The Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, No. 07-962, 2008 WL 1803448, at *5 (U.S. Apr. 16,
2008).
146. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 1.
147. Malinda Osborne, Unwanted Horse Survey Sheds Light on Issue's Causes,
Extent, J. AM. VETERINARY Ass'N NEWS, Aug. 15, 2009, https://www.avma.org/News/
JAVMANews/Pages/090815d.aspx.
148. UNWANTED HORSE COAL., supra note 137, at 19.
149. Brief of The Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, No. 07-962, 2008 WL 1803448, *12 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008).
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veterinarians in the state would not euthanize a horse for the convenience
of the owner.so The inability to find a veterinarian willing to euthanize a
horse increases the likelihood of that horse being abused, neglected, or
abandoned by its owner because it deprives that owner of another avenue
of disposal. Groups supporting veterinary euthanasia and domestic,
regulated horse slaughter often stress the point that from a welfare
perspective it is important not to confuse longevity with quality of life in
order to lessen the aggregate amount of suffering endured by horses.' 5 1
After the euthanasia process, burial, cremation, and rendering are
commonly used methods of carcass disposal.15 2 Rendering is the process
by which the carcass of a horse is salvaged to make a multitude of products
used in items such as feed, fertilizer, car tires, and gelatin.15 3 This is done
by heating the carcass in high temperature vats that break down any
potential contaminants like disease-causing organisms and drug residues.154
Although renderers typically do not pay for carcasses and often charge a
fee for body removal, 55 owners sometimes choose to render their horses
because it can be cheaper than burial or cremation or continued feeding of
horses.15 6 In summary, high euthanasia and carcass disposal costs, along
with questions regarding the ethics of voluntary euthanasia, have severely
limited the popularity and practicality of veterinary euthanasia of unwanted
horses, contributing greatly to the unwanted horse issue.
Donation is another option available to owners of unwanted horses
that also has drawbacks that hinder its practicality and viability. Though
donating a horse seems like an expense-free action, it actually can be very
costly to the owner. The UHC reports the average cost of donating a horse
to be over $1000, as reported by horse owners.157 This is due to expenses
from veterinary examinations, transportation, and boarding fees. 58 Unless
the owner of the unwanted equine has a specific contact that wishes to own
150. Osborne, supra note 147.
151. Brief of The Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, No. 07-962, 2008 WL 1803448, at *5 (U.S. Apr. 16,
2008).
152. Your Horse Just Died - Now What?, PETRIB ARTICLES & ADVICE BLOG (Apr. 17,
2011, 4:47 PM), http://www.petrib.com/articles-advice/your-horse-just-died-now-what
[hereinafter ADVICE].
153. EQUINE PROTECTION NETWORK, HORSE SLAUGHTER - AN AMERICAN DISGRACE,
NOT A NECESSARY EVIL, http://www.equineprotectionnetwork.com/slaughter/render.
htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. ADVICE, supra note 152.
157. UNWANTED HORSE COAL., supra note 137, at 19.
158. Id.
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and care for said equine, it is likely that the owner looking to donate his
horse will seek a rescue ranch or horse sanctuary. Living out the remainder
of his or her life on a rescue ranch is by far the most humane and relaxing
way for a horse to approach death and for an owner of an unwanted horse
to be relieved of his or her animal. There are, however, some issues that
prevent all horses from retiring to rescue ranches when they are deemed
unwanted by their owner.
One barrier to entry concerns the dwindling capacity of rescue
ranches.15 9 According to an estimate by the National Association of
Counties and the UHC, the nationwide capacity of rescue facilities was
about 6000 in 2011, though the lack of a national registry for rescue horses
indicates that the exact number is unknown.' 60 In 2009, 39% of rescue and
retirement facilities were at full capacity, while another 30% were near
capacity,'61 numbers that are likely increasing because "the high number of
retiring horses, economic troubles, or unsuitable adopters can make
placement difficult."' 62 For example, facilities in Florida have recovered as
many as twenty-three horses in a month, imposing high costs on rescue
ranches.' 63 Individually, horses can cost rescue facilities as much as $2340
per year,'6" a number that can rise in the midst of a troubled economy and
high grain and transportation costs.'"6 This can cause major capacity
limitations because ranches that board horses at too high of a capacity often
are financially overwhelmed, imposing starvation and neglect upon the
horses. 66
In addition, tax structures can prevent the successful operation of
rescue ranches. In some counties and states, equestrian properties are not
classified as agricultural; this is harmful because "reduced taxation for
farmland is based on a legislative determination that agriculture cannot
reasonably be expected to withstand the tax burden of the highest and best
159. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 23.
160. Id.
161. Osborne, supra note 147.
162. Michael T. Olexa, Joshua A. Cossey & Katherine Smallwood, Protecting
Equine Rescue From Being Put Out to Pasture: Whether Ranches Dedicated to
Abused, Abandoned, and Aging Horses May Qualifyfor "Agricultural" Classifications
Under Florida's Greenbelt Law, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 69, 87-88 (2011).
163. Id.
164. Brief of The Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, No. 07-962, 2008 WL 1803448, at *12 (U.S. Apr. 16,
2008).





use to which such land might be put."' 6 7 This costly tax classification can
prevent the establishment of rescue ranches, depriving areas of an entity
that, according to an article in the Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, can
"strengthen the equestrian community, create an additional revenue base
for municipalities, provide an agricultural benefit to the public, and,
perhaps most importantly, foster a humane alternative for all of the
potentially useful, yet abused, abandoned, and aging livestock."l 6 8
Therefore, rescue ranches provide the ideal avenue of disposal for owners
of unwanted horses but are limited in practicality and functionality in that
high costs and rising numbers of unwanted horses leave these facilities with
a capacity far lower than the number of horses in need of a new home.
VI. THE HISTORY OF HORSE SLAUGHTER LEGISLATION
In recent decades the issue of horse slaughter has been addressed in
many different bills, decisions, and legal proceedings. California became
the first state to impose an outright ban on the slaughter of equines under
the Prohibition of Horse Slaughter and Sale of Horsemeat for Human
Consumption Act of 1998, also known as Proposition 6.169 New Jersey
also imposed an outright ban on horse slaughter when Governor Chris
Christie signed bill A.2023/S.1976 into law on September 19, 2012.170 The
first major national attempt to ban the practice of horse slaughter occurred
in 2001. On July 25th, the Helping Out to Rescue and Save Equines Act,
or H.R. 2622, was introduced to Congress.171 It was intended to prohibit
the interstate transport of horses for the purpose of slaughter or horseflesh
intended for human consumption, but died in committee.17 2
In 2005, Congress passed H.R. 2744-45, an agriculture
appropriations bill that provided no funds for the inspection of horsemeat,
effectively implementing a de facto ban on horse slaughter in the U.S.1 73
Then, in response to pressure from the horse slaughter industry, the USDA
issued CFR § 352.19 in February 2006, a regulation that allowed horse
slaughter facilities to pay for the government inspection mandatory for
167. Straughn v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 326 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1976).
168. Olexa, Cossey & Smallwood, supra note 162, at 88.
169. Prohibition on Slaughter of Horses and Sale of Horsemeat for Human
Consumption Act of 1998 (proposed amendment to CA. CONST. art. 11, pt. VIll),
available at http://vote98.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/ 6text.htm.
170. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-25.5 (2012).
171. Helping Out to Rescue and Save Equines Act, H.R. 2622, 107th Cong. (2001).
172. Id.
173. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-97, 119 Stat. 2120.
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operation and the subsequent export of horsemeat.17 4 The next piece of
legislation concerning horse slaughter appeared in Congress in 2006.
During the 109th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 503,
the American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act, also known as the Horse
Slaughter Prohibition Bill."' The bill was intended "to amend the Horse
Protection Act to prohibit the shipping, transporting, moving, delivering,
receiving, possessing, purchasing, selling, or donation of horses and other
equines to be slaughtered for human consumption, and for other purposes,"
but died in the Senate. 17 6 The American Horse Slaughter Prevention act
was reintroduced in both the Senate and the House in January 2007.177
Shortly after the American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act's failure
to reach a full vote in the Senate, anti-horse slaughter groups gained major
ground with regard to their efforts to end American horse slaughter. On
January 19, 2007, the slaughter of horses and sale of horsemeat in the state
of Texas were declared unlawful by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit. 78 By upholding Chapter 149 of Texas Agriculture Code, the court
effectively ended horse slaughter in the state, forcing Dallas Crown's
facility in Kaufman and Beltex Corporation's facility in Fort Worth to
cease operations.179  On March 28, 2007, the last operational
slaughterhouse in the U.S., Cavel International, located in DeKalb, Illinois,
was informed that the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia had
declared paying for USDA horsemeat inspections illegal, leading to the
shutdown of their operations.' 80 To ensure that the horse slaughter industry
could never renew operations in the state, the governor of Illinois then
signed H.B. 1711 on May 24, 2007, making it illegal for a person to
slaughter a horse for human consumption.' Cavel International's
shutdown marks the end of the domestic horse slaughter industry in the
U.S..
Though no federal funding was available for horsemeat inspection,
the Montana state legislature passed a bill in 2009 that promoted the ability
of horse slaughterhouses to build and operate, sparking much controversy
174. 9 C.F.R. § 352.19 (2006).
175. Horse Slaughter Prohibition Bill, H.R. 503, 109th Cong. § 1824 (2006).
176. Id.
177. Leslie Potter, A Timeline of Horse Slaughter Legislation in the United States,
HORSE CHANNEL (Mar. 2012), http://www.horsechannel.com/horse-resources/horse-
slaughter-timeline.aspx.
178. Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V., v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 326
(5th Cir. 2007).
179. Id.
180. Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Johanns, 520 F. Supp. 2d 8, 8 (D.D.C. 2007).
181. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/1.5 (2007).
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about horse slaughter.' 8 2 H.B. 418 prohibits certain injunctions that stop or
delay construction of horse slaughter facilities, as well as making filers of
unsuccessful actions against the slaughterhouse liable for financial losses
imposed by injunctions. 83  The passage of this law became much more
significant in 2011 when Congress passed H.R. 2112, an agriculture
appropriations bill that lacked the specific wording that created the de facto
ban on horse slaughter.' 8 4 With horse slaughter no longer prohibited, four
states-Iowa, New Mexico,' 86 Missouri,187 and Oregon'"-became
home to companies that have sought and are currently awaiting USDA
inspection for horse slaughter.'" However, lawsuits from animal rights
groups are threatening to drag out the process.' 90 Recently, Oklahoma
joined that list of states. In April of 2013, the governor of Oklahoma
signed H.B. 1999 into law, lifting the ban on horse slaughter in the state
and allowing companies to apply for inspection. 191
On June 28, 2013, the USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS)
issued a grant of inspection to Valley Meat Co. in New Mexico.192 Then,
on July 2, the USDA issued a grant of inspection to Responsible
Transportation's slaughterhouse in Sigourney, Iowa.' 93 This allowed the
facilities to begin hiring employees and the FSIS to put inspectors in
place.19 4  Inspection, however, will likely be delayed until at least
September, as a U.S. District Court in New Mexico granted a temporary
restraining order on August 2, 2013, to suspend federal horse meat
182. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-9-240 (2009).
183. Id.
184. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 2112, 112th
Cong. §4 (2012).
185. Abbott, supra note 7.
186. Clausing, supra note 17.
187. Deirdre Shesgreen, Missouri Horse Slaughter Plant Close to Getting Permit,
KSDK, July 8, 2013, http://www.ksdk.com/news/article/387292/3/Permit-near-for-
Missouri-horse-slaughter-plant-.
188. Richard Cockle, Horse Slaughter Plant Planned for Eastern Oregon After
Change in National Rules, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 9, 2012, http://www.oregon
live.com/pacificnorthwestnews/index.ssf/2012/03/horseslaughterplant planned.html.
189. Eckhoff, supra note 9.
190. Clausing, supra note 17.
191. See generally An Act Relating to Meat Inspection, H.B. 1999, 54th Leg., Ist
Sess., (Okla. 2013)
192. John Dillard, USDA Gives Go-Ahead on Horse Slaughter. .. For Now, AG WEB
(June 28, 2013), http://www.agweb.com/blog/agin the courtroom/usdagivesgo-
ahead on horse slaughter for now/.
193. Sheena Dooley, Iowa Town Becomes Site of Second U.S. Horse Slaughterhouse,
IOWA WATCHDOG, July 2, 2013, http://watchdog.org/93739/ia-horseslaughterhouse/.
194. Dillard, supra note 192.
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inspections due to concerns about negative environmental externalities.' 95
If restraining orders are not sufficient to prevent horse slaughterhouses
from operating, the Humane Society of the United States intends to file a
lawsuit based on the negative environmental consequences of slaughter
plantsl 96 and the Endangered Species Act.' 97 Although the ongoing legal
actions are important in determining whether horse slaughter will take
place in the U.S., it is possible that Congress could make that determination
through appropriations bills. Currently, committee approved
appropriations bills contain wording that eliminates federal funding for
horse slaughter inspection;'98 if these bills are passed, the de facto ban on
horse slaughter will be reinstated on October 1, 2013.199
Funding for horsemeat inspection is very controversial in itself.
Horse slaughter is opposed by eighty percent of Americans, yet the money
used to pay for horsemeat inspections is federal, allocated by Congress and
collected via taxation.200 Is it right for society to pay for an industry that
they do not approve of? The pay for inspection program that horse
slaughter companies utilized in 2006 and 2007201 remedied this issue, but
was declared unlawful in March 2007 by a U.S. District Court. 20 2  if
Congress allows horse slaughter for fiscal year 2014, each facility opened
would cost taxpayers over $400,000 for inspection and operations,
according to Virginia Congressman Jim Moran.203 The unfair burden
imposed on taxpayers by horsemeat inspection costs has quickly become a
central argument of those who support a ban on domestic horse slaughter
and could very well cause the renewal of the de facto ban through the 2014
agriculture appropriations bill.204
These attempts at entering the horse slaughter industry come at an
interesting time. In January and February of 2013, millions of beef-based
195. Front Range Equine Rescue v. Vilsack, No. 1:13-CV-00639-MCA-RHS
(D.N.M. Aug. 2, 2013) (order granting preliminary injunction), available at http://
www.agri-pulse.com/uploaded/Order.pdf.
196. Frank Dubois, HSUS Intends to Sue Feds on Roswell Horse Processing Plant,
AG Gary King Gets Involved, THE WESTERNER (Apr. 22, 2013, 3:57 AM), http://the
westerner.blogspot.com/2013/04/endangered-species-act-lawsuit-dismissed.html.
197. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
198. Dillard, supra note 192.
199. Id.
200. Eckhoff, supra note 9.
201. 9 C.F.R. § 352.19 (2006).
202. Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Johanns, 520 F. Supp. 2d 8, 8 (D.D.C. 2007).
203. Press Release, Congressman Jim Moran, Moran Statement on USA Decision






meals were recalled from supennarket shelves in the EU and Australia after
significant traces of equine DNA were discovered in school meals, grocery
store meals, hospitals, and restaurants.2 05 This has raised major questions
and concerns about the trustworthiness of the food supply system and meat
processors; it is possible that horse slaughter facilities vying for USDA
inspection are attempting to take some market share from European meat
processors whose reputations have been marred by the scandal.206
Despite significant progress made for horse slaughter's possible
revival, there is still the possibility of a national ban on the slaughter of
horses and the sale of horsemeat. The Safeguard American Food Exports
Act, or H.R. 1094, was introduced to Congress on March 12, 2013.20 If
passed, the act would prohibit the sale or transport of equines and equine
parts in interstate or foreign commerce for human consumption. 208 Though
its chances of becoming enacted are quite slim, it is the best hope for anti-
horse slaughter groups apart from a renewal of the de facto ban through an
appropriations bill. 209
VII. CONCLUSION
North American horse slaughter is an issue rife with conflict. The
debate over the legality, morality, and practicality of slaughtering equines
in the U.S. pits equestrians against ranchers, communities against
corporations, welfare groups against the meat industry, and special interest
against public opinion. There is no "magic bullet" to solve the issue-no
real, practical system can be put in place to satisfy the desires of all parties
and protect them from economic and ideological losses. The existence of
regulated slaughterhouses, mitigation of the unwanted horse issue, and
decreasing sale price of horses garner significant support for the renewal of
domestic horse slaughter. In addition, one must consider the ethics of not
slaughtering horses in world plagued by food crises; 210 are those calories
wasted and could they be efficiently reallocated? 211 On the other hand, the
205. Stewart, Australian Inst. of Food Safety, supra note 45.
206. Lawless, supra note 29.
207. Safeguard American Food Exports Act of 2013, H.R. 1094, 113th Cong. § 3
(2013).
208. Id.
209. Safeguard American Food Exports Act of 2013, S. 541, 113th Cong. (2013).
210. John Vidal, UN Warns of Looming Worldwide Food Crisis in 2013, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 13, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/
oct/14/un-global-food-crisis-warning.
211. This is a philosophical and ethical notion only. It is acknowledged that
allocating horsemeat to those in need of food may be impractical, uneconomic, or not
possible.
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negative externalities that horse slaughterhouses impose on their host
communities, the inherent nobility and value seen in horses by humans, and
lack of a domestic market for horsemeat drive many to support a ban on
either domestic horse slaughter or sending American horses across borders
for slaughter. Eventually the U.S. government will take action either by
inspecting and approving proposed slaughter facilities or by enacting
legislation to prohibit domestic slaughter or the slaughter of American
horses-the decision on which route to take will have serious implications,
effectively displaying what groups, ideas, and practices the government
endorses, while also having significant impacts on horse welfare, the
relationship between industry and government, and citizens across the
nation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While federal and state government regulations have become
commonplace in almost every conceivable facet of the modem American
lifestyle, the prison food system has inconspicuously remained under-
regulated despite the progress made by the prisoners' rights movement in
other areas.' Legislatures in most states generally leave prison food
regulation to the sole discretion of prison administrators, resulting in a
"laissez-faire approach" in the prison food system; an anachronism in
contemporary America.2 Some states' prison systems do in fact self-
regulate to an adequate degree despite this under-regulation, while others
participate in voluntary, nongovernmental prison accreditation programs.3
However, many states and localities are not so magnanimous. Serious
issues concerning the nature and quality of food offered to prison inmates
arise when these governments do not participate in such programs or
simply choose to ignore the programs' provisions at their convenience, due
4to their voluntary nature. As an example of the potential for abuse that can
occur when prison food systems are under-regulated, the state of Illinois
initiated a large scale plan to substitute meat with soy-based products for
budgetary reasons in 2003, resulting in a multitude of health related
complaints from its inmates, including digestive disorders, skin problems,
and even breast development in males.' As such, while there may not
necessarily be a nationwide prison pandemic that poses a threat to every
1. Clifford M. Hardin, The Effects of Over-Regulation, 34 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
50, 50 (1979) (noting that "the increased involvement of government ... is affecting
nearly all walks of life in America today").
2. Cyrus Naim, Prison Food Law 1 (Spring 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://dash.harvard.edu /handle/1/8848245 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
3. Dale K. Sechrest, The Accreditation Movement in Corrections, 40 FED.
PROBATION 15, 17 (1976).
4. AM. CORRECTIONAL Ass'N, AGENCY MANUAL OF ACCREDITATION: POLICY AND
PROCEDURE 50-51 (2012), available at https://www.aca.org/standards/pdfs/
AccreditationPolicyProcedure.pdf (explaining that the only penalty for a violation is
revocation of accreditation and that accreditation can be granted again after a violation
following a 180-day waiting period).
5. Kimberly Hartke, Budget Shortfalls Hit Illinois Prison Diet, WESTON A. PRICE
FOUND., July 19, 2010, http://westonaprice.org/press/budget-shortfalls-hit-illinois-
prison-diet.
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inmate in the U.S., it is clear that the issues involved are serious and impact
a significant portion of the inmate population.6
Further, one must understand that these issues tend to manifest
primarily in state prisons, as a comprehensive system of standards
promulgated and enforced by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, complete with
the input and oversight of registered dietitians, regulates the federal prison
system.' So, while the concerns at issue here may not be applicable to
prisoners in federal penitentiaries, many inmates are incarcerated in state
prisons that choose not to self-regulate or are overly lax regarding
enforcement when they do self-regulate.
This article will illustrate the need for pervasive regulation in the U.S.
prison food system, focusing primarily on state penitentiaries. Section II
begins by demonstrating the adverse effects of an under-regulated prison
food system on those incarcerated within our nation's state prisons, as
bottom-line budgetary concerns are permitted to reign supreme. Section III
then surveys the primary remedial tool available to inmates who feel they
have been provided inadequate nourishment, litigation, and seeks to
demonstrate why it is wholly insufficient as a curative mechanism. Next,
section IV uses federal regulations in the realm of public school lunches as
a paradigm for crafting appropriate regulations in the prison food system.
Finally, section V addresses the practical limitations of implementing these
proposed regulations and suggests how they might be mitigated.
II. FOOD DEFICIENCIES IN STATE PRISONS
Surely, regulation for the sake of regulation in the face of no true and
pervasive problem produces the potential for tremendous economic waste.8
As such, if the lack of food regulation in prisons does not lead to
cognizable and verifiable health risks to the inmates housed in these
facilities on a meaningful scale, it would be imprudent to impose them.9
6. See generally David M. Reutter, Gary Hunter & Brandon Sample, Appalling
Prison and Jail Food Leaves Prisoners Hungry for Justice, 21 PRISON LEGAL NEWS 1
(2010).
7. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, MANAGEMENT OF FOOD ALLERGIES - CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINES 1 (2012), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/mgmt
_food allergies.pdf.
8. Satish Joshi, Ranjani Krishnan & Lester Lave, Estimating the Hidden Costs of
Environmental Regulation, 76 ACCT. REV. 171, 194-95 (2001) (contending that
government regulation has a substantial impact on prices in the steel mill industry,
concluding that the associated hidden costs of regulation are eight to ten times the
visible costs at the margin).
9. Christian Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What
Incarceration Costs Taxpayers, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE 1, 8 (2012), available at http://
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This is because taxpayers would ultimately bear the increased "hidden
costs" of regulation to fund a sector of the government that already faces
significant budgetary unrest.10 However, it is empirically clear that in the
absence of some agency with actual enforcement power presiding over
offending prisons, administrators and contractors are motivated to cut
corners with food quality, often leading to infirmity in their inmates.
A. Aramark's Bottom Line
Perhaps the best illustration of the tendency for prison meals to fall
short of generally accepted nutritional standards in the absence of proper
regulation is the litany of complaints and allegations brought over the past
several decades against Aramark Correctional Services (Aramark).
Aramark is a private food contractor responsible for distributing over one
million meals per day to inmates across the country.H Aramark's business
model has resulted in incidents of unsanitary conditions, insufficient
portions of food, and inadequate nutritional provisions in at least nineteen
states.1 In addition, numerous inmates have brought lawsuits against
Aramark challenging its food service practices. Such infractions range
from altering expiration dates on food to instructing its employees
responsible for dispensing food to do so parsimoniously, intentionally
providing inmates less than the required serving in an effort to increase
profits. 14 For example, Aramark contracts with the state of Pennsylvania to
provide food services to Northampton County Prison.15  In 2005, city
inspector Ed Ferraro discovered that the prison stored food in a bathroom,
did not have hot water or soap for kitchen workers to wash hands, and used
refrigerators not cold enough to safely store food. 16 In fact, Ferraro stated
www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Price-of Prisons-updated versi
on_072512.pdf.
10. Id. (noting that of the forty states surveyed, all exceeded the corrections budget
by an average of 13.9%).
11. ARAMARK, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, http://www.aramark.com/Industries/
Correctionallnstitutions/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
12. John E. Dannenberg, Aramark: Prison Food Service with a Bad Aftertaste, 17
PRISON LEGAL NEWS 1, 10 (2006).
13. See generally, e.g., McRoy v. Aramark Correctional Serv., Inc., 268 Fed.App'x
479 (7th Cir. 2008); Drake v. Velasco, 207 F. Supp.2d 809 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Horton v.
Sheriff of Cook Cnty., No. 11 C 6064, 2012 WL 5838183 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2012).
14. Dannenberg, supra note 12, at 10.
15. Paul Muschick & Christopher Schnaars, Easton: Prison Kept Food Unsafely,
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that would have asked the owner to close the facility if he found the same
conditions in a private business' kitchen."
Further, due to the often extreme disparity between Aramark's bid
offers and those of its competitors, it seems clear that Aramark employs
these tactics with the sole intention of improving its bottom line., 8 For
example, a Florida inspector general's cost-value analysis of its contract
with Aramark found that Aramark pocketed a $10.5 million windfall in
Florida alone by charging for meals it never served and by incorporating
cheaper ingredients into recipes despite explicit instructions forbidding this
practice. 19  Ultimately, the report recommended terminating Florida's
contract with Aramark, primarily because Aramark failed to meet its
expectations of "maintaining the current standards of quality in delivering
food service." 2 0 Additionally, the Kentucky Department of Corrections
conducted an extensive examination of its food services contract with
Aramark, revealing numerous improprieties. 2 1 For example, despite the
fact that the parties' contract specifically required Aramark to disclose
documents to the state for purposes of a financial audit and public
transparency, Aramark refused to do so at the state's request. 22 Further, the
audit revealed numerous instances of Aramark making unauthorized food
substitutions and using improper quantities of ingredients.23 The audit
revealed several other examples of Aramark cutting corners in order to
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. PAUL C. DECKER & DONALD L. MILLER, FLA. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, COST-
VALUE ANALYSIS: ARAMARK FOOD SERVICE CONTRACT C 1927 4-5 (2007), available at
http://www.privateci.org/privatepics/Aramarkfinal.pdf (noting that during the bid
process, Aramark inquired, "[m]ay ground turkey be used to replace ground beef in
recipes?" The Florida Department of Corrections responded negatively, stating that
"[i]f the recipe specifies ground beef, then ground beef must be used." Despite this, the
audit found that Aramark had "virtually eliminated" ground beef from the menu,
frequently substituting it with ground turkey).
20. Id.
21. See generally CRIT LUALLEN, KY. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, EXAMINATION OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS' FOOD SERVICES CONTRACT WITH
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC (2010), available at http://apps.auditor.
ky.gov/Public/Audit Reports/Archive/201 OARAMARKreport.pdf
22. Id. at 9-10 (citing provisions of the parties' contract, stating that Aramark agrees
that "the Contracting Agency, the Finance and Administration Cabinet, the Auditor of
Public Accounts, and the Legislative Research Commission, or their duly authorized
representatives, shall have access to any books, documents, papers, records, or other
evidence, which are directly pertinent to the Contract(s) for the purpose of financial
audit or program review").
23. Id. at 19-20 (noting an instance in which Aramark substituted "[flour pieces of
brownie . . . for a meat" and another "in which the recipe called for 1501bs of beans, but
only 100lbs were used").
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further its own pecuniary interest. 24 Finally, as its contracts with state
corrections departments often compensate Aramark based on the number of
inmates housed in the prison rather than the total number of meals actually
served, Aramark has little financial incentive to produce meals that inmates
25actually want to consume.
Lastly, one may be fairly tempted to apportion much of the blame for
these unfortunate situations to the individual states for contracting with
Aramark despite these complaints and lawsuits. However, Aramark
frequently includes provisions in its prison food services contracts which
would give the appearance of propriety and therefore induce states into
believing that Aramark will adhere to accepted standards of decency when
providing food to inmates. Unfortunately, it seems that Aramark includes
these provisions, at least in part, for the purpose of appearances, as it often
displays a lack of fidelity to these safeguards. For example, when Aramark
contracted with the Kentucky Department of Corrections, it conducted a
review of its master menu with both its own and the state's dieticians in
order to ensure that all meals were of suitable nutritional value to the
inmates. 26  However, a subsequent audit of Aramark's food service
practices discovered numerous instances in which Aramark deliberately
27avoided following this mutually agreed upon master menu. Similarly, as
a term of the parties' contract, Aramark agreed to prepare all of its meals in
24. Id. (noting the following: Aramark billed for a substantially higher rate of
kosher meals than appeared necessary; Aramark stored leftover food well beyond
acceptable timeframes;. Aramark violated the terms of the contract by paying
substantially less than fair market value for inmate grown food; Aramark frequently
stored food at temperatures below its own guidelines; a significant amount of food
preparation equipment required repairs, including thirteen pending repairs at one
institution alone; and Aramark failed to address identified sanitation issues).
25. JIM PETRO, OHIO DEP'T OF REHAB. CORRECTIONS, ARAMARK CONTRACT AND
THE COLLEGE PROGRAMS: SPECIAL AUDIT 7, available at http://www.plunderbund.
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/AramarkAudit2001.pdf (noting that Aramark's
contract with a prison in Ohio permitted it to bill the state under the assumption that
90% of its inmates consumed three meals a day despite findings that only 64% of
inmates attended the meals made available to them).
26. Ward v. Aramark Corrections Food Serv., No. 3:09-CV-00802, WL 1833312, at
*2 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2012).
27. LUALLEN, Ky. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 18-20 (noting that
Aramark frequently substituted ingredients without approval, did not provide written
documentation to the Kentucky Department of Corrections of any of the 142 instances
in which it substituted ingredients, often substituted foods for other foods that were not
even in the same food category, left certain spices entirely out of recipes and
dramatically reduced or omitted flour, beef base, and other bulk food ingredients from
recipes).
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28accordance with the Florida Department of Corrections' master menu.
Despite a contractual obligation to refrain from doing so, Aramark
methodically substituted ground beef with turkey and turkey breast with
"turkey ends and pieces" over a nearly two year period, pocketing an
estimated $4.9 million windfall in the process. 2 9  These instances
demonstrate that states likely have not tacitly agreed to Aramark's
impropriety upon contracting with it. Rather, Aramark promises these
states compliance to certain nutritional standards, but deliberately fails to
adhere to those standards for the purpose of reaping pecuniary gains.
B. Illinois' Soy Substitution
These unhealthy conditions do not only manifest when commercial
entities contract to handle food distribution for prisons; deplorable food
conditions arise in prisons when the state itself is responsible for procuring
and preparing food as well. Perhaps the most systematic, statewide
example of this exists in Illinois. 3 0 Due to budgetary constraints, Illinois
began substituting meat for soy-based products in inmate meals on a large
scale basis in 2003. While one could certainly construct a healthy diet
entirely absent of meat, Illinois' reliance on soy in inmate meals has
resulted in inmates routinely consuming approximately four times the daily
recommended quantity of soy for a healthy diet. 32 More than two-hundred
inmates in Illinois have come forward with complaints stemming from the
soy heavy diet, claiming health consequences that run the proverbial
gamut: digestive disorders, skin problems, and even breast development in
males.33 A number of these inmates have filed lawsuits against the state for
these grievances. 34 One former Illinois inmate who ate the soy heavy diet
even claimed that prison doctors recognized that the imbalanced diet may
be the cause of his and other inmates' poor health conditions and lamented
28. DECKER& MILLER, FLA. DEP'TOF CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 2.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Andrea Billups, Soy Diet Prompts Prisoners' Lawsuit, WASHINGTON TIMES,




33. Hartke, supra note 5.
34. See generally, e.g., Garcia v. W. Correctional Ctr., No. I 1-CV-3420, 2012 WL
589039 (C.D. 111. Feb. 22, 2012) (noting that the court was unaware of any prisoner's
claim seeking a soy-free diet in that district succeeding); Smith v. Illinois, No. 13-cv-
220-JPG, 2013 WL 13311818 (S.D. Ill. April 2, 2013); Wheeler v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., No. 11-CV-0839-MJR-SCW, 2012 WL 3308874 (S.D. 111. Aug. 13,
2012).
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the fact that they could do nothing to change it.35 Further, Illinois does not
provide inmates suffering from soy intolerance with alternative rations and
thus these inmates must rely on the commissary as their primary method of
sustenance, which prisons traditionally stock with many nutrient poor
36items.
C. Alabama's Prison Food Funding Statute
Illinois is not the only state that has permited pecuniary
considerations to take precedence over inmates' health concerns. One 1939
Alabama statute allocates each county's sheriff a fixed amount of money
per day for the procurement of food for the county's inmates.37 Another
statute provides that a sum of money intended to cover food service shall
be disbursed to each county's sheriff based on the number of inmates
located in the prison, in addition to the money disbursed for the cost of the
food itself." Alabama's Office of the Attorney General has construed this
statute as permitting "any surplus in the sheriffs food service allowance [to
be] retained by the sheriffs office unless the county commission has
directed" otherwise.39
While not explicitly permitting a sheriff to personally benefit
financially from this disbursements, the type of abuse and corruption that
could arise from this system is plainly obvious. In fact, it has manifested
itself on several occasions, including one in which two sheriffs each
contributed $500 to purchase a tractor-trailer load of hot dogs and served
them "at each meal until they had been depleted" (emphasis in original).40
It is a fundamental concept of health that nutritional deficiencies abound
when an individual consumes the same food exclusively over significant
period of time, especially a food as nutrient poor as hot dogs.4 1 In fact, a
U.S. District Court found Sheriff Greg Bartlett of Morgan County,
35. Billups, supra note 30.
36. Laura A. Bischoff, Ohio Inmates Spent $38 Million on Essentials, Junk Food,
CORRECTIONSONE, Jan. 23, 2012, http://www.correctionsone.com/corrections/articles/
4966936-Ohio-inmates-spent-38M-on-essentials-junk-food (noting that carbonated
beverages, candy, and ramen noodles are among the most frequently purchased
commissary items among Ohio's 50,000 inmates).
37. ALA. CODE § 14-6-42 (2013).
38. ALA. CODE§ 16-6-43 (2013).
39. Sheriffs - Meals - Funds - County Commissions - Prisons and Prisoners, Ala.
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2011-053 (Apr. 20, 2011).
40. Maynor v. Morgan Cnty., Ala., No. 5:01-cv-0851-UWC, at 4 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 8,
2009), available at http://www.schr.org /files/morgan findingfact.pdf.
41. See Virginia McGee, A Test of a Balanced Diet, 55 AM. J. NURSING 1386, 1386
(1955); Janet Raloff, Not so Hot Hot Dogs?, 145 Sci. NEWS 264, 264 (1994).
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Alabama guilty of consistently failing to provide a nutritionally adequate
diet, motivated by his financial incentive.42 The court made substantial
findings of fact illustrating the steps Bartlett took to reduce the quality of
the inmates' food for his own pecuniary gain.43 The most inculpatory of
these findings was that the sheriff had "deposited in excess of $200,000 to
his personal account from the funds allocated to him by the State of
Alabama and the federal government for the feeding of inmates."44
These examples illustrate the severity and potential for impropriety in
both the private and public sector that exists when legislatures essentially
leave prisons to self-regulate their inmate food policies; bottom-line budget
considerations will routinely prevail over inmate health concerns for a
segment of the population that is left with no political recourse.
III. INSUFFICIENCY OF LITIGATION AS A REMEDIAL METHOD
Currently, litigation is the primary remedial method available to
inmates who seek to vindicate their constitutional rights.45 In the prison
food context, this litigation most often takes the form of an Eighth
Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment.4 6 However, there are
four significant issues inherent in relying solely on the judicial system to
ensure that prisons supply inmates with proper food. First, the preliminary
injunction is an inadequate tool for ensuring that prisons cease potentially
unconstitutional conduct during the often lengthy litigation process.
Second, most inmates bring their claims without the assistance of an
42. Maynor, No. 5:01-cv-0851-UWC, at4.
43. Id. at 3 (noting the following: Morgan County Jail never served the inmates milk
while under Bartlett's control; the Morgan County Jail sometimes served chicken that
was not thoroughly cooked, "with a pinkish appearance and blood still showing;"
Morgan County Jail only served its inmates fruit three or four times per year; and
Morgan County Jail served meals that were "woefully insufficient to satisfy the normal
appetites of adult males").
44. Id. at 6.
45. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557-58 (2003)
(noting that inmates filed nearly 40,000 new federal lawsuits in 1995, which
constituted nineteen percent of the federal civil docket).
46. See generally, e.g., Adam Cohen, Can Food be Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, TIME, Apr. 2, 2012, http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/02/can-food-be-cruel-
and-unusual-punishment; Stephen Hudak, Florida Prisoner's Lawsuit Calls Soy Meals
'Cruel and Unusual' Punishment, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 2011, http://articles.
orlandosentinel.com/201 1-11-06/news/os-soy-prison-meals-201 11107_1 soy-foods-
soy-products-inmate-food; Bridget Thoreson, Inmate Files Lawsuit Alleging Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, JOURNAL TIMEs, Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.journaltimes.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/inmate-files-lawsuit-alleging-cruel-and-unusual
punishment/article 4d9b3 6d6-023b- 11 df-8554-001 cc4cOO2eO.html.
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attorney, diminishing the chances that a meritorious claim will succeed.
Third, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) has imposed even greater
statutory limitations on the use of the legal system as a remedial tool for
inmates. Fourth, courts have interpreted the Eighth Amendment in a
manner highly deferential to the government, facing inmates seeking to
challenge prison food practices as cruel and unusual punishment with
substantive as well as procedural obstacles to success. Consequently, sole
reliance on the court system to cure food related violations in prisons
ensures that many inmates are left with no legitimate method of recourse.
A. The Preliminary Injunction
The judicial system is unwieldy and inefficient, often leading to large
gaps in time between when a case is actually filed and the plaintiffs
ultimate day in court. For example, more than one-third of civil cases in
federal district court take more than one year to resolve and the longest
cases can take more than ten years to resolve.4 7 This would have the effect,
in the prison food context, of unjustly perpetuating potentially
unconstitutional conduct during this time period. Of course, the court
system has created a remedy for this problem, the preliminary injunction,
which allows a court to force or prevent a party from engaging in certain
conduct prior to hearing the merits of the case.48 The problem with forcing
inmates to rely heavily on preliminary injunctions to forcibly discontinue
potentially improper conduct regarding their food conditions is that, as one
would expect due to the extraordinary power they vest in the courts, the
standard for whether or not a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction
is "stringent."49 As such, it is possible that even when an inmate has a
meritorious claim the injustice will be perpetuated during the lag time
between filing the initial complaint and the ultimate decision on the merits
due to the strict standard that courts abide by when determining whether to
issue preliminary injunctions, coupled with the general disapproving
disposition that many court officials have regarding inmate pleadings.o
47. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING
IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 4 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%2OMaterials/Library/AALS,%2OCivil%2OCa
se%20Processing%20in%20the%2OFederal%2ODistrict%2OCourts.pdf.
48. Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & EcON. 573, 576 (2001).
49. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 9 (2008) (noting that a "preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never
awarded as of right").
50. Shon R. Hopwood, Slicing Through the Great Legal Gordian Knot: Ways to
Assist pro se Litigants in Their Quest for Justice, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1229
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Thus, despite the fact that courts intend preliminary injunctions to
"minimize the irreparable loss of rights" of a litigant, it would be a dubious
proposition to suggest that courts achieve this goal in regard to inmate
suits."
B. The Pro Se Problem
The second concern in solely relying on the court system to remedy
inmate food claims is that inmates generally do not have the financial
ability to hire counsel to assist them in filing their claims.5 2 Accordingly,
the U.S. government estimates that inmates file approximately two-thirds
of all pro se cases in the United States. Our legal system has significant
barriers to entry for practitioners due to its vastness and complexity and the
requisite competency often required to construct a valid and persuasive
legal argument.54 One should not be surprised then that one pro se litigant
in a federal prison commented that acting as his own advocate without any
formal legal education was like "trying to unravel the law without knowing
where the ends of the knot began." 5 The same former inmate turned law
student posits that court clerks often delay pro se complaints due to a
general contemptuous disposition toward these generally poorly drafted
documents.56
Additionally, pro se inmate litigants face other barriers to success
beyond that which non-incarcerated pro se litigants face. For example,
many prison inmates do not have access to the Internet and none have
access to valuable legal resources freely available to the non-incarcerated.57
As a consequence, prison inmates pursuing litigation pro se must often rely
(2011); Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1594 (explaining that over 80% of inmate
litigation is determined pretrial in favor of the government and less than 15% of inmate
litigation is ultimately successful).
51. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARv. L. REV.
525, 541 (1978).
52. Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1609 (noting that over 95% of inmate civil rights
cases in 2000 were filed without the assistance of counsel).
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (9th ed. 2009) (defining pro se as "one who
represents oneself in a court proceeding without assistance of a lawyer); United States
Courts, IN-DEPTH: Leveling the Playing Field: Help for Self-Filers, THE THIRD
BRANCH, July 2011, http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/1 1-07-01/IN-
DEPTH Levelingthe Playing_ Field Help for Self-Filers.aspx.
54. Reed Olsen, Dean Lueck & Michael Ransom, Why Do States Regulate
Admission to the Bar - Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 253, 261-63 (1991).
55. Hopwood, supra note 50, at 1229.
56. Id. at 1230.
57. United States Courts, supra note 53.
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exclusively on the courts to mail them paper versions of documents.
Beyond this, at least one legal scholar has substantiated his claim that
judges may not be fully sensitive to actions filed by pro se inmate litigants
and that these preconceived notions may manifest as "inclination [s] to
resolve ambiguities in pleadings against" pro se inmate litigants.59 This
predisposition of some judges against pro se inmate claims may partially
explain why judges dismiss such an abundance of inmate claims prior to
trial.60
C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
If the barriers to the judicial system by prison inmates were not high
enough previously, Congress passed the PLRA in 1996 in order to combat
the notion that inmates were overly litigious and frequently clogged the
court system with frivolous claims.6 ' The PLRA has four primary
provisions that exacerbate the problem of barriers of entry to the judicial
system for inmates.62 First, the statue imposes financial obligations in the
form of filing fees to inmates seeking to instigate litigation, even inmates
classified as in forma pauperis.6 3 By definition, one classified as informa
pauperis is indigent to the point that she is permitted to disregard filing
fees. Consequently, this obstacle is necessarily a difficult, if not
impossible, hurdle for many hopeful inmate litigants to overcome.M While
it is clear that this provision will cause a potential litigant to reconsider
prior to filing a claim with little or no merit and may well serve the purpose
of filtering out a great deal of meritless lawsuits, it is over-inclusive in that
it potentially filters out many meritorious inmate suits as well.
Second, the PLRA imposes a requirement that an inmate seeking a
claim for damages must make a prior showing of physical injury.65 While
many of the claims relevant to this analysis would be injunctive in nature
and would thus seem to fall outside of the purview of this provision, some
58. Id.
59. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 545 (1982).
60. Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1572 (noting that approximately 19% of inmate
claims are dismissed as frivolous).
61. James E. Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates as "Outsiders"
and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 187-88
(2001).
62. Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Litigation Reform Act Raises the Bar, 16 CRIM.
JUST. 10, 11 (2002).
63. Id.
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (9th ed. 2009).
65. Alexander, supra note 62, at 13.
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courts have nonetheless concluded that a claim for a violation of one's
constitutional rights is intrinsically a claim to redress mental or emotional
injury. In these courts, an inmate seeking to bring litigation claiming a
violation of her Eighth Amendment freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment, as is typically the case, would have the added burden of
proving physical injury prior to being admitted to court.67
Third, when an inmate seeks injunctive relief, the PLRA requires that
the petition for relief must be "narrowly drawn, extend[ing] no further than
necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and that the relief is the
least intrusive means necessary." 68 While such a pleading standard may
not pose an issue for an experienced attorney, as mentioned previously,
inmates bring a vast majority of these cases pro se.6 9 Consequently, the
likelihood that an inmate untrained in the nuances of the law will violate
this standard is elevated significantly.
Finally, the PLRA mandates that prisoners may not file suit regarding
prison conditions until exhausting all possible administrative remedies.70
This requirement may be particularly onerous for three reasons. First, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the exhaustion of all possible administrative
remedies is a mandatory requirement, and thus district court judges have no
discretion to waive this requirement even when equitable concerns may
demand it.7 1 Second, nine circuits have held that the district court judge
must dismiss the prisoner's suit if she has not exhausted all of her
administrative remedies prior to filing the suit, even where she exhausts all
possible administrative remedies during the course of the lawsuit. 72
Finally, the pro se status of most inmate litigants makes it unlikely that the
litigant will be aware of every administrative remedy available.
Legislators claim that they intended the PLRA merely to sift out
frivolous inmate claims and permit meritorious ones to proceed to court,
and the legitimacy of that purpose cannot be doubted due to the clear
governmental interest in judicial efficiency. However, despite its
intentions, the PLRA simply "shut[s] the courthouse doors to many
inmates" regardless of the validity of their claims.73 This can be
demonstrated by the fact that judges frequently rely on the PLRA directly
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1609.
70. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996).
71. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (2001).
72. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).
73. Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1562.
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in dismissing inmate claims.74 Legal scholars, judges, and legislators alike
have lamented this fact and members of each of these groups have joined to
call for amendment of the PLRA for these very reasons.75
D. The "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" Standard of the Eighth
Amendment
While hopeful inmate litigants face the significant aforementioned
procedural hurdles, they also face a difficult substantive obstacle in the
event that they do ultimately reach trial. As mentioned previously, an
inmate seeking to challenge the nature of the rations provided to him would
find her only recourse in the Eighth Amendment, in the form of a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court has offered no
static test in determining whether a particular punishment violates the
Eighth Amendment.76 Instead, the constitutionality of a particular prison
condition hinges on "evolving standards of decency," commensurate with
contemporary understanding of what constitutes acceptable punishment. 77
One might reasonably anticipate that such a subjective standard affords the
inmate litigant a greater chance at success due to the flexibility to make a
number of varied arguments, but Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has not
comported with this idea. Instead, the Court tends to be highly deferential
to the government in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, often relying on
state counting to determine a national consensus of acceptability in regard
to punishment, thus often subverting the need for independent Supreme
Court review.78
Beyond this deference, the Court further decreased the likelihood of
success of an inmate's food-based Eighth Amendment claim when it
announced that the "Eighth Amendment outlaws cruel and unusual
'punishments,' not 'conditions,' and the failure to alleviate a significant
risk that an official should have perceived but did not ... cannot be
74. See, e.g., Flowers v. Ahern, 650 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991-92 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
Kasiem v. Switz, 756 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Page v. Kirby, 314 F.
Supp. 2d 619, 620 (N.D.W.V. 2004).
75. Andrew W. Amend, Giving Precise Content to the Eighth Amendment: An
Assessment of the Remedial Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 143, 170 (2008).
76. Betsy M. Santini, Curtailment of Prisoners'Ability to Protect Their Right to be
Free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Post- Wilson Circuit Survey of Prison
Conditions Cases, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 423 (1993).
77. Id.
78. Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment,
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 17
(2010).
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condemned as the infliction of punishment." 79 In so holding, the Court
refused the notion that all state-created prison conditions should
presumptively be regarded as punishment for Eighth Amendment
purposes.80 Rather, an inmate litigant seeking to base her claim on prison
conditions must make two showings.8' First, she must show that she
suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation. 82  Second, the Eighth
Amendment contains an intent requirement mandating that, at minimum,
the prisoner must establish that a prison official demonstrated a subjective
"deliberate indifference" towards the prisoners' needs; mere negligence
will never suffice.83 As such, inmate litigants utilizing the Eighth
Amendment have a cross to bear in proving prison officials' subjective
awareness, particularly in regard to macro-level failures, due to their lack
of resources as incarcerated, often pro se, litigants. 84
This high Eighth Amendment standard thus serves as a final barrier to
an inmate's food-related litigation should she successfully navigate through
the aforementioned procedural difficulties.85 Where then are prisoners left
to turn to seek a remedy in the face of such limitations? The
implementation of a federal standardization of prison food law, complete
with the authorization to regulate and discipline offending institutions is the
only viable solution to ensure that the rights of our nation's incarcerated are
not routinely violated in the context of food related impropriety.
79. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
80. Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 890 (2009).
81. Id. at 889-90.
82. Id.
83. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301 (1991).
84. Dolovich, supra note 80, at 948.
85. See e.g., Stanley v. Page, 44 Fed.App'x 13 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal
of inmates' class action suit alleging that they received diminished food portions, were
denied utensils for meals, were served scrambled eggs with a greenish tint, and were
served ice cubes containing roaches; these conditions constituted "temporary
inconveniences" and not "extreme deprivations cognizable under the Eighth
Amendment"); Islam v. Jackson, 782 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Va. 1992) (dismissing
inmate's suit where he alleged that he and other inmates were served maggot infested
meat for one meal and were served food for thirteen subsequent days prepared in
unsanitary conditions, including being prepared without gloves and by individuals
without certifications or medical examinations to work with food); Tucker v. Rose, 955
F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (granting summary judgment in favor of state regarding
prisoner's allegations that the prison served food tainted by rodents because the
incidents were not frequent enough to constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation and
there was no evidence that food service managers were aware of the problem at the
time the allegedly tainted food was served).
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IV. PUBLIC SCHOOL REGULATION AS A MODEL FOR PRISONS
Section IV begins by analyzing the constitutionality of the
promulgation of federal regulations to govern state prisons. It then uses the
federal regulation of food in the public school system as a paradigm for the
federal regulation of food in the prison food context. Finally, this section
focuses on the adjustments that legislators must make in order to ensure
that these regulations function properly, taking into consideration the
difference in context between public schools and prisons. This article
assumes that this agency would promulgate standards for prison food that
would promote the good health and nutrition of inmates, as it is beyond the
scope of the article to prescribe the specific nutritional standards that would
be necessary to achieve these goals. Further, as the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (the Department) is already responsible for carrying out the
federal regulation of public school food, the proposition offered in this
article would not require the costly creation of an additional federal
agency.86 Rather, Congress could simply and logically expand the purview
of the Department to include the dominion of prison food regulation.
A. Constitutional Authority
Perhaps the most useful method of ensuring compliance with federal
prison food regulations on a local scale is one used in the context of the
public school system routinely in order to further the congressional agenda
- federal grants." While the notion of federalism traditionally leaves
education regulation to the states as a function of their general police
powers, the federal government nonetheless has a hand in forming
regulatory schemes for public schools. It accomplishes these goals through
its spending power, both providing federal grants with strings attached and
withholding federal funds in order to incentivize states to participate in its
regulatory programs." Despite the fact that Congress' ability to influence
state regulatory schemes through its spending power does indeed have
limits when taken to the extreme, Congress has "virtually unfettered
discretion to spend federal monies on projects it deems worthwhile and,
86. Clint G. Salisbury, Make an Investment in Our School Children: Increase the
Nutritional Value of School Lunch Programs, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 331, 334
(2004).
87. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K-12 EDUCATION FUNDING, http://
www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed /10facts/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
88. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
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moreover, to condition such spending as it thinks best."89 Accordingly, our
courts have interpreted the Constitution to authorize Congress to spend in
the form of grants to the states and to create federal agencies in order to
pursue its regulatory goals. 90 As such, Congress would have the ability
under the authority granted to it by the Spending Clause to effectuate the
regulation of food standards in state prison systems.
B. The National School Lunch Program and the Healthy, Hunger-
Free Kids Act of 2010
A set of regulations recently promulgated by the Department
concerning minimum required standards for nutrition in public school
systems that participate in the National School Lunch Program (the
Program), coupled with the more recent Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of
2010 (the Act) illustrates the type of comprehensive and pervasive
influence that the federal government exercises over the public school
system and could exercise over state prison systems.91 This section
specifically evaluates four critical components of the Act and its
corresponding regulations. First, as the backbone of the regulatory scheme,
they impose a set of nutritional standards upon participating schools
intended to promote proper nutrition among our nation's youth. Second,
they require substantial training and certification of food service personnel
in participating schools in order to maintain those nutritional standards.
Third, they include a periodic review process to ensure compliance with
89. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2603-04 (2012) (holding
that Congress' spending power is invalid when it amounts to a "gun to the head" of the
states); Ronald J. Kortosyzski, Jr., Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" But
Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11, 16
(1998).
90. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2601 (noting that the Supreme Court has "long recognized
that Congress may use [its spending power] to grant federal funds to the States, and
may condition such a grant upon the States' 'taking certain actions that Congress could
not require them to take') (quoting College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)).
91. Melissa D. Mortazavi, Are Food Subsidies Making Our Kids Fat - Tensions
Between the Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act and the Farm Bill, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1699, 1713-14 (2011) (stating that Congress incentivizes states to participate in
the Healthy, Hunger Free Kids Act of 2010 by increasing the federal reimbursement
rate for free lunches by six cents per meal to $2.74); ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, http://www.ers.usda.gov
/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/chi ld-nutrition-programs/national-school-lunch-
program.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (explaining that the National School Lunch
Program provided meals to over 31 million public school students per day in 2012).
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their provisions. Finally, they allow the federal government to levy fines
against states that violate their requirements for deterrent effect.
1. Nutritional Standards
The Act, which was crafted with the input of nutritionists and
dietitians in accordance with the 2010 Dietary Guidelines, explicitly states
the types of food groups and quantities of those food groups that schools
must make available at each meal in order to ensure healthy meals for
schoolchildren.92 For example, not only does the Act require participating
schools to provide vegetables as a component of each school lunch, it also
mandates that schools provide each of a number of various types of
vegetables throughout the week.93 Beyond that, the Act's standards ensure
that students receive a wide variety of vitamins and minerals, necessary to
promote a diversified and healthy diet.9 4 In addition, the federal nutrition
standards for public schools take into consideration that not all students and
age cohorts have the same nutritional demands and requirements and thus
vary the quantity required of particular food groups dependent upon the
student's age and grade level. 95 This is consistent with the fundamental
notion that all people, particularly within varying age groups, do not have
uniform caloric intake and nutritional requirements.96
2. Training and Certification
Additionally, the Act requires a system of training and certification to
ensure that food service personnel are familiar and compliant with the
included nutritional standards. 97 First, the Act mandates annual training
and certification of food service personnel in order to ensure program
compliance and integrity as well as requiring a showing of competence in
regard to the principles they learn in the training sessions. 98  The
Department determines the standards of these training and certification
92. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088, 4088 (Jan. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R pts. 210
and 220).
93. Id. at 4091.
94. Id. at 4094.
95. Id. at 4098.
96. R.A. McCance and E.M. Widdowson, Food Requirements and Food Intakes, 2
BRIT. MED. J. 311, 311 (1937).
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programs. 99 Further, the Act prescribes that each annual training session
must contain training modules on nutrition, health and food safety
standards and methodologies, and "any other appropriate topics, as
determined by the Secretary."100 The corresponding federal regulation also
permits the use of training as a corrective action when a particular school
violates the requisite standards.' 0 ' Because nutritional researchers
frequently uncover new and compelling data, these annual training sessions
are essential in ensuring that the standards and procedures of the Act do not
become obsolete or ineffective.102 The final section allows discretion and
flexibility on the part of the Department to tailor the training session to the
individual needs of the locality, as nutritional issues requiring remedial
attention may vary from state to state, and even city to city. 103
3. Review Processes
While training and certification are critical to the effectiveness of
public school food regulation, any rule is only as good as its enforcement
mechanism. The federal government imposes a number of review and
enforcement mechanisms to ensure public schools' compliance with its
nutritional standards.104 First, the federal government enlists state agencies
to conduct administrative reviews, ensuring that they review each school
for compliance at least once during every five year review cycle, but in no
circumstances shall a school avoid review for longer than six consecutive
years.' Much of the review process is concerned with ensuring that
schools spend federal funds pursuant to the regulations and also to ensure
that schools do not claim more funds than needed to operate the Program,
in an attempt to defraud the federal government.106
However, a significant portion of the review process is also focused
on ensuring that participating schools adhere to the nutritional standards
99. Id
100. Id.
101. 7 C.F.R. § 210.18 (2012).
102. CAROLE DAVIS & ETTA SALTOS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Dietary
Recommendations and How They Have Changed Over Time in AMERICA'S EATING
HABITS: CHANGES AND CONSEQUENCES 33-50 (1999) (describing how prevailing
notions of what constitutes prudent nutrition have evolved over time as new nutritional
research becomes available).
103. Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-296 § 306, 124 Stat.
3183, 3243 (2010).
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promulgated by these regulations. 10 7 For example, the Act instructs the
reviewing agency to "[c]onduct a weighted nutrient analysis of the
meals .. . to determine whether the meals offered meet the calorie, sodium,
and saturated fat requirements" stated previously in the regulations.'0o In
addition, the reviewing agency is responsible for reviewing "nutrition
labeling or manufacturer specifications for products or ingredients used to
prepare school meals to verify they contain zero grams . . . of trans fat per
serving."' 09 As such, the Act charges the reviewing agency with ensuring
schools' compliance with a strict set of criteria in order to make an
assessment as to whether or not each school abides satisfactorily by the
terms of the regulations."o
4. Penalties
However, it is not enough simply to charge an agency with the
responsibility of identifying violations; the proposed act must impose a
system of penalties in order to deter prisons from violating of the
regulations."' According to the current system of regulations for public
schools, a school that has violated any provision of the Program is not
immediately penalized for its transgression, but rather then becomes
subject to a follow-up review.1 12 During the interim between the violation
and the follow-up review the regulations provide the school with an
opportunity to rectify its violation.l13 However, if upon follow-up review
the school has still not cured the issue, a number of remedial procedures are
possible.114 These remedial procedures include requiring the school food
authority to resolve the problems complete with documentation of the
corrective action taken, the taking of corrective fiscal actions, and the
withholding of payments under the program.'
Further, and perhaps most persuasively to the participating schools,
the Act imposes a system of fines to be assessed to the school upon a
determination that the school either failed to correct a severe





111. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 237 (2000).
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which the school food authority or school had been informed, or failed to
correct repeated violations of program requirements.1 6 Arguably more
importantly, the Act also prescribes the amount of the fines that reviewing
agencies can accord to the states, capping the fine at a maximum of ten
percent of the funds made available to the state under the program.117
C. Comparing Public Schools to Prisons
Upon first glance, one might reasonably reject the notion that these
two institutions with such seemingly diametrically opposed goals, public
schools and prisons, could be so related so as to justify the implementation
of similar regulatory schemes. However when one considers the facts more
closely, that they are both largely state funded and operated, they both
demand highly controlled and supervised environments, and they both
subject their primarily involuntary inhabitants to rigid routines, the
comparison seems far less attenuated.' 18  Beyond this, due to the high
operating costs of both establishments and their substantial impact on the
general welfare, governments have limited viable alternatives to both
schools and prisons."' 9 In fact, the need for pervasive regulation in the
prison food system exceeds that of the public school system since, unlike
schoolchildren, inmates do not have the option of providing their own food.
As such, one may fairly conclude that Congress can and should expect a
similar regulatory scheme that is effective to control food quality in our
public schools to serve as an archetype that may be applied with efficacy to
the prison setting.
D. Necessary Alterations for the Prison Context
Of course, Congress cannot simply apply the preexisting regulatory
scheme in public schools to the prison context identically. This section
identifies and analyzes the necessary alterations that Congress would have
to make to the public school food paradigm in order to ensure effectiveness
in the prison food system. Further, this section examines the monetary
116. Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-296 § 303, 124 Stat.
3183 (2010).
117. Id.
118. Wayne K. Hoy, Organizational Socialization: The Student Teacher and Pupil
Control ideology, 61 J. EDUC. RES. 153, 153-54 (1967).
119. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, WHY WE STILL NEED PUBLIC SCHOOLS - PUBLIC
EDUCATION FOR THE COMMON GOOD 7-13 (2007), available at http://www.cep-
dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentlD=291 (follow "Full Report" hyperlink);
Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 340-41 (2001).
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feasibility of implementing such a regulatory scheme and of making the
necessary alterations to tailor them to the prison context. In doing so, this
section mirrors section IV.B in focusing on nutritional standards, training
and certification, review processes, and penalties.
1. Nutritional Standards
Congress could not directly translate the nutritional standards of the
Act and the Program to the prison context due to the obvious distinction
between the variation in nutritional requirements between children and
adults, and an amended version of these standards would certainly have its
place in the prison system. If the Act recognizes the necessity to
accommodate differences in standards among age groups in the public
school setting, which only vary from five to eighteen, it only follows that
prison food regulations would need to make the same, and perhaps even
more regimented, distinctions in a system feeds inhabitants comprising a
far wider gap in age.120 While making the necessary adjustments to the
current public school regulation in this regard to make it viable for prison
inmates would incur some cost through hiring registered dietitians to tailor
food group requirements to various adult age cohorts, the cost would be
negligible when compared to the health benefits generated. 12 1 Further, it is
possible that much of these costs could be offset by a reduction in prison
health care costs, as the inverse correlation between good nutrition and
health care costs is well documented, particularly in regard to reducing the
average length of stay of patients.122
2. Training and Certification
The implementation of a training and certification program similar to
the Act would be essential to the success of the program in a prison setting.
Taking into consideration the fact that Congress has yet to place federal
standards in the prison food system despite the obvious and empirical need
for them, it would be far too easy for them to effectuate a system of
standards and guidelines and then neglect it for years at a time, allowing
120. See generally A. Stewart Truswell, Adults Young and Old, 291 BRIT. MED. J.
466 (1985) (standing for the general proposition that nutritional requirements for adults
change as they age).
121. D.C. Hemingway, Good Nutrition Lowers Health Care Costs, 7 J.
ORTHOMOLECULAR MED. 67, 68 (1992) (stating that patients showing signs of
nutritional deficiency have ninety-eight percent longer average lengths of stay in
hospitals than those patients displaying no such signs).
122. Id.
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the provisions therein to become obsolete. Certainly, one might expect that
the propensity for this to happen in a prison context would be substantially
greater than in a school setting since schoolchildren have the benefit of the
political lobbying power of their parents to ensure that their interests are
represented. 12 3  Inmates generally do not have the benefit of the same
political protection; in fact, powerful interest groups routinely lobby for
interests diametrically opposed to those of the incarcerated.12 4
Consequently, this proposed act would require stricter training and
certification standards than those currently in place in public schools.
Otherwise, the risk of ignoring advances in nutritional science and the
general degradation of food service officials' knowledge base would be far
too great.125
3. Review Processes
While the review process is certainly an essential element of any
regulatory scheme, the prison food system would require no substantial
departures from the preexisting public school regulatory system in regard
to review in order to be effective. A schedule requiring review at least
once during every five year period allows for enough deterrence in
oversight without imposing the significant costs that would accompany
more frequent review.126 It is important that review must occur at least
once per five year review cycle, allowing for the possibility of more
frequent review.
One may argue that such an infrequent review process coupled with
prior notice of an impending review increases the possibility that a prison
may engage in detection avoidance and conceal its violations during the
123. See, e.g., Andrea Eger, Tulsa-area Parent Group Lobbying for Graduation
Requirement Changes; Good Students Could be Denied Diplomas, TULSA WORLD,
Mar. 2, 2012, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/education/tulsa-area-parent-group-
lobbying-for-graduation-requirement-changes-good/article cl e7b7d9-4a40-50f1 -935a-
255e720aa66d.html; Steve Stoler, Parents Lobby for Downtown Dallas School Zone,
WFAA, Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.wfaa.com/news/education /Parents-lobby-for-
downtown-Dallas-school-zone-i 69384946.html.
124. Harvey Silvergate & Kyle Smeallie, Freedom Watch: Jailhouse Bloc, THE
PHOENIX, Dec. 9, 2008, http://thephoenix.com/Boston/News/73092-Freedom-watch-
Jailhouse-bloc/?page=3#TOPCONTENT (explaining that the Corrections Corporation
of America, the country's largest private prison provider, spent more than $2.7 million
in the period between 2006 and September of 2008 lobbying for stricter laws in order
to keep their prisons occupied).
125. See supra p. 19.
126. See supra pp. 21-22.
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review period.12 7 However, this ignores the inherent cost associated with
detection avoidance.128 From a prison's perspective "there is little
difference between a dollar of sanction . .. and a dollar spent avoiding that
sanction."1 29 Consequently, it would be financially illogical for prisons to
expend significant resources to avoid detection despite the fact that review
occurs fairly infrequently. As such, the proposed prison regulatory scheme
could adopt the review processes currently in use for the public school
system with no significant substantive change, contributing further to the
cost-effectiveness of implementation.
4. Penalties
A significant divergence from the public school model in regard to
penalties would be in order for this regulatory scheme to work effectively
in a prison context. 3 0 The maximum fine of ten percent of all funding
received for violations currently imposed by the Act, while certainly a
tremendous amount of money when dealing with a program of this
magnitude, may be inadequate to effectively deter prisons from violating
the provisions of such regulations.' 3 1 This is due to the idea that if fines are
not set at a sufficiently high level, a rationally thinking, profit motivated
entity, even a state government, may be willing to continue its current
prison food scheme, even under the threat of sanction, because of the
uncertainty that a reviewing agency will actually discover its violations and
the vast sums of money that it could save by continuing to cut corners.132
This notion mirrors the fundamental yet poignant law and economics
idea that "a particular damage measure provides a particular degree of
incentive to perform, and in general, it is evident that the higher is the
127. 7 C.F.R. § 210.18 (2012).
128. Chris Williams Sanchricho, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1361
(2006).
129. Id.
130. Mortazavi, supra note 91, at 1732 (noting that there is even evidence that the
current enforcement mechanisms in the public school context are ineffective,
suggesting that penalties in the prison context may need to substantially increased in
order to ensure efficacy).
131. Donald C. Klawiter, After the Deluge: The Powerful Effect of Substantial
Criminal Fines, Imprisonment, and Other Penalties in the Age of International Cartel
Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. R. 745, 757 (2001) (noting that "it appears certain"
that blockbuster fines in the area of antitrust violations are substantially more effective
than the previous, more limited fines).
132. Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 880 (2012)
(concluding that the probability of detection and the harm from the violation should lie
at the center of an agency's calculation of penalties).
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damage measure, the greater incentive to perform."l 3 3 In effect, the amount
of money that a state could save through continuing to cut corners coupled
with an accounting for the uncertainty of enforcement may lead to a
scenario where the perceived savings through non-compliance exceeds the
highest currently available monetary penalty.134 Accordingly, the penalties
currently utilized for federal programs involving public school food would
likely be insufficient to serve the purpose of deterrence in a prison setting.
The implementation of a severe fine for infractions may also have the
added benefit of encouraging self-reporting, mitigating some enforcement
costs and contributing to the overall cost-effectiveness of the program. 35
This makes more severe fines a preferable alternative to more frequent
review. Prescribing an exact figure of what a sufficient penalty should look
like without complete information and data would prove to be a nearly
impossible task. However, the proposed act should set the optimal fine at
some figure beyond the total cost that a state can save through non-
compliance, adjusting for the chance of enforcement, a function of the total
resources devoted to enforcing the scheme.' 36
As such, while the Act and the Program serve as a foundation for the
implementation of a regulatory scheme for food in the prison context,
legislators would have to impose some significant modifications in order to
ensure an effective regulatory scheme in the prison context. First, the
differences in physiology and nutritional requirements between children
and adults demand more finely tailored nutritional standards. Second,
more frequent training and certification sessions will ensure that nutritional
standards do not become quickly outdated. Finally, a proper prison food
regulatory scheme would require harsher monetary penalties in order to
ensure compliance. While these modifications would incur some cost, the
overall regulatory scheme would be cost-effective, particularly when one
considers potential savings in regard to health care costs for inmates.
133. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 305 (2004).
134. Id. at 306.
135. Klawiter, supra note 131, at 762 (noting that when criminal fines are high
enough in the context of antitrust violations, companies are eager to self report if this
means a reduced penalty).
136. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON.169 (1968) (making the case that actual penalties should be set at a
level substantially beyond the amount of harm done through noncompliance. If set
appropriately, the same level of deterrence could still be achieved in this way, while
saving a substantial amount of social resources through reduced enforcement
expenditures).
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V. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
It seems clear that the implementation of nationwide, federal
standards for prison food is not only a feasible goal, but may even be
socially and economically beneficial in many ways. However, several
obstacles stand in the way of imposing a food based federal regulatory
scheme in state prisons. This section reviews these obstacles and suggests
ways in which each might be ameliorated. First, widespread
disenfranchisement of felons leaves politicians with little incentive to
concern themselves with inmates' needs and desires. Second, the
popularization of "tough on crime" policies gives non-felon political
constituents little motivation to pressure their legislators into passing laws
intended to benefit the incarcerated. Finally, deep-seated notions of
federalism dictate that state governments, not Congress, should be
responsible for prison related policies.
A. Felon Disenfranchisement and Socioeconomic Trends in Voting
Patterns
It is a cornerstone of any democracy that the right to vote of all
citizens is essential.137 Alexis de Tocqueville echoed this sentiment when
he wrote that "[w]hen a nation begins to modify the elective qualification,
it may easily be foreseen sooner or later, that qualification will be entirely
abolished."' 3 8 Despite this, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the right of
states to disenfranchise felons, contending that, "the exclusion of felons
from the vote has an affirmative sanction in the Fourteenth Amendment."' 39
Consequently, state legislatures have rescinded the right to vote of nearly
six million Americans nationwide.140  While some states have no
restrictions or limited restrictions on felons' right to vote, other states have
particularly onerous policies.141 For example, in Florida, over 10% of the
137. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (stating that "[n]o right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make
the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live").
138. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 71 (Henry Reeve trans., vol.
1, 1898).
139. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality
of the disenfranchisement of felons).
140. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & JEFF MANZA, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2010 1 (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
fd State Level Estimates of Felon Disen 2010.pdf.
141. Id. at 6.
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adult voting age population lacks the ability to cast a vote at the ballot box
due to its stringent disenfranchisement laws. 14 2
Beyond felon disenfranchisement, those individuals that are likely to
vote to protect inmates' interests, namely their family members, are those
individuals that traditionally are underrepresented in the political process; a
byproduct of inherent racial and socioeconomic disparities in the prison
population. For example, African Americans represent only approximately
12% of the United States population, but 40% of the total prison
population; a product of incarceration at a rate of 5.6 times that of their
white counterparts.14 3 Hispanics, as well, are incarcerated at a rate of 1.8
times that of whites.144 Additionally, data show that enfranchised African
Americans and Hispanics generally vote at a substantially lower rate than
do whites.145
As a consequence of felon disenfranchisement and socioeconomic
trends in the voting patterns of those voters likely to sympathize with the
interests of inmates, legislators have very little self-interest in passing laws
concerned with the improving prison conditions.146 As "legislative
elections are devices . . . for translating . .. citizen desires into legislative
action," where the electoral system bars a particular class of individuals
from participating in the election process, it is clear that legislative
responsiveness to that class will be diminished.14 7  Felon
disenfranchisement thus poses perhaps the most significant barrier to the
implementation of a federal regulatory scheme devoted to the
standardization of prison food.
In order to overcome this hurdle, interest groups such as the American
Civil Liberties Union must mobilize to advocate more ardently for
prisoners' political rights. Further, these interest groups must zealously
support the movement toward felon re-enfranchisement. The political
resources of powerful interest groups coupled with the general citizenry's
support of reinstating an inmate's right to vote after her release from
142. Id.
143. Brett E. Garland, Cassia Spohn & Eric J. Wodahl, Racial Disproportionality in
the American Prison Population: Using the Blumstein Method to Address the Critical
Race and Justice Issue of the 21st Century, 5 JUST. POL'Y J. 2, 4 (2008).
144. Id.
145. THOM FILE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE
VOTING RATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT
ELECTIONS) 3 (2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf.
146. Debra Parks, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 71, 100 (2003) (noting
that "[p]risoners are no politician's constituents").
147. Lyn Ragsdale, Responsiveness and Legislative Elections: Toward a
Comparative Study, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 339, 341 (1983).
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incarceration could make substantial inroads toward improving felon
participation in the political process.14 8  Increased public awareness of
prison food conditions may also engender increased political sympathy
from enfranchised Americans, forcing legislators to take action in regard to
prison food conditions. Finally, increased awareness on the part of
Democratic Party politicians that "felon disenfranchisement erodes the
Democratic voting base" may encourage those politicians to unite to
support the repudiation of felon disenfranchisement laws, thus increasing
the likelihood that the proposed federal prison food regulations may reach
fruition.149
B. "Tough on Crime" Political Landscape
The public and political disposition toward harsh penalties for those
who violate the law, often referred to as the "tough on crime" movement,
also poses a significant threat to the imposition of the proposed federal
prison food regulatory scheme. 5 0 The war on drugs, coupled with the
politicization of crime, has resulted in a political landscape in which
constituents extol the virtues of acute penalties on lawbreakers. 1' As a
result, American law enforcement policies have produced a retributive
system that incarcerates its citizens at a rate five to eight times that of most
other industrialized nations.15 2  Consequently, it may pose exceedingly
difficult to engender enough public support for a federal food regulatory
scheme to make the implementation of such a scheme feasible.
Falling crime rates since the inception of the war on crime have led
many to the reasonable conclusion that the war on crime caused this
decline. However, some have suggested that this may be a simple case
148. Shawn Macomber, Re-enfranchising Felons, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 2, 2005,
http://spectator.org/archives /2005/03/02/re-enfranchising-felons (noting that a July
2002 Harris poll found that 80% of Americans believe that all ex-felons who have
completed their sentences should be allowed to vote and that 60% of Americans
believe that felons finished with their sentence but on probation or parole likewise
should have the right to vote).
149. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REV.
777, 780 (2002) (explaining that "African Americans are overwhelmingly Democratic
Party voters" and thus felon disenfranchisement disproportionately affects Democratic
politicians, as opposed to Republican politicians).
150. See generally, K.L. Mclff, Getting Smart as Well as Tough on Crime, 11 UTAH
B. J.41 (1998).
151. Marc Mauer, Why are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 9, 13 (1999).
152. Id. at 9.
153. Id.
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of correlation and not causation. 15 4 For example, one staple of the war on
crime is the increase of mandatory sentences.'55  One legal scholar
determined that these mandatory sentences have produced "severe,
unevenly imposed sentences that have little effect on crime" instead of the
deterrent effect that legislators intended.15 6 Similarly, more affordable and
higher quality cocaine, heroin, and marijuana is available today than was
available prior to the war on drugs.'57 Increased public awareness of these
findings, that "tough on crime" policies may not produce the effects that
voters believe, may cause constituents to renounce their strict beliefs about
proper punishment for lawbreakers. Then, inducing voters to support a
regulatory scheme concerned with the rights and interests of inmates would
prove far less challenging.
C. Federalism and the States' Police Powers
Federalism, the traditional division of powers between state and
federal governments in America, also stands as a potential roadblock to the
implementation of a federal prison food regulatory scheme.' While the
dichotomy between states' power and federal power is often debated "the
Founders undeniably left [police powers] reposed in the States and denied
the central Government [the regulation of] the suppression of violent crime
and vindication of its victims." 59 Consequently, the Supreme Court has
seemed to have made an emphatic statement that states should maintain
dominion over general concerns over the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare of their citizens. As prison conditions would undeniably fall within
the purview of police powers, one is left reconsidering the constitutionality
of a federal prison food regulatory scheme.
However, the Court's statement in Morrison has proven less absolute
than it may otherwise appear, leaving open the door for federal regulation
of state penitentiaries. For example, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (the Act) requires that "[n]o government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in
154. Id.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Mitchell F. Crusto, The Supreme Court's New Federalism: An Anti-Rights
Agenda, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 517, 522 (2000) (defining federalism as "our system of
government, formed by a compact between and among the federal government and the
state governments, wherein the states have surrendered their individual sovereignty to a
central authority but retain limited residuary powers of government").
159. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).
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or confined to an institution," including those housed in state
penitentiaries.160 Despite the fact that this federal law clearly infringes on
the states' police powers to control the conditions of their own prisons, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Cutter v. Wilkinson.16 1
Consequently, while federalism and the reservation of police powers to the
states might appear at first glance to provide a substantial obstacle to a
federal prison food regulatory scheme, the Court has been inconsistent in
its holdings and the potential for such a scheme remains viable.
Felon disenfranchisement and socioeconomic trends in voting
patterns, the recent increase of "tough on crime" legislation, and basic ideas
of federalism all pose substantial threats to the feasibility of implementing
the proposed regulatory scheme. These obstacles are not insurmountable,
however. A number of solutions to these problems are available and their
adoption will pave the way for the federal regulation of state prison food.
VI. CONCLUSION
The prison food system is an anomaly in modern political America, as
it lacks many of the stringent regulations that have become ordinary in
virtually every facet of our lives. Section II surveyed how this under-
regulation has resulted in significant health related issues for inmates, as
both individual states and large corporate food contractors, such as
Aramark, routinely take advantage of the lack of accountability in prison
food provision for their own financial benefit. These health-related issues
range from simply providing inadequate amounts of food to providing
meals that lack the same nutritional standards that are provided in other
public settings, such as public schools. The issue is amplified in the prison
context based on the lack of alternatives that inmates have to rely on in the
face of insufficient provisions.
Section III then analyzed the adequacy of litigation as a remedial tool
for inmates the current to inmates to cure any perceived injustices they may
have endured pertaining to improper food service. Taking into
consideration the lengthy litigation process, the fact that many inmates
must proceed pro se due to their indigent status and a general underlying
perception that inmate claims are frivolous, it is clear that relying on
litigation as the sole corrective mechanism is a virtual assurance of the
perpetuation of these unjust food practices. Additionally, Congress
adopted the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996, which provided further
160. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I(a)
(2000).
161. See generally, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
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barriers to inmates seeking to utilize the court system. Finally, Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence serves as a substantive barrier to the hopeful
inmate litigant even if she navigates the aforementioned procedural
difficulties.
Since many states evidently will not take the initiative to solve the
issue independently and the litigation system alone is insufficient to solve
the problem, it is obvious that pervasive and stringent federal standards are
needed. Section IV proposed a federal regulatory scheme to standardize
prison food using preexisting federal regulations for public school food as a
paradigm. Some substantive and administrative alterations would have to
be incorporated to adjust for the change in demographic and setting, such
as more narrowly tailored, age-specific nutrition plans and increased
penalties for noncompliance. However, the general framework could
remain intact. Further, section IV explored the notion that such a policy
may actually be economically beneficial for states based on an expected
reduction in inmate health care costs.
Section V then analyzed a number of practical barriers to the
implementation of a federal prison food regulatory scheme in state prisons.
Felon disenfranchisement and socioeconomic trends in voting patterns
ensure that inmates' interests fall through the cracks of political discourse.
The recent proliferation of "tough on crime" legislation dissuades the
citizenry from championing the rights of inmates. Finally, traditional
notions of federalism may leave regulation of state prisons to the sole
authority of individual state governments. Section V then proposed a
number of solutions to each of these potential obstacles.
In conclusion, it seems an unfortunate political reality that the only
realistic solution to these problems is strict, interventionist legislation.
Otherwise, the pleas of this class of individuals with "no political
constituency" will continue to fall on deaf ears.16 2
162. Esteemed legal scholar Erwin Chemerisnky has been quoted as saying that
inmates, "get no protection from the political process. They have no political
constituency." Robertson, supra note 61, at 203.
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